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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation comprises three related but different essays on corporate 
governance issues. The essays are preceded by an overview of the major areas of corporate 
governance research. The first essay investigates whether the valuation discount of dual 
class firms reported in the literature can be explained by three channels through which 
private benefits can be extracted -excess compensation, excess cash and excess capital 
expenditure. With a propensity score matched sample of S&P 1500 dual class and single 
class companies, I provide evidence that excess compensation and excess cash holdings of 
dual class companies lead to a larger discount that investors apply to the value of dual versus 
single class companies. However, capital expenditure is not statistically significant in 
explaining the dual class discount. 
The second essay examines the impact of concentrated control under dual and single 
class share structure on dividend policy. Three potential dividend policy hypotheses -
extraction of private benefits, family legacy and managerial reputation - are proposed and 
tested. The results indicate that in the U.S. dual class firms pay less dividends and cash 
dividend and total distribution decrease as the divergence of voting and cash flow rights 
widens. This is consistent with the extraction of private benefits and the family legacy 
hypotheses. However, using excess CEO compensation to disentangle these two hypotheses, 
the payment of lower dividends in dual class firms is consistent with the extraction of 
private benefits hypothesis. 
The third essay investigates the impact of managerial and board entrenchment on 
dual class discount. Dual class ownership structure is arguably the most effective anti-
takeover mechanism as it allows controlling shareholders to maintain concentrated voting 
ii 
positions even if additional equity needs to be issued. Thus, management is insulated from 
hostile takeover and is able to become entrenched. Investors, knowing that dual class 
structure can result in entrenchment, will discount the value of dual class firms. I provide 
evidence that the larger the degree of entrenchment the larger the dual class discount. The 
results also show that anti-takeover defenses in dual class firms, such as classified boards, 
serve to entrench managers. 
Keywords: Dual Class Discount, Executive Compensation, Cash Holdings, Family 
Ownership and Control, Ownership Structure, Dividend Policy, Agency Theory, Private 
Benefits of Control, and Managerial Entrenchment 
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Chapter 1 
An Overview of Corporate Governance 
1.0.0 Conceptual Framework of Corporate Governance 
In recognition of the key role played by owners, directors and senior officers in the 
financial decisions of a company, corporate governance has grown to be an important 
subject area within finance. It is a field of research which is multifaceted as it involves 
issues related to the board of directors, executive compensation, ownership structures, 
market for corporate control, shareholder activism and regulations. 
There is no precise definition for corporate governance. The definition depends on 
the conceptual framework within which it is being examined. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
define corporate governance as the ways in which suppliers of capital to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investments. l The Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan 
define corporate governance is defined as a system by which companies are directed, 
controlled and evaluated. Hence, the primary responsibility for corporate governance lies 
mainly with the board of directors. In most definitions of corporate governance several 
common concepts tend to resonate, such as accountability, direction, control and evaluation. 
Solomon and Solomon (2004) distinguish between the narrow definition of 
corporate governance as corporate accountability to shareholders and a broader definition as 
a system of checks and balances, both internal and external, which ensure that companies 
1
 Denis (2001) defines corporate governance as the set of institutional and market mechanisms that induce self-
interested managers to maximize the value of the residual cash flows of the firm on behalf of its shareholders. 
1 
discharge their accountability to shareholders and act in a socially responsible way in all 
areas of their business activities. Thus, the breadth of the definition of corporate governance 
relates to whether the company should operate for the sole interest of the shareholders or 
whether it should safeguard the interest of those that are impacted by it (employees, 
customers, the public, government and other stakeholders). From the perspective of nearly 
all finance literature and from that of institutional investors, the narrow definition is 
preferred. It is the narrow one that will be applied to this dissertation. 
Although the term was not explicitly used before the 1960s, corporate governance 
issues have been around since the influential writings of Adam Smith. In the 1930s, Berle 
and Means (1932) and Dodd (1932), shed light on corporate governance by looking at the 
separation of ownership from control. The rise of professional managers and modern 
corporations (Chandler, 1962 and 1977) further exacerbate the separation of ownership and 
control. Coase (1937) argues that the presence of transaction costs leads to incomplete 
contracting between managers and shareholders. Since all possible eventualities cannot be 
contracted, managers must use their discretion when dealing with future eventualities. In this 
situation, managers can act in the interest of shareholders or in their own interest. Hence 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as board of directors, are required to ensure that 
managers act in the interest of shareholders. 
Agency problems arise from the separation of ownership and control as well as the 
limited liability of the modern corporation. As firms grow, the need for capital as well as 
professional managers to run these large corporations results in further separation of 
2
 For further discussion on the rise of professional manager as a dominant force in Modern Corporation, see the 
writings of Chandler (1962, 1977). 
3
 Transaction costs include: i) costs of thinking about all eventualities that can occur during contracting 
relationships, ii) negotiating costs and iii) costs of writing contracts which are enforceable by the courts (Hart, 
1995). 
2 
ownership and control and the accompanying agency costs. Managers (agents) do not 
always act in the best interest of the shareholders (principal). Agency costs arise because 
shareholders attempt to monitor managers, use incentives and contracts to align managers' 
and shareholders' interests (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). The potential conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders can arise from managers' resistance to being replaced 
by a more competent successor, difference in risk borne by shareholders and managers and 
diversion of "free cash flow" for the benefit of managers. 
Managers and shareholders may face different degrees of risk. This is particularly 
true when companies are not closely controlled. In such companies, shareholders normally 
have a diversified portfolio of stocks. In comparison, managers' face undiversified risk. 
Managers have large human capital tied up in the firm, and often a significant equity 
interest. Hence, managers are expected to be more conservative in their decision making 
since they have a great deal more at stake. Managers' conservative decision making may 
conflict with shareholders' goal of profit maximization. Therefore, managers may be 
unwilling to take on a project that is worthwhile from the shareholders' point of view 
because they have a lot to lose if the project fails (Denis, 2001). On the other hand, incentive 
based compensation such as stock options has the potential to induce unnecessary risk-
taking behavior by managers. With stock options, managers can benefit greatly from high 
risk projects that succeed while facing limited downside risk if the project fails. This is 
particularly true if executives have limited equity interest in the firm. Hence, incentive 
compensation schemes can serve to increase the alignment of interests between managers 
and shareholders or increase risk-taking by executives. 
3 
Jensen (1986) was the first to identify the agency costs of "free cash flow". He 
argued that managers could use "free cash flow" to pursue value-destroying projects rather 
than return the free cash flow to shareholders. Managers may mistakenly believe that the 
project is worthwhile or may wish to maximize assets under management (Denis, 2001). As 
assets under management increase, managers' gain power and prestige as well as increase 
compensation which is usually a function of the firm's size. Managers may also use free 
cash flow to undertake "pet" projects which are often value-destroying. Hence, by pursuing 
these projects, managers waste "free cash flow" rather than distributing it to shareholders. 
There are several potential solutions to agency problems which result from 
separation of ownership and control. These include: bonding by the managers, monitoring of 
the managers and incentives which align the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders.4 The effectiveness of these potential solutions is greatly debated in the 
corporate governance literature. In particular, monitoring and alignment of interests occurs 
through various corporate governance mechanisms that may help to alleviate agency 
problems. For example, legal and regulatory mechanisms as well as incentive based 
compensation can align the interests of managers and shareholders. The debate is ongoing 
and it is my hope that this dissertation will help to understand the critical role that ownership 
and voting control play in determining the value of the firm. 
4
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide a detailed discussion on how owner-managers can effectively bond 
themselves in order to reduce agency costs. 
4 
2.0 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
2.1.0 Laws and Regulations 
Legal and regulatory corporate governance mechanisms are the most basic external 
mechanisms that exist. Regulations and laws have received increasing attention from the 
press, researchers and practitioners. One such regulation in the U.S. involved disclosures of 
top level executives' compensation by the Securities and Exchange Commission. This has 
led to a growing literature that treats executive compensation as both a source and a 
potential solution to agency problems. Corporate failures in the U.S. such as Enron and 
WorldCom and the financial crisis in several countries around the world have led to an 
increasing call for legal and regulatory reforms and oversight. Regulations have been 
introduced in many countries to protect minority shareholders. This is especially true in 
countries where concentrated control is the dominant form of corporation. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) argue that in many large corporations around the world the fundamental 
agency problem is not the traditional agency problem (between managers and shareholders) 
but it is the conflict between outside investors and controlling shareholders. Hence, how best 
to protect minority shareholders is an important governance issue. 
2.2.0 Hostile Takeovers 
Hostile takeovers can be an effective external disciplinary mechanism when 
managers are inefficient at running the corporation. The bidding firm or corporate raider 
often takes control of the target firm and replaces "inefficient" managers with their own 
slate of new executives. In a hostile takeover, the bidder thinks that they can do a better job 
5 
than the current management and hence, improve efficiency and increase firm value. 
However, researchers are questioning the effectiveness of hostile takeovers as a corporate 
governance mechanism due to the sharp decline in takeover activities after 1989. The 
decline in hostile takeovers in the U.S. is due to managers lobbying for protection from the 
market for control and the demise of the junk bond market (Becht et al., 2003). Also, studies 
have shown that the overall gains (target and bidder) are not different from zero (Becht et 
al., 2003). This finding is contrary to the popular notion that hostile takeovers correct 
managerial inefficiency and enhance value. Often the target shareholders gain at the expense 
of the bidder's shareholders. Therefore, hostile takeovers can be ineffective due to the 
following: the free-rider problem, the raider may face competition from other bidders and 
incumbent management (Hart, 1995).5 
2.3.0 Blockholders and Institutional Investors 
Outside blockholders are a potential solution to agency problems that arise due to 
separation of ownership and control. With large equity interest, blockholders can monitor 
managers and influence their decisions by electing board members to act on their behalf. For 
example, Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) provide evidence that outside blockholders are more 
efficient in reducing managerial discretionary expenses while inside blockholders, especially 
managerial blockholders significantly increase the underinvestment problems.6 Several 
other studies provide evidence that institutional investors play an important monitoring role 
5
 Small shareholders who believe that their decisions are unlikely to affect the success of the bid have an 
incentive not to tender to the raider, since they may be able to obtain a pro-rata fraction of the capital gain by 
holding on to their shares (Hart, 1995) 
6
 Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) used Selling, General and Administrative expenses to proxy for managerial 
discretionary spending and Market-to-Book value as a proxy for underinvestment. 
6 
(Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Bushee, 1998; Wahal and McConnell, 2000; Brickely et al., 
1988; and Agrawal and Mandelker, 1992). 
In contrast, blockholders may not be effective monitors if they are able to sell the 
holdings in liquid secondary markets. It can be argued that the highly liquid nature of the 
U.S. secondary markets, along with regulations, make it difficult for large shareholders to 
monitor managers (Mayer, 1988 and Coffee, 1999). Evidence to support this argument is 
provided by Kahn and Winton (1998). In addition, Parrino et al., (2003) find that aggregate 
institutional ownership and the number of institutional investors decline in the year prior to 
forced CEO turnover. This implies that institutional investors prefer to sell their holdings 
rather than to monitor and remove poorly performing managers. Furthermore, large 
shareholders may use their voting power to improve their own position, agree to leave 
managers alone in exchange for having their share repurchased at a premium or they may 
take over management of the firm for themselves (Hart, 1995). For these reasons, the 
effectiveness of large shareholders as monitors is questionable. 
The literature on block ownership is surveyed by Holderness (2003). The evidence 
to date indicates that outside blockholders are not that uncommon. First, blockholders seek 
to increase value and enjoy private benefits of control not available to other shareholders. 
Second, there is some evidence that larger ownership by blockholders has a positive impact 
on a firm. For example, the presence of an external blockholder on the board increases the 
likelihood of a change in control. 
7 
2.4.0 Board of Directors 
As an internal governance mechanism, the board of directors performs four major 
functions. These include: hiring top management, compensating and evaluating the 
performance of top management; voting on major operating proposals (for example, large 
capital expenditures); voting on major financial decisions (for example, issuing dividends 
and share repurchases) and offering expert advice to management (Kim and Nofsinger, 
2004). Another critical role of directors, at least in theory, is the monitoring function of the 
board. Directors are expected to monitor managers and fulfill their fiduciary duty by 
ensuring that managers act in the interests of shareholders. However, the board of directors 
can often be a "rubber stamp" for CEOs. This is evident in some of the most infamous 
corporate failures such as Enron and WorldCom. Similarly, when CEOs control the 
nomination process and influence the choice of directors, the board of directors can be 
ineffective monitors because potential directors will be ones who are more likely to support 
the CEO (Becht et al, 2003). 
Furthermore, the size of the board has an impact on its effectiveness.7 Larger boards 
may have the breadth and expertise to deal effectively with issues confronting the business 
because the talent pool is deeper as boards become larger. However, it can be difficult to 
keep a larger number of people involved and working efficiently as a team (Colley et al, 
2005). With smaller boards, directors can become more focused and can collaborate more 
easily. Most of the recent regulations and exchange rules focus on board effectiveness and 
independence. 
7
 Board size may be a function of complexity of the firm's operations and the type of industry in which it 
operates. The typical board size ranges from 8 to 16 directors. 
8 
Rules and regulations, such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the NYSE and NASDAQ 
corporate governance guidelines, are aimed at improving independence and effectiveness of 
the board in the U.S. The Dey report (1994) in Canada and the Cadbury report (1992) in the 
U.K. contain similar recommendations. Findings on the effectiveness of independent 
directors are mixed. Several studies provide evidence of a negative relationship between the 
number of outside directors and company performance in the U.S. (Yermack, 1996; Klein, 
1998; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1998). On the other hand, other studies provide evidence that 
there is a positive relationship between outside directors and firm performance (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983 and Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). The conflicting result could be 
driven by the fact that directors who are considered as outside directors are not truly 
independent directors. For example at Disney, several of the outside directors have personal 
and related business ties to Michael Eisner, the CEO.8 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) survey the literature on the board of directors and 
highlight some of the common findings. First, smaller boards and boards with a greater 
proportion of outside directors result in management taking actions more in line with 
shareholders' interest. Second, smaller boards and boards with more "independent" directors 
are more likely to remove poorly performing managers. Third, CEO compensation packages 
are also more sensitive to performance in firms with smaller boards. Fourth, boards with a 
greater proportion of outside directors seem to make better acquisition related decisions. 
However, the bulk of the evidence indicates that the proportion of outside directors is not 
8
 According to Kim and Nofsinger (2004), Disney claims that 13 of the 16 directors are independent members 
of the board. However, of these "outside" directors, Reveta Bowers, is the headmaster of the school Eisner's 
children attended. Also, Leo O'Donovan is president of Georgetown University, which one of the Eisner 
children attended and which received donations from Eisner. Other "outside" directors such as Irwin Russell is 
Eisner's personal attorney and Robert Stern is an architect for several of Disney's projects. It is evident that 
these members are not true independent directors since they have ties to the CEO. 
9 
related to firm performance. In terms of firm characteristics and board of directors, larger 
firms, older firms and firms with small inside ownership stakes have more outside directors. 
Closely held firms have insider dominated boards (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
2.5.0 Executive Compensation 
Executive compensation in the U.S. and in most countries has increased dramatically 
over the past few decades. The primary reasons include: the bull market throughout most of 
the 1980s and 1990s, the increased use of stock options and ways in which compensation 
packages are determined according to market standards and benchmarking (Becht et al., 
2003). According to the agency theory, incentive based compensation should result in a net 
increase in shareholders' wealth. Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) provide evidence to the 
contrary. They find that Q-ratio falls as CEO's option holdings increase. However, evidence 
in favor of the agency theory comes from event studies by Larcker (1983), DeFusco et al., 
(1990), and Morgan and Poulsen (2001). 
Surveys of the executive compensation literature are provided by Murphy (1999) 
and Core et al., (2003). The major findings of the papers surveyed by these authors are as 
follows: (i) sensitivity of pay-performance has increased over time due to pay packages with 
more incentive based compensation which is predominantly option based compensation; (ii) 
the evidence on the relationship between managerial equity ownership and performance is 
mixed and (iii) stock options are the fastest growing component of CEO compensation. The 
authors argue that an increase in option based compensation is driven by several factors. 
First, options do not require cash outlay by the firm. Second, options and stocks are treated 
as deferred compensation providing tax advantages for both the firm and executives. These 
10 
findings have important implications for compensation packages which are being used as a 
corporate governance mechanism to align the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders. Murphy (1999) and Core et al., (2003) argue that we do not fully understand 
why stock options have become an increasingly important part of executive compensation 
packages. 
3.0 Brief history of the dual class market in the United States 
In the 1920s, firms in the U.S. began issuing two classes for common shares. This 
allowed one group of shareholders to control firms with a disproportionately large number 
of voting rights relative to equity (cash flow rights) ownership. In 1926, there were 183 
firms with a dual class share structure (Dewing, 1953).9 The New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) was concerned with the separation of voting and cash flow rights and therefore, 
prohibited the listing of non-voting securities in 1926. This prohibition remained in place 
until 1985. A few companies such as, Ford Motor Company were able to get around the 
NYSE prohibition by issuing a class with inferior voting rights rather than non-voting shares 
(Howell, 2009). On the other hand, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and National 
Association of Securities Dealer (NASD) did not prohibit the listing of firms with dual class 
share structure (Bayley, 1989).10 AMEX permitted companies to issue multiple classes of 
common stock but only listed designated classes. However, NASD imposed no limitation on 
the use of multiple classes of common shares (Bayley, 1989). 
9
 For a detailed history of dual class share structure in the U.S. see Howell (2009) 
10
 There were only 10 NYSE listed firms with dual class structure in 1985 compared to 60 firms (7% of listed 
firms) on AMEX and 110 firms (2.7%) with dual class structure on NASDAQ (Seligman, 1988). 
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Because of the trend in dual class capitalization, the NYSE felt increasing 
competitive pressure from AMEX and NASD to alter its prohibition on dual-class 
mechanisms (Bayley, 1989). Therefore, in September 1986, NYSE sought to suspend its 
enforcement of the one-share one-vote standard. However, the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) did not approve the NYSE proposed rule change but instead solicited 
public comments and held hearings in December, 1986 (Bayley, 1989). As a result, in 1988, 
the SEC formally adopted Rule 19c-4. Prior to rule 19c-4, companies commonly introduced 
dual class share structures through a recapitalization. However, the Rule 19c-4 prohibits the 
creation of dual class structure through recapitalization.11 Rule 19c-4 allows for the creation 
of dual class firms via initial public offerings and in 1988 and 2007, 6.7% and 7.2%> of 
publicly listed firms used dual class share structures (Howell, 2010). Listing of dual class 
firms in the U.S. has remained fairly constant. For example, in 2002, about 6% of all 
publicly traded firms in the U.S. (or 362 ) were dual class firms (Gompers, et al., 2010).12 
The following characteristics pertain to dual class firms in the U.S. Gompers et al. 
(2010) provide evidence that the typical voting structure for firms with two classes of 
common share is at a ratio of 10 to 1. In addition, 13% of dual class firms in the U.S. give 
the inferior voting class a higher dividend. Typically, the superior voting shares do not trade 
but are held by the controlling shareholders. In the U.S., 15% of dual class firms list both 
classes for shares. In addition, insiders of dual class firms own a majority of the voting 
rights (60%>) and a significant minority of the cash flow rights (40%). 
11
 Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) argue that there are few regulations for dual class firms in Canada relative to 
other countries. Apart from the coattails provisions, there are no other specific Ontario Securities Act 
restrictions and regulations for dual class firms. 
12
 Howell (2009) provides evidence that dual class firms' listing increased slightly from 6.7% in 1988 to 7.2% 
in 2007. In 2002, 9.97% of TSX-listed firms in Canada were dual class firms compared to 5.7% in 2007. 
12 
A survey by Rydqvist (1992) of the dual-class literature identifies several common 
characteristics among dual class firms. Most dual class firms are family-controlled firms 
(Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999 and Cronqvist and Nelisson, 2005) and hence, these firms 
are reluctant to undertake seasoned equity offerings. Worldwide, dual class firms are usually 
smaller and younger than single class firms (Rydqvist, 1992). However, dual class firms in 
the U.S. and Canada are usually larger and older (Smith, et al., 2009 and Gompers et al., 
2010). In addition, dual class firms are more highly leveraged and have a lower value than 
single class firms in both Canada and the U.S. (Smith, et al, 2009 and Gompers et al., 
2010). 
In the case where both classes of shares are trading, superior voting shares (SV) 
trade at a premium. The general argument for the price differential between superior and 
restricted voting shares is that voting premiums are related to potential takeover premiums 
(Levy, 1982; Horner, 1988; Megginson, 1990; and Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1995). Voting 
premiums are significantly reduced when firms are cross-listed in the U.S. (Doidge, 2004). 
Voting control has economic value and voting premiums will depend on the voting 
differential of the two classes of stocks and the properties of each class of shares in the 
firm's equity structure. (Levy, 1982) Voting rights in many countries are worth between 
10% and 20% of the value of common equity (Zingales, 1994). Zingales (1994) provides 
evidence that voting shares with inferior dividend rights trade at an average premium of 
82%) above nonvoting shares in Italy. He argues that, if there were no private benefits, there 
would be no reason to hold large blocks of shares in any company. Therefore, concentration 
itself is an indication of a large value of control. In a study of British firms, Megginson 
(1990) finds that superior voting (SV) shares trade at a premium (13.3%) relative to 
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restricted voting (RV) shares. Similarly, Lease et al., (1983) test whether control is valued 
by examining firms with two classes of shares outstanding. Both classes of shares have 
identical dividend and distribution rights as well as liquidation rights in the event of 
insolvency. They only differ in terms of their voting rights. Price difference reflects 
differences in "future benefits". A majority of the firms with superior voting (SV) shares 
trade at a premium relative to restricted voting (RV) shares. 
The evidence that dual class share structure is detrimental to minority shareholders is 
somewhat mixed. For example, Partch (1987) compares managerial ownership before and 
after the creation of a class of limited voting common stock for 44 publicly traded firms 
between 1962 and 1984, and examines whether the event affects the wealth of current 
shareholders. Partch (1987) argues that there is no evidence that current shareholders are 
harmed by the creation of limited voting common stock. Similar evidence is provided by 
Ang and Megginson (1989) and Cornett and Vetsuypens (1989). On the other hand, Jarrell 
and Poulsen (1988) find negative abnormal stock price returns at the announcement of the 
dual class recapitalization. In the case of Canada, Jog and Riding (1986) provide similar 
evidence. Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) present numerous legal disputes between 
controlling and outside shareholders. Such disputes arise because of the agency problems 
which tend to be associated with dual class shares. Agency problems are a major factor 
which may explain the observed fact that dual class firms sell at a valuation discount 
compared to a control sample of single class firms with concentrated ownership. 
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4.0 Further areas of research and unresolved questions 
Holderness (2003) argues that we need to fully understand the relationship between 
control and fractional ownership, whether by inside or outside blockholders. I attempt to 
address this issue from the perspective of concentrated control and ownership structure. 
There is substantial and fairly consistent evidence that dual class structure is associated with 
lower valuation. I want to address whether this discount is associated with the extraction of 
private benefits of control by examining channels through which private benefits can be 
extracted. Also, dual class ownership structures can allow managers to become entrenched. 
Therefore, investors discount the value of dual class firms relative to single class companies 
with concentrated control. 
The existing evidence on many of the corporate governance mechanisms fails to 
establish a convincing link between these mechanisms and firm value. One possible reason 
is that corporate governance systems are not important enough to have a meaningful impact 
on firm value. However, it can be argued that various corporate governance mechanisms 
may interact in complicated ways with each other and other aspects of the firms. Therefore, 
a particular mechanism valuable for one group of firms may not have an effect on another 
group. Hence, it is difficult to identify certain relationships by looking at a broad cross-
section of firms (Denis (2001). I propose to take a narrower focus by separating firms into 
different ownership structures such as dual and single class with concentrated control and 
investigate how differences in ownership structure and control affect dividend policy. In this 
way, I will hold constant the impact of concentrated control and isolate the impact of dual 
versus single class share structure. 
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In addition, we do not know whether dual class firms possess other countervailing 
governance mechanisms such as outside directors, stronger pay-for-performance or strong 
monitoring by outside blockholders, which may decrease potential agency conflicts. By 
pursuing research on closely controlled companies, we can increase our understanding of 
this particular group of firms and increase our ability to better regulate large or active 
shareholders to obtain the right balance between managerial discretion and minority 
shareholder protection. 
The first dissertation essay titled, Dual Class Discount, Agency Problems and 
Wealth Expropriation, is presented in Chapter 2. The aim of the essay is to address the 
following question: Is the valuation discount of dual class companies compared to 
concentrated control single class firms due to greater extraction of private benefits? The 
valuation discount of dual class companies is documented in the literature (King and Santor, 
2008; Gompers et al., 2010; and Smith et al, 2009). The general conclusion of these and 
other studies is that the discount reflects the extraction of private benefits. However, there is 
no systematic evidence showing the channels of extraction of private benefits which may 
result in the valuation discount between dual class companies and single class companies 
with concentrated control. In addressing the above question, I examine three channels 
through which private benefits of control can be extracted using a panel dataset of 792 
firm-year observations from the S&P 1500 group of firms that have dual class share 
structure and a propensity score matched sample of single class firms with concentrated 
ownership. These channels are: excess compensation to all senior executives, excess cash 
holdings and capital expenditure. 
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Using a panel regression with industry and year fixed effects, the main result is 
that investors believe that controlling shareholders and managers in dual class firms are 
using their voting control to extract private benefits and therefore, investors discount the 
value of dual class companies. I demonstrate that the greater the excess compensation and 
excess cash holding, the larger the valuation discount of dual class companies. First, after 
controlling for firm characteristics and governance determinants of executive compensation 
based on prior literature, I find that the separation of voting and cash flow rights leads to 
higher executive compensation for all executives. Furthermore, family executives received 
significantly higher compensation compared to non-family executives in the same position. 
In a sub-sample of family executives only, I show that family executives in dual class firms 
extract higher compensation relative to family executives in single class concentrated 
control firms. Second, I find that dual class firms retain more cash holdings compared to 
single class firms. Excess cash holdings, in turn, lead to a larger valuation discount of dual 
class companies. The results are consistent with investors' belief that managers and 
controlling shareholders of dual class firms are using excess cash in pursuit of private 
benefits. 
The second dissertation essay titled Ownership Structure, Agency Problems and 
Dividend Policy is presented in Chapter 3. In this essay, I investigate how concentrated 
control through dual versus single class share structure affects dividend policy. I use a 
propensity score matched sample of dual and single class companies with concentrated 
control. I propose three competing explanations of dividend policy in firms with 
concentrated control. The extraction of private benefits hypothesis, the family legacy 
hypothesis and the managerial reputation hypothesis are proposed and tested. The 
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extraction of private benefits hypothesis states that managers of dual class firms set a low 
payout policy in order to retain resources within firms which can be extracted as private 
benefits. The family legacy hypothesis predicts that controlling shareholders in dual class 
firms are more likely to maximize firm value and hence, are less likely to extract wealth 
from the firm for their own benefits. Therefore, firms that are family controlled may retain 
resources in order to ensure survival and growth of the firm which is beneficial to several 
generations of family members. The managerial reputation hypothesis states that investors 
are concerned about the extraction of private benefits. Therefore, higher dividend payout 
commits the firm to raise capital more frequently and hence, the firm is subjected to 
increased scrutiny by investment professionals, investors and the capital market (Rozeff, 
1982 and Easterbrook, 1984). 
Using Tobit estimation and panel regression with industry and fixed effects, the 
major findings are as follows: first, dual class firms tend to payout less dividend and 
repurchase fewer shares. Second, the greater the divergence between voting and cash flow 
rights, the lower the cash dividends and total distribution. This is consistent with both the 
extraction of private benefits and family legacy hypotheses. Third, using excess 
compensation of the controlling shareholders-executives, I show that lower payout policy is 
consistent with the extraction of private benefits of control hypothesis. 
The third dissertation essay titled, The Valuation Effects of Managerial 
Entrenchment on Dual Class Discount is presented in Chapter 4. In this essay, I 
investigate the relationship between managerial entrenchment and the documented dual 
class discount. Managerial entrenchment is expected to reduce the value of the firm as there 
is a lack of discipline on managers to address the poor performance. Several studies provide 
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evidence indicating that dual firms are discounted compared to single class firms (King and 
Santor, 2008, Gompers et al., 2010, Smith et al., 2009). One possible explanation for the 
dual class discount is managerial entrenchment. Entrenched managers are more likely to 
extract private benefits of control and therefore, investors are likely to discount dual class 
firms relative to single class concentrated control companies. 
Using a sample of dual class firms and a propensity matched sample of single class 
companies with concentrated control, I show that CEOs and directors in dual class firms are 
more entrenched. CEOs and directors of dual class firms tend to have longer tenure 
compared to their counterparts in single class companies. Furthermore, Entrenchment 
should be defined in the context of poor performance by management and hence, it is 
important to account for this performance. Conditional on poor performance, I show through 
panel regression that dual class firms with excess CEO tenure, E-index or excess directors' 
tenure are discounted more by investors. This implies that investors price the impact of 
managerial entrenchment in firms with dual class ownership structure. 
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Chapter 2 
Dual Class Discount, Agency Problems and Wealth Expropriation 
1.0 Introduction 
A dual class company is a firm with two or more classes of common shares 
outstanding (superior voting shares and restricted voting shares).13 A dual class ownership 
structure allows an individual or a related group of individuals to control the firm with a 
significant proportion of votes, but with a small proportion of the total equity. As a result, 
dual class ownership structure can exacerbate the agency conflict between controlling 
shareholders-managers and minority shareholders. The agency costs of dual class companies 
is due to monitoring costs associated with two groups of non-controlling shareholders, 
minority superior voting shareholders and non-voting or restricted voting shareholders. 
Similarly, agency problems can arise in single class concentrated control companies due to 
monitoring costs and conflicts of interest between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders. However, alignment of interest is stronger compared to dual class firms due to 
the larger equity ownership in single class concentrated control companies.14 This may 
reduce the impact of agency problems on firm value. Agency costs are expected to be 
higher in dual class firms because insiders have to deal with both the minority shareholders 
13
 Restricted voting shares (RV) are defined as common shares with votes ranging from no vote to one vote per 
share. Superior voting shares (SV), on the other hand, are common shares with more votes per share than 
restricted shares. A typical superior voting share has a 10:1 ratio that is, 10 votes per share (Gompers et al., 
2010). 
14
 Dual class ownership structure can lead to weaker alignment of interest among shareholders compared to 
single class closely-held companies due to the divergence of voting and cash flow rights. 
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of the multiple voting shares and the shareholders of the restricted voting shares. Given the 
greater divergence in interests of controlling and outside shareholders, agency costs 
associated with monitoring and disciplining are expected to be higher in dual class firms 
(Correia da Silva et. al., 2004). The argument that dual class companies may have bigger 
agency problems is made by Grossman and Hart (1988), Bebchuk et al. (2000), Correia da 
Silva et al. (2004) and King and Santor (2008). 
Controlling shareholders-managers in dual class companies can use their voting 
control to influence their compensation, resulting in the extraction of private benefits and 
agency costs. These controlling shareholders-managers, by virtue of their voting power, can 
influence the composition of the board of directors and therefore influence the board's 
effectiveness as a governance mechanism. Furthermore, controlling shareholders-managers 
in single class companies with concentrated ownership can also use their equity ownership 
to influence the board of directors and therefore, they can influence their compensation and 
extract private benefits of control in the form of perquisites and higher compensation.15 
However, extraction of private benefits may be greater in dual class companies because of 
the smaller proportion of equity ownership relative to control rights. Therefore, as the 
divergence between the manager's voting and equity interest widens, the incentive for the 
manager to expropriate private benefits from the corporation increases (Grossman and Hart, 
1988 and Bebchuk et al., 2000). Hence, the value of dual class firms may be lower 
compared to single class concentrated control companies due to weaker alignment of 
interest, extraction of private benefits and higher agency costs. 
15
 Following La Porta et al., (1999) and Claessens et al., (2000), a single class firm with concentrated control is 
defined as a firm with ownership of 15% of the shares outstanding by an individual, a family or an institution. 
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The main objective of this essay is to analyze the documented valuation discount of 
dual class firms and to relate the discount to three direct avenues through which controlling 
shareholders and managers can extract private benefits from dual class companies. The 
means through which controlling shareholders of dual class companies can expropriate 
wealth from the firm are: excess executive compensation, capital expenditure and excess 
cash holdings. Using these mechanisms, the paper investigates whether investors are aware 
of the agency costs and potential extraction of wealth by controlling shareholders and 
managers from dual class companies and as a result, discount the value of dual class 
companies compared to single class concentrated control companies. Therefore, the aim of 
this research is to address the following question: Is the valuation discount of dual class 
companies compared to concentrated control single class firms due to greater extraction of 
private benefits? The valuation discount of dual class companies is documented in the 
literature (King and Santor, 2008; Smith et al., 2009 and Gompers et al., 2010). The general 
conclusion of these and other studies is that the discount reflects extraction of private 
benefits. However, there is no systematic evidence showing the channels of extraction of 
private benefits which may result in the valuation discount between dual class companies 
and single class companies with concentrated control. 
Masulis et al. (2009) are the first to examine the channels through which managers 
can pursue private benefits and provide evidence that managerial extraction of private 
benefits is influenced by divergence of control and cash flow rights in a sample of dual class 
firms. They find that as divergence in voting and cash flow rights increases, corporate cash 
holdings are worth less to outside shareholders, CEOs of dual class companies receive 
higher levels of total compensation, managers undertake value-destroying acquisition more 
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frequently and capital expenditure contributes less to shareholder value. Hence, managers 
with greater control rights in excess of cash flow rights are prone to wasting corporate 
resources to pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders. 
My research differs from Masulis et al. (2009) in several important aspects. First, I 
directly relate dual class discount to the channels through which controlling shareholders-
managers can extract private benefits and I test the rational investor hypothesis. Under this 
hypothesis, investors expect executives in dual class companies to use their voting power to 
extract private benefits and as a result, they discount the value of dual class companies. 
Second, I argue that controlling shareholders and managers in single class concentrated 
control companies can also use their ownership control to extract private benefits. Therefore, 
it is important to examine the channels of wealth expropriation by comparing concentrated 
control in dual class companies with concentrated control in single class companies. The 
difference between dual class and concentrated control single class is how control is 
achieved. In dual class firms, control occurs through superior voting shares with 
proportionally less equity ownership. Therefore, controlling shareholders and managers in 
dual class companies are more likely to use their voting power to extract private benefits. In 
comparison, control in single class firms occurs through significant equity ownership and 
hence, executives in single class concentrated control companies are less likely to extract 
private benefits. Third, unlike Masulis et al. (2009), I examine all the senior level 
executives' compensation, not only the CEO compensation. This is important since family 
involvement tends to be higher in dual class companies and excess compensation paid to 
these family members would be a perquisite flowing from control. In fact, 83.2% of dual 
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class firms have some degree of family involvement.16 For example, 45.9% of dual class 
executives who serve as both CEO and President are family members, compared to 17.6% 
in single class companies. It remains to be seen whether family executives in dual class 
companies use their voting power to influence their compensation and whether their 
compensation is excessive compared to family executives in single class concentrated 
control companies. Hence, excess compensation paid to family executives will provide 
further evidence of private benefits of control and agency costs associated with dual class 
ownership structure. 
Exorbitant CEO pay packages have been widely regarded as a major form of private 
benefits and are a symbol of poor governance (Masulis et al., 2009). Therefore, it is possible 
that investors are aware of this and as a result, discount the value of dual class companies 
compared to single class concentrated control companies. Similarly, excess corporate cash 
holdings and excess capital expenditure are other mechanisms through which managers can 
pursue private benefits of control. However, it is not clear whether investors, knowing that 
controlling shareholders and managers can potentially misuse excess corporate cash 
holdings, discount the value of dual class companies. The prior literature does not examine 
whether dual class companies compared to single class concentrated control firms retain 
excess cash, or pay their executives excess compensation. 
Using a propensity score matched sample of dual and single class concentrated 
control companies, I provide evidence to support the argument that investors believe that 
controlling shareholders and managers in dual class firms are using their voting control to 
16
 Family involvement typically includes the following: family members as senior executives of the company, 
as consultants to the company, as directors of the company or as controlling shareholders. 
17
 A family executive is defined as an individual who is a member of the senior management team and is related 
to the controlling shareholder or founding family, either by blood or marriage. 
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extract private benefits and therefore, investors discount the value of dual class companies. I 
demonstrate that the greater the excess compensation and excess cash holding, the larger the 
valuation discount of dual class companies after controlling for factors that have been 
proven to partially explain the dual class discount. First, after controlling for firm 
characteristics and governance determinants of executive compensation based on prior 
literature, I find that the separation of voting and cash flow rights leads to higher executive 
compensation for all executives. This implies that executive compensation is one avenue 
through which managers are extracting private benefits. Since dual class companies 
frequently employ family members, excess compensation paid to family executives allows 
us to test whether dual class ownership structure and family involvement leads to extraction 
of private benefits of control and agency costs. I find that family executives received 
significantly higher compensation compared to non-family executives in the same position. 
In a sub-sample of family executives only, I show that family executives in dual class firms 
extract higher compensation relative to family executives in single class concentrated 
control firms. 
Second, corporate cash holdings provide managers with the most latitude as to how 
and when to spend it (Masulis et al., 2009). Univariate tests show that dual class companies, 
on average, tend to retain excess cash compared to single class concentrated control 
companies. This excess cash can be easily diverted or misused by controlling shareholders 
and managers. Hence, managers may spend part or all of the excess cash in order to pursue 
private benefits such as perquisite consumption. Investors, knowing this, may value 
corporate cash holdings of dual class firms less compared to cash holdings of single class 
companies. Consistent with this prediction, I find that excess cash holdings lead to a larger 
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valuation discount of dual class companies. However, capital expenditure does not explain 
dual class discount. This implies that investors do not view capital expenditure as a potential 
avenue of extraction of private benefits. 
2.0 Dual Class Discount 
Using a sample of only dual class firms with both classes of shares trading, 
empirical studies generally find that superior voting shares trade at a premium or 
alternatively, restricted voting shares trade at a discount, relative to superior voting shares.18 
The general argument for the price differential between superior and restricted voting shares 
is that voting premiums are related to potential takeover premiums and private benefits of 
control (Levy, 1983; Lease et al., 1983; Horner, 1988; Megginson, 1990; Rydqvist, 1992; 
Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1995, and Zingales, 1995). 
Equally important, other studies examine the impact of dual class share structure on 
the overall firm value using a proxy for Tobin's Q as a valuation measure. These studies 
find that the greater the divergence between voting and cash flow rights, the lower the value 
of dual class firms compared to single class companies (King and Santor, 2008; Gompers, et 
al., 2010; Smith et al., 2009). Furthermore, family control of dual class firms can exacerbate 
the agency problems and lead to a greater discount. In the Canadian context, King and 
Santor (2008) find that family ownership and dual class share structure leads to a 17% 
discount relative to other firms. In addition, Smith et al., (2009) examine dual class 
companies compared to single concentrated control companies and find that the value of 
dual class companies is discounted relative to single class concentrated control companies. 
18
 The sample size in these studies is generally small as only a small fraction of dual class firms have both 
classes of shares trading. 
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This discount can be explained by private benefits of control and agency problems of dual 
class ownership structure. Therefore: 
& Single Class Concentrated Control = QuualClass + DiSCOUYlt (1) 
Thus, the dual class discount is the valuation wedge between dual class companies 
and single class concentrated control firms. Based on the previous literature, it can be argued 
that dual class discount is reflective of the agency problems of dual class ownership 
structure and potential wealth expropriation in the form of private benefits. 
Discount = \QDuai class ~ QSingle Class Concentrated Control ) d), 
where Q is a proxy for Tobin's Q ratio. 
Using the definition of "free cash flow" and considering the cash flow differential 
between dual and single class firms, 
Dual Class Discount = /{[(R - OC - D)(\ -1) + D\-ACapex- AWorkingCapital} (3), 
where R is defined as total revenue, OC is operating costs including executive 
compensation, D is depreciation, t is corporate tax rate, ACapex and AWorking Capital are 
allocations for capital expenditure and net working capital, respectively. From the above 
definition, we can identify potential avenues through which private benefits can be extracted 
from dual class companies by insiders. These channels are: executive compensation which 
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is part of the operating costs, capital expenditure (Capex) and cash and near cash which are 
part of the working capital. 
Alternatively, following the several studies on diversification discount such as Lang 
and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995) and Villalonga (2004), I estimate the value effects 
of dual class ownership structure based on the industry adjusted difference between the dual 
class firm's Q ratio and the industry average Q ratio.19 Following Villalonga (2004), I 
compute industry means and medians using 4-digit and 3-digit SIC codes for which there is 
a minimum of five single class firms in the industry for given year.20 
3.0 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.1.0 Ownership Structure and Compensation 
Firms with concentrated control may be subject to agency costs arising from 
conflicts of interest between minority and majority shareholders (Cheung et al., 2005).21 
Controlling shareholders can use their influence to extract private benefits of control at the 
expense of minority shareholders. A potential avenue for such an extraction is through 
executive compensation because controlling shareholders-executives or owners-directors 
effectively set their own compensation. Empirical evidence relating equity ownership and 
19
 Studies by Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995) and Villalonga (2004) examined the 
diversification discount, that is the excess value between multi-segment (diversified) firms and single-segment 
firms. 
20
 In 9% of the cases, I relied on 2-digit SIC codes to compute the industry averages, in 33% of the cases I used 
3-digit SIC codes and in 68% of cases I used 4-digit SIC codes. 
21
 Minority shareholders are defined as dispersed shareholders with a small fraction of the outstanding shares or 
where their total votes are less than 15%. A controlling shareholder is a shareholder with more than 15% equity 
ownership or voting rights. 
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executive compensation is mixed. Prior studies show that top executives owning a 
majority block of common shares receive higher salaries and bonuses than top executives in 
similar sized, but diffusely held firms (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988). Cheung et al. (2005) 
find a positive relationship between cash emoluments received by the CEO and the 
Chairman and their respective shareholding for levels of ownership of up to 35% in small 
firms and up to 10% in large firms.23 
On the other hand, several studies examining ownership and executive 
compensation find that greater ownership concentration lowers the ability of executives to 
extract higher levels of compensation (Dyl, 1988; Goldberg and Idson, 1995; Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003; Haid and Yurtoglu, 2006).24 For example, Dyl (1988) provides evidence that 
corporate control in firms with concentrated ownership is negatively related to total CEO 
compensation. This implies that in these firms, major shareholders engage in monitoring 
activities which reduce agency costs. In addition, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) argue 
that when externally-controlled owners have direct or indirect influence over CEO pay, they 
will have a pay philosophy which is to minimize CEO pay subject to the ability to attract 
and retain a "satisfactory" CEO. Ownership concentration in these studies predominantly 
occurs through significant equity ownership in single class firms. There is little evidence 
examining concentrated control where control occurs through voting power with limited 
equity investment (dual class share structure). 
22
 See Murphy (1999) and Core et al. (2003) for surveys of the executive compensation literature. 
23
 Cheung et al., (2005) examine cash emoluments and dividends as income to CEOs and Chairmen. They did 
not examine other senior level executives or other forms of compensation such as options. 
24
 The firms examined by Haid and Yurtoglu (2006) are closely-held with an average ownership of 53% by the 
largest shareholders and 65% by the three largest shareholders. The derivation of voting rights and cash flow 
rights in their sample occurs primarily through pyramid structure. Hartzell and Starks (2003) provide evidence 
that institutional ownership is negatively related to the level of compensation for the top management as a 
group. 
25
 Dyl (1988) utilizes the percentage of the total shares outstanding owned by the five largest shareholders as a 
measure of concentrated control. 
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Denis (2001) argues that it may be difficult to identify the effects of various 
corporate governance mechanisms because they interact with other firm characteristics in 
complicated ways. In studies of corporate governance, one of the fundamental 
distinguishing characteristics among firms is whether they are closely controlled or widely 
held. Along this line of argument, instead of analyzing executive compensation in a broad 
cross-section of firms, by examining only closely controlled companies, I can better identify 
the effects of dual and single class ownership structures on extraction of private benefits in 
the form of excess executive compensation. It is not clear whether executives in dual class 
firms pay themselves more than executives in single class firms with concentrated control. 
According to the private benefits of control hypothesis, executives in dual class firms will 
tend to extract private benefits. This can be in the form of excess compensation relative to a 
control group of firms. 
HI: In dual class firms, executives have the ability to extract excess 
compensation. After controlling for firm characteristics and governance attributes, I 
expect executives in dual class firms to have higher compensation compared to 
executives in single class concentrated control firms. 
3.2.0 Family Executives and Compensation 
The ownership concentration and management in the hands of a family gives a lot of 
power to the family executives. It enables them to take actions that are beneficial to 
themselves which may be detrimental to minority shareholders. Family executives, because 
of their control, are more likely to receive higher compensation compared to non-family 
executives due to their influence over the board of directors. They may use their power to 
26
 Following Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2005), a family firm is defined as one in 
which the founder or a member of his or her family, by either blood or marriage, is an officer, director or 
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influence the remuneration process thereby extracting benefits at the expense of 
shareholders (Bebchuk, et al., 2002). On the other hand, in family firms, the firm symbolizes 
the heritage and tradition of their family and is often a part of their identity. Therefore, 
family executives are unlikely to act against the interests of the company because in doing 
so, they may also harm themselves. It is not clear whether the same argument holds for both 
dual class and single class firms. Family executives in firms with concentrated ownership 
and control are in a position to exert their influence on the composition of the board and its 
various committees. Therefore, concentrated control may allow executives to extract private 
benefits. Hence, family ownership and control can affect family and non-family executive 
compensation in very different ways. 
The evidence on the relationship between family ownership and compensation is 
mixed. There is evidence that family CEOs earn less compensation compared to non-family 
CEOs in a group of family firms (McConaughy, 2000 and Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). 
Several studies, on the other hand, provide evidence that family executives earn higher 
compensation compared to executives in non-family controlled firms (Cheung et al., 2005; 
Basu et al., 2007; and Cohen and Lauterbach, 2008).27 Cheung et al. (2005) provide 
evidence that family control is associated with higher executive compensation when the 
CEO and Chairman have significant shareholdings in the firm and with lower executive 
compensation when they hold a small percentage of shares outstanding. 
blockholder, either individually or as a group. In addition, if there are firms with co-founders, I will consider 
these firms as family firms. 
27
 Basu et al., (2007) provide evidence that the founding families retain strong ownership and control rights in 
Japanese firms. Top executives in Japanese firms earn more in family-controlled firms than firms lacking such 
influence. In a study of Israeli firms, Cohen and Lauterbach (2008) find that CEOs who belong to a family or a 
business group that own most of the firm shares receive significantly (about 50%) higher pay than professional 
CEOs who do not belong to the control group. 
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 Cheung et al., (2005) used an indicator variable to identify whether a firm has family ownership greater than 
a certain percentage. For example, when family ownership is over 30% or over 50% and executive ownership is 
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The few studies analyzing dual class share structure and compensation did not 
separately examine executive compensation of family versus non-family executives in these 
companies. Family executives in dual class companies are expected to behave differently 
because they control their companies with a larger proportion of voting rights relative to 
their equity ownership. Due to the proportionately smaller cash flow consequence to 
themselves, executives who are family members in dual class companies will find it more 
attractive to use their control to extract resources from the firm. One possible way of 
extracting resources is through excess compensation. If the private benefits of control 
hypothesis is true and family executives extract resources in the form of excess 
compensation, then I expect (1) higher compensation in firms with family executives 
relative to other executives in a similar position and (2) higher compensation for family 
executives in dual class firms relative to family executives in single class concentrated 
control firms. Therefore: 
H2a: Family members of the controlling shareholder who are executives are 
expected to earn higher compensation compared to non-family executives in similar 
positions in non-family controlled firms. 
H2b: Family members who are executives in dual class firms are expected to pay 
themselves higher compensation relative to family members in single class 
concentrated control firms. 
3.3.0 Dual Class Discount and Corporate Cash Holdings 
Agency theories can be used to explain why corporate cash holdings are valued less 
in countries with poor shareholder protection. Managers and controlling shareholders in 
10% to 35% the interaction term between family dummy variable and executive ownership is positively related 
to compensation. One possible reason is that family members in family firms are also executives in these firms. 
However, Cheung et al., (2005) did not explicitly examine compensation of family executives in their study. 
Furthermore, it is possible that outside CEOs are appointed to run family firms. 
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these countries can extract private benefits using corporate cash holdings and use "free cash 
flow" to pursue value-destroying activities such as acquisition (Jensen, 1986) or to obtain 
perquisite consumption at the expense of minority shareholders. Harford (1999) provides 
evidence that cash-rich firms are likely to undertake value-destroying acquisition. 
Therefore, when managers control the firm, either by equity ownership or by votes, 
corporate cash holdings can influence firm value. The evidence in the literature shows that 
the contribution of corporate cash holdings to firm value is lower in countries with weak 
investor protection (Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; and Harford et al., 
2008). However, Kalcheva and Lins (2007) also find that when external shareholder 
protection is strong, cash held by controlling managers is unrelated to firm value. In 
contrast, Masulis et al. (2009) examine the contribution of one extra dollar of cash to firm 
value in a sample of dual class companies in the U.S. where investor protection is more 
stringent than in other countries. They find that the marginal value of cash is decreasing in 
the divergence between voting and cash flow rights. This is consistent with the evidence 
provided by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) that an extra dollar of cash is valued less by 
shareholders in poorly governed companies. 
Most of the evidence in the prior literature is consistent with the agency theory of 
"free cash flow" (Jensen, 1986). Shareholders believe that managers are more likely to 
misuse corporate cash holdings and therefore, shareholders' place a lower value on 
corporate cash holdings. In keeping with this argument, I investigate the link between the 
dual class discount and excess cash holdings. Managers and controlling shareholders of dual 
class firms are likely to misuse corporate cash holdings in pursuit of private benefits. Hence 
investors, anticipating misused cash holdings by dual class managers, are more likely to 
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discount the value of dual class companies compared to single class companies with 
concentrated control. 
H3: The higher the excess cash holding, the greater the valuation discount of 
dual class firms relative to single class concentrated control firms after controlling 
for size, dividend differences, conversion rights and financial leverage. 
3.4.0 Dual Class Discount and Capital Expenditure 
Capital expenditure can have a positive effect on firm value if shareholders believe 
that the firm's capital expenditures are related to positive net present value projects. 
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) provide evidence that mangers seek to maximize the 
market value of the firm in making their corporate capital expenditure decisions. Also, 
Masulis et al. (2009) find that change in capital expenditure has a positive impact on returns 
for dual class firms. However, insiders' excess control rights reduce the contribution of 
capital expenditure to shareholder value in dual class firms. Therefore, shareholders believe 
that insiders' in dual class companies are using capital expenditure to pursue private 
benefits. As a result, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
H4: Excess capital expenditure in dual class firms relative to single class firms 
increases the dual class discount. 
3.5.0 Dual Class Discount and Excess Compensation 
If investors believe that excess compensation is a channel through which managers 
extract private benefits, then the rational investor hypothesis can add to our understanding of 
the valuation discount of dual class companies by relating excess executive compensation to 
the valuation discount. Investors, knowing that executives in dual class firms have the ability 
and incentive to expropriate or extract resources without facing the cash flow consequences, 
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will discount dual class companies. Therefore, the larger the excess compensation, the 
greater the dual class valuation discount. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5: The higher the excess executive compensation, the greater the valuation 
discount of dual class firms relative to single class firms. 
4.0 Methodology and Data 
4.1.0 Methodology 
The fixed effects regression specification will be utilized to test the various 
hypotheses in this paper. The fixed effects approach is a common technique in panel data 
setting. By incorporating industry fixed effects, I account for fixed differences in executive 
compensation across different industries within the cross-section. Year fixed effects are 
included to control for any year specific shocks to executive pay and concentrated control. 
4.1.1 Ownership Structure and Compensation 
The following equation will be estimated in order to test hypothesis 1. 
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where i is equal to different components as well as total compensation for each executives' 
compensation package for firm/ at year t and management voting leverage (Mgmt. Vote) is 
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, _ . % of total votes controlled by management and directors ?9 ^. defined as . Firm 
% of total equity held by management and directors 
characteristics include: size, profitability, growth, risk and financial leverage. The 
governance variables are as follows: board size, percentage of independent, busy and grey 
directors, percentage of institutional ownership and percentage of family members on the 
board of directors.30 Position is a dummy variable equal to 1 for different executive 
positions and zero otherwise. For a complete definition of all the variables see Appendix A, 
Table 1A. 
Management voting leverage ratio is an indication of concentrated control relative to 
equity ownership by senior level executives and directors. It is expected to be positively 
related to executive compensation, hence, <j>. is expected to be positive. A high management 
voting leverage ratio indicates that managers and directors control a significant proportion of 
the voting shares relative to their equity stake. Therefore, executives in firms with high 
management voting leverage are able to exert control over the board and extract more 
resources or private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Several firm characteristics based on previous studies are used as control variables 
such as size, performance, investment opportunities, risk and financial leverage. It is 
expected that larger firms (log of sales), and those with more complex operations (proxy by 
size) will tend to pay their executives more in order to attract high quality executives (Core 
et al., 1999 and Chalmers et al, 2006). Board of directors often reward executives for 
29
 Instead of using management voting leverage ratio as an indication of concentrated control, I re-estimate 
equations (4) to (6) replacing management voting leverage with the "wedge" variable. Wedge is defined as the 
difference in the percentage of votes and the percentage of cash flow rights held by management and directors. 
The results (not reported) are similar to those presented in Tables 4-6 using wedge instead of management 
voting leverage. 
30
 A busy director is defined as a director with more than four board memberships and grey directors are 
defined as outside directors who are related to the company through a transactional relationship. 
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superior performance. Therefore, more profitable firms (ROA or stock return) will tend to 
pay their executives higher compensation, especially in the form of bonuses and stock 
options. Hence, profitability is expected to be positively related to compensation. Firms with 
more growth options will tend to compensate executives more in order to attract executives 
capable of turning those options into actual growth. Therefore, growth (geometric mean 
growth in total assets over the previous five years) is expected to be positively related to 
compensation. Firm risk can be a measure of the firm's operating risk as well as the firm's 
information environment. Following (Smith and Watts, 1992; Core et al., 1999 and 
Chalmers et al., 2006), I include a measure for firm risk. Firm risk is measured by the 
standard deviation of annual returns (Core et al., 1999) and it represents total risk because of 
the undiversifiable nature of executive contracts. Based on prior literature, firm risk can 
positively as well as negatively influence the level of compensation. Therefore, the 
expectation is ambiguous. In addition, several governance variables that explain executive 
compensation are controlled for in equation (4). 
Governance variables include, board size, independent directors, busy directors, grey 
directors, institutional investors and the percentage of family directors. According to Core et 
al. (1999), weak governance structure results in greater agency problems and higher 
compensation. Therefore, a greater percentage of busy and grey directors signifies a weaker 
governance structure. Hence, busy and grey directors are expected to be positively related to 
executive compensation. In theory, independent directors are expected to monitor managers 
and curb excess compensation and therefore increase board effectiveness. However, 
empirical evidence shows a positive relationship between the percentage of independent 
directors and CEO compensation (Lambet et al, 1993). One possible explanation is that 
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independent directors are not truly independent directors such as grey directors.31 Therefore, 
after controlling for the percentage of grey directors, the percentage of independent directors 
is expected to be negatively related to executive compensation. Furthermore, institutional 
investors can play an important role in executive compensation by using their voting power 
to influence board composition and thereby limiting rent extraction. Empirical evidence 
shows that institutional ownership is negatively related to the level of executive 
compensation (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). As a result, I account for the effects of 
institutional ownership on executive compensation. In addition to the governance variables 
used in the literature, since several of the firms are family controlled, I account for the 
percentage of family directors on the board. Family directors are expected to monitor non-
family executives and therefore, reduce compensation of non-family executives. Family 
directors, on the other hand, may be influenced by family executives and are likely to 
reward these executives with higher compensation. 
4.1.2 Family Executives and Compensation 
Testing the effects of family executives on compensation in both dual and single 
class firms (H2a), the following equation is estimated using a panel regression with year and 
industry fixed effects. 
31
 For example, Disney claims that 13 of the 16 directors are independent members of the board. However, of 
these "outside" directors, Reveta Bowers, is the headmaster of the school Eisner's children attended. Also, Leo 
O'Donovan, president of Georgetown University, which one of the Eisner children attended, received 
donations from Eisner. Other "outside" directors such as Irwin Russell, Eisner's personal attorney and Robert 
Stern, architect for several of Disney's projects are clearly not true independent directors since they have ties to 
the CEO. They may be considered as "grey directors" (Kim and Nofsinger, 2004). 
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where / is equal to different components for each executives' compensation package for firm 
j at year t. Family positions are indicator variables equal to 1 if, for example, the CEO is a 
family member and 0 otherwise. It is expected that family executives will extract more 
resources from the firms they control and therefore, executive compensation will be higher 
for family members relative to non-family executives. 
I will estimate equation (6) below to examine the difference in executive 
compensation for family members in dual class firms as compared to family executives in 
single class firms (H2b) in a sub-sample of family executives only. I expect dual class 
family executives to extract resources in the form of higher executive compensation relative 
to family executives in single class firms. To test this prediction, I interact dual class family 
executive positions and management voting leverage. The coefficients of interaction terms 
are expected to be positive and significant for various executive positions since greater 
voting power relative to cash flow stake in family firms can exacerbate the agency conflict 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. I also include management 
voting leverage as a separate control variable to make sure that the interaction term does not 
merely pick up the effect of management voting leverage itself. 
44 
Ln(Compensation), j
 t = a, + Z 9 a f DFam.Execu kj x Mgmt.VoteyjM) 
A=I 
+ ^lMgmt.VoteJil_l + Y.r\lkFirm Characteristicsk t_ 
6 6 
+ H&i,kGovernancek,il_l + ^ , position k + e , (6), 
fc=i *=i , y ' 
where DFam.Execu. is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the k family executive position 
•th in the/ dual class firm and zero otherwise. 
4.1.3 Dual Class Discount and Corporate Cash Holdings 
In order to test the effects of excess corporate cash holdings on the valuation 
discount of dual class companies, I estimate the following equation: 
Dual Class Discount]t+x - a + (3j (Excess Cash x Mgmt.Vote) t + Q^Mgmt. Vote t 
+ (3
 3 Excess Cash-1 + p 4 Financial Leverage t 
+ $5ConversionRight t + (36 Size t + p7D/v.diff t +£,, (7) 
There are two measures of dual class discount. In the first measure, dual class 
discount is the difference between Tobin's Q ratio for a dual class firm and Tobin's Q ratio 
for a matching single class concentrated control firm.32 The second measure of dual class 
In order to estimate Tobin's Q ratio, I follow the approach used by Lins (2003) where 
Q = ' Market Value of Equity + Total Assets - Book Value of Equity * Gompers et al. (2010 used a similar 
Total Asse ts 
definition except they subtract deferred taxes from the numerator. In order to calculate the market value equity 
of the dual class companies, I follow Smith et al. (2009). For dual class companies with both classes of shares 
trading, the market value equity is the sum of the market value of the restricted voting class plus the superior 
voting class. For companies with only the restricted voting class shares trading, I add a premium to the price of 
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discount is the difference in the Q ratio of dual class firms and their SIC industry average Q 
ratio. Excess cash is defined as ^ A cash, \ ( A cash. 
Total assets, , ; , , , 
' ~ ' / Dual class 
v Total assets, , ,, , , 
V (~"1 y Single class 
where 
the change in corporate cash holdings is cash and marketable securities at the end of year t 
minus cash and marketable securities at the end of year t-1. To test whether the divergence 
between voting and cash flow rights along with excess cash holdings affect dual class 
discount, I interact management voting leverage and excess cash and include the interaction 
term as an explanatory variable. The coefficient of the interaction term is expected to be 
negative and significant, since excess control rights relative to equity stake can lead to 
inefficient use of corporate cash holdings. Management voting leverage (Mgmt. vote) is 
expected to be negatively related to the dual class discount. This represents agency problems 
associated with dual class ownership structure. Therefore, the greater the divergence 
between voting and cash flow rights, the larger the discount. Following Zingales (1995), 
conversion right is an indicator variable equal to 1 if superior voting shares can be converted 
into restricted voting shares and 0 otherwise, market value of equity (size) is used as a proxy 
for the probability of acquisition and dividend difference (Div. diff) is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the dividend paid or payable to restricted voting shares is greater than that of the 
superior voting shares and zero otherwise. 
the restricted voting shares in order to estimate the market value of equity for the superior voting shares. I use 
6.5% as the voting premium which was established by Zingales (1995). There has been some debate on the 
measurement error of Tobin's Q ratio as a proxy for "true" Q (See Whited, 2001, Erickson and Whited 2002 
and Erickson and Whited 2006). Erickson and Whited (2006) argue that the measurement error of Q becomes 
an issue depending on the use of Q in a regression. If a proxy for Q is used as a regressor to control for the 
incentive to invest, then the measurement error is a serious problem. However, if proxy appears as the 
dependent variable in a regression, then the measurement error does not bias any slope coefficient. It does, 
however make the R2 smaller than in the absence of such error. 
33
 In 13.5% of the dual class firms, holders of restricted voting (RV) shares are paid more or will receive more 
dividends in the future relative to holders of superior voting (SV) shares. 
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4.1.4 Dual Class Discount and Capital Expenditure 
In order to test the effects of capital expenditure on the valuation discount of dual 
class companies, I estimate the following equation: 
Dual Class Discount
 t+] = a + fix (Capex x Mgmt.Vote) t + §2Mgmt. Vote t + fi3Capex t 
+ p^Financial Leverage
 t + fi5Conversion Right t + p6 Size t 
+ V7Div.diffJt + eJt (8), 
where capital expenditure (Capex) is defined as: 
ACapex,
 t 
Market value of equity
 t_x Dual class 
AC apex
 ( , 
Single class Market value of equity t_{ j , 
and the change in Capex is capital expenditure at the end of year t minus capital expenditure 
at the end of year t-l. The interaction term between capital expenditure (Capex) and 
management voting leverage (Mgmt.Vote) is expected to be negative. This implies that 
excess capital expenditure increases the dual class discount. 
4.1.5 Dual Class Discount and Excess Compensation 
Finally, I examine the effects of excess compensation on valuation discount of dual 
class firms (H3b). Following Zingales (1995) and Masulis et al. (2009), I estimate equation 
(9) using firm characteristics and governance variables that have been proven to explain 
executive compensation and extract the residuals as a measure of excess compensation. This 
excess compensation is used to explain the valuation discount in equation (10). 
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Ln(Compensation)
 t - a, + X r\lkFirm Characteristicsk , , 
,j,
 k = ] , ,j, 
6 6 
+ I 5lkGovernancek ,_, + I ylkPositionk + e , (9), 
ft=l £=1 ' 
where z is equal to different components of the executive compensation package for firm 7 at 
year /. 
Dwa/ CYass Discount
 t+x - a + Pjisxcess Comp. t + <^1{Mgmt. Vote x Excess Cash) t 
+ $3Mgmt. Votej t + fi4Excess Cash t + fi5Financial Leverage t 
+ P^Conversion RightJt + (37 Size t + P8D/v. diff t 
6 
+ £ Y
 tPositionk + s , (10), 
where exce^ cowp. is residual from equation (9) for total compensation and the various 
components of executives' pay package such as salary, bonuses, stock options and other 
compensation. 
After accounting for excess corporate cash holdings, management voting leverage 
and other control variables, I expect a higher excess compensation (Excess Comp.) to be 
associated with a larger valuation discount of dual class companies. The discount reflects 
investors' belief that executives of dual class companies are extracting private benefits of 
control through excess compensation. Thus excess compensation is expected to be 
negatively related to dual class discount after controlling for factors that partially explain 
dual class discount in the prior literature. Management voting leverage and the interaction 
term between management voting leverage and excess cash are expected to be negatively 
related to dual class discount. 
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4.2 Data 
4.2.1 Sample Construction 
The dataset used in this research is constructed from a variety of sources. 
To construct a sample of U.S. dual class firms, I retrieved a list of firms with dual class 
share structure from Corporate Library for 2005-2007. Corporate Library identifies all firms 
with dual class common shares as a takeover defense mechanism during the period. I extend 
this list of dual class firms to 2001 using a list of dual class IPOs and a list of dual class 
firms used in Gompers et al. (2010).34 The list of 1,910 dual class firms over the period of 
2001-2007 is merged with Execucomp database to determine whether compensation data is 
available for these firms. Execucomp database contains executive compensation data for the 
top executives representing the S&P 1500 group of companies. For each dual class company 
with compensation data, I retrieve proxy statements from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) website and check the proxy statement for each firm in the sample to 
ensure that they are in fact, dual class companies. Next, using proxy statements, I collect 
voting rights per share and the number of superior voting and restricted voting shares owned 
by the largest shareholders and management and directors as a group. 
For each firm, I collect accounting data from Compustat. I retrieve annual firm-level 
information such as total assets, sales, long-term debt, common equity and operating 
income. In addition, I collect several governance variables and equity ownership data from 
Corporate Library and Execucomp. These include the number of directors, outside related 
directors and unrelated directors. I use proxy statements, firm websites and internet search 
34
 A list of dual class IPO is available on Jay Ritter's IPO website. Andrew Metrick generously provided the list 
of dual class companies used in their study. 
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engines such as Lexus Nexus and Google to identify family executives and family directors. 
I then calculate the percentage of family members who are directors of the board. In order 
to complete the set of control variables, I collect stock return data from CRSP. I obtain 
monthly returns to estimate beta and annual returns to compute standard deviation. Finally, I 
collect compensation information for all executives available on Execucomp. Total 
Compensation (TDC1) is defined as:35 
Total Compensation = Salary + Bonuses + Other Compensation + Stock Options (11), 
where other compensation includes the value of restricted stock grants, long term incentive 
payouts, contributions to defined pension plans, life insurance premiums, consulting fees 
and awards under charitable award programs. 
4.2.2 Propensity Score Matching 
The list of dual class companies is matched with a list of single class concentrated 
control firms using propensity score matching. Propensity score matching methods were 
developed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Heckman and Robb (1986) and Heckman et al. 
(1998). Propensity score matching has become a popular matching technique applied to 
studies of the financial markets (see Hillion and Vermaelen, 2004 and Villalonga, 2004) 
which allows for matching using a larger number of characteristics and hence, reducing or 
eliminating potential bias. The greater the overlap in all characteristics of the treated and 
35
 The Execucomp database value of executive stock options using Black-Scholes call option valuation model 
(1973). Alternatively, Johnson, Ryan and Tian (2009) adopt a modified version of the Black-Scholes model 
to compute the option values because executives typically exercise their options before maturity. Therefore, 
they reduce the contractual option maturity by 30%. 
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control groups, the more comparable the groups are and the smaller the bias (Heckman et 
al., 1997 and Heckman et al., 1998). 
Using a propensity score algorithm, I estimate a probit model of the determinants of 
dual class structure and compute a propensity score for each firm based on several firm and 
governance characteristics. The propensity score is then used to match each dual class firm 
with a similar single class company. The following firm and governance characteristics are 
used in the matching exercise: equity ownership of the largest shareholder, sales, industry, 
return on asset, annual stock return, beta, standard deviation of annual returns, market-to-
book, debt-to-asset, sales growth, board size, proportion of independent directors, busy 
directors, grey directors, institutional ownership, company age, R&D-to-sales and capex-to-
total asset. This matching exercise results in a final sample of 792 dual class firm-years over 
the period of 2001-2007. This represents an average of 113 dual class firms per year. The 
final matched sample is made up of 1,584 firm-year observations and 7,920 executive-firm-
year observations. 
5.0 Results 
5.1.0 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of executive compensation. Panel A shows 
that on average, dual class executives received $2.6 million of total compensation compared 
to $2.3 million of total compensation for a similar executive in a single class concentrated 
control firm. The test of mean (median) difference between dual and single class executives 
is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. In terms of salary and bonuses, dual 
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class executives are paid more than single class concentrated control executives. Univariate 
tests for the difference in mean (median) show that salary and bonuses are significantly 
higher for dual class executives (Panel A, Table 1). The CEOs, COOs and VPs of dual class 
firms receive significantly higher salary, bonuses and total compensation relative to the 
matching group of executives (Panels B, D and E). However, there is no difference in total 
compensation for CFOs (Panel C, Table 1). For example, Panel B Table 1, shows that dual 
class CEOs and presidents receive an average of $5.2 million of total compensation 
compared to matching single class concentrated control CEOs with $4.7 million in total 
compensation. The univariate test for difference in mean (median) for CEO total 
compensation is positive and significant at the 5% level. 
Compared to single class firms, COOs and VPs in dual class firms received $287.35 
thousand and $122.98 thousand more in total compensation, respectively (Panel D and E, 
Table 1). The test for difference in mean (median) is positive and significant for salary, 
bonuses and total compensation for both COOs and VPs. Figure 1 shows the median total 
compensation for the top three executives over the period 2001-2007. The graph indicates 
that the top three highest paid executives in dual class firms receive more compensation 
compared to similar top three executives in single class concentrated control firms. 
In terms of family executives, family CEOs and Chairmen in dual class firms are 
paid more total compensation ($2.9 million) compared to family CEOs and Chairmen in 
matching single class firms (Panel F, Table 1). A family member who is the CEO but not 
the Chairman of the board also earns significantly more salary, bonuses and total 
compensation compared to a similar family CEO in a single class company (Panel G, Table 
1). Finally, family CEOs in general received higher compensation than non-family CEOs 
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(Panel H, Table 1). In fact, family CEOs received 24.6% more in total compensation to 
similar non-family CEOs. 
In terms of the industry distribution of dual class firms, Table 2 provides descriptive 
statistics based on SIC industry codes. The sample of dual class firms in this essay is 
generally distributed across all industries. However, business services, communication, 
retail services, food and kinder products, printing and publishing and electronic equipment 
are the six industries with the greatest number of dual class firms over the period of 2001-
2007. 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of firm characteristics, governance and executive 
characteristics. Panel A summarizes governance characteristics for the sample. In most dual 
class firms the family, founder or management as a group, controls a significant proportion 
of the voting rights. The mean (median) cash flow ownership by the largest shareholders is 
22.5% (18.2%>) compared to 23.6% (19.2%) for similar single class companies. In terms of 
the voting rights, the largest shareholder controls on average, 57.8% of the voting rights. As 
a group, management and directors in dual class companies, on average control 58.3% of 
the votes and only 24.9% of the cash flow rights. This represents a significant divergence 
between their voting and cash flow rights. As a result of this divergence, institutional 
investors are less likely to hold a significant proportion of dual class restricted voting shares. 
According to Li et al. (2008), voting rights are an important determinant of institutional 
investment decisions. This argument is consistent with the finding that institutional investors 
hold significantly fewer shares in dual class firms (16.9%) compared to single class firms 
(21.5%). 
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Univariate tests show that dual class firms have, on average, significantly less 
independent directors (59.3%) but significantly more busy directors (16.6%) compared to a 
group of matching single class concentrated control firms (68.8% and 13.0%, respectively). 
Also, dual class firms have more grey directors. In fact, 10.2% of the board is made up of 
outside related directors (grey directors) compared to 9.9% in single class concentrated 
control firms. In addition, a large percentage of dual class firms in the sample are considered 
as family firms. In fact, 83.2% of dual class firms are family firms compared to only 31.4% 
of the single class concentrated control firms. This implies that family influence is greater in 
dual class companies. The univariate test shows that a greater percentage of family members 
in dual class companies are directors (15.8%) relative to single class firms (5.6%) with the 
difference in mean and median being positive and statistically significant. 
Table 3, Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for firm characteristics. In terms of 
the valuation discount, measured by Tobin's Q ratio, dual class companies have a lower 
value compared to a group of matching single class concentrated control companies. This is 
consistent with the findings of prior studies such as King and Santor (2008), Gompers et al. 
(2010), and Smith et al. (2009). The test for mean (median) difference is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Using median Q ratio, there is a 9.3% discount of 
dual class firms compared to single class companies. Figure 2 shows the average discount of 
restricted voting shares relative to superior voting for dual class companies with both classes 
of shares trading over the period of 1998-2007. The mean (median) discount over this period 
is 5.10% (5.98%). In terms of firm size, the univariate test indicates that there is no 
difference in the mean (median) size of dual class firms and their matching single class 
concentrated control counterpart (Table 3, Panel B). Measured by sales, the mean size of 
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dual class firms is $4.9 billion compared to $4.6 billion for single class concentrated control 
firms. Similarly, there is no difference between single class and dual class firms in terms of 
risk (standard deviation), growth, performance (ROA) and financial leverage (D/A). This 
implies that, based on firm characteristics, the propensity score matching produces a 
relatively good group of control firms. 
5.2.0 Regression Analysis 
5.2.1 Ownership Structure and Compensation 
The relationship between executive compensation and ownership structure after 
accounting for firm characteristics and governance determinants of executive compensation 
is examined using fixed effects regression. The dependent variable includes various 
components of the executives' compensation package as well as total compensation 
(Execucomp item TDC1). The results are presented in Table 4. Under the identification 
assumption that variation in concentrated control is exogenous, the regression results are 
consistent with the prediction of hypothesis 1. Executives in dual class companies are paid 
significantly higher salaries, bonuses, other compensation, options and total compensation. 
The results provide evidence that dual class executives are using their voting power to 
extract resources from the firm at the expense of minority shareholders. This finding is 
consistent with the private benefits of control and the agency costs arguments. Management 
voting leverage is positive and significant for each component of compensation package as 
well as total compensation. This implies that the greater the voting power relative to cash 
flow ownership, the greater the excess compensation paid to dual class executives. The 
55 
positive relationship between management voting leverage and executive compensation for 
all senior level executives corroborates the findings of Masulis et al. (2009) for CEOs only. 
Several firm characteristics are positive and significant which are consistent with 
previous research findings. As expected, performance is positively associated with total 
compensation and all components of executive compensation, except for salary.36 Financial 
leverage is negative and significant for total compensation and stock options. The 
coefficient on size is positive and significant indicating that larger firms tend to pay their 
executives higher compensation. The evidence is consistent with the argument that 
compensation related to size, complexity and investment opportunities reflects a demand for 
higher quality executives (Core et al., 1999; and Chalmers et al., 2006). Firm risk, measured 
by standard deviation of returns, is positively associated with bonuses, stock options and 
total compensation. This implies that executives in more risky firms demand higher 
compensation. The evidence is consistent with Chalmers et al. (2006). Growth is positive 
and significant for total compensation which is primarily driven by bonuses and stock 
options. This implies that firms with growth options tend to compensate their executives 
with more incentive based compensation compared to fixed salaries. 
Table 4 also presents results for several governance variables that have been proven 
to explain executive compensation. Larger boards (number of directors) lead to higher 
compensation. This evidence suggests that larger boards are less effective in reducing excess 
compensation. This is consistent with prior studies such as Core et al. (1999). In theory, a 
greater percentage of independent directors should result in lower executive compensation 
because independent directors are expected to be better monitors. However, the coefficient 
361 replaced ROA as a measure of performance with annual stock returns and the results are qualitatively 
similar. 
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on independent directors is positive indicating that a greater percentage of independent 
directors leads to higher executive compensation. The greater the percentage of busy or grey 
directors, the higher the executive compensation. The evidence suggests that boards with a 
high proportion of busy and grey directors are less effective in monitoring managers and 
acting in the interest of shareholders. Finally, the results presented in Table 4 indicate that 
the percentage of family directors on the board leads to lower executive compensation as 
predicted. However, the percentage of institutional ownership does not influence executive 
compensation. 
5.2.2 Family Executives and Compensation 
Table 5 presents the results for various family executives after controlling for 
management voting leverage, firm characteristics and several governance variables that 
explain executive compensation. Being family members in executive positions in both dual 
class and single class concentrated control firms has a positive impact on executive 
compensation. The coefficient on family CEOs and chairmen is positive and significant 
indicating that family members performing the dual role of CEO and chairman received 
significantly higher compensation. Family CEOs who are not the Chairmen also received 
higher total compensation. This evidence is consistent with the findings of Cheung et al. 
(2005), Basu et al. (2007) and Cohen and Lauterbach (2008). Family members in other 
executive positions earn significantly higher compensation compared to non-family 
executives in similar positions. Family Chairmen, CFOs and COOs received significantly 
higher total compensation compared to non-family executives in similar positions. 
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Table 6 presents regression results for a sub-sample of family executives only in 
both dual and single class concentrated control firms. Examining compensation of dual class 
family executives compared to single class family executives, total compensation as well as 
various components of executive compensation are regressed on several interaction 
variables along with firm characteristics and governance determinants of executive 
compensation. As predicted, dual class family executives received significantly higher 
compensation compared to family executives in similar positions in single class 
concentrated control firms, except for dual class family VPs. This provides additional 
support for the extraction of private benefits of control and the agency cost arguments. In 
terms of the various components of the compensation package, dual class family executives 
seem to be extracting private benefits in the form of higher salaries and other compensation. 
5.2.3 Dual Class Discount and Corporate Cash Holdings 
Dual class firms, on average, retain more cash compared to single class companies 
with concentrated control. The mean (median) cash holdings for dual class companies is 
$642.3 million ($166.0 million) compared to $431.0 million ($132.8 million) for single class 
concentrated control firms (Table 3, Panel B). The univariate test for the difference in mean 
(median) is positive and significant at the 1% level. The change in cash, year t-1 to year t, is 
larger in dual class companies compared to single class concentrated control companies. 
This implies that managers in dual class companies are retaining excess cash which can be 
58 
used to provide private benefits. In addition, the mean (median) excess cash holdings, scaled 
by total assets, is 2.4% (0.35%) and the mean is statistically significant at the 5% level.37 
Table 7 provides evidence which links the discount of dual class companies to the 
managerial extraction of private benefits of control. I estimate equation (7) and present the 
results in Table 7. In models (1) and (2) the dependent variable, dual discount, is the 
difference between Q ratio for dual class firms and matching single class concentrated 
control firms. In columns (3) and (4), the dual class discount is computed as the difference 
between dual class firms and their respective SIC industry average Q ratio. Using both 
measures of discount, I find that the interaction term between excess cash holdings and 
management voting leverage is negative and significant after controlling for excess cash, 
management voting leverage and other control variables. The result is consistent with the 
argument that when managers control a significant proportion of votes relative to equity 
ownership, excess corporate cash holdings is more likely to be diverted to provide private 
benefits and thus investors discount the value of dual class companies. The findings imply 
that investors view excess cash in dual class companies as a potential avenue for the 
extraction of private benefits. Therefore, excess cash exacerbates the agency conflict 
between controlling shareholders and managers and minority shareholders. For the control 
variables, the signs are generally consistent with those reported in the literature. For 
example, the difference in dividends paid or payable to restricted shareholders is positive 
and significant when dual class discount is measured using average industry Q ratio. 
37 Excess cash is defined as: 
A cash,, 
Total assets,_ \J 
A casht t 
Total assets,_ \) 
where the change in 
'Single class 'Dual class 
corporate cash holdings is cash and marketable securities at the end of year t minus cash and marketable 
securities at the end of year t-1. 
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5.2.4 Dual Class Discount and Capital Expenditure 
Univariate tests indicate that dual class firms undertake more capital investments 
compared to single class closely-held companies. The mean (median) capital expenditure for 
dual class firms is $256.5 million ($65.5 million) relative to $138.3 million ($46.5 million) 
for single class concentrated control companies (Table 3, Panel B). Given the size of the 
capital expenditure for dual class companies, one would suspect that capital expenditure is a 
channel through which managers and controlling shareholders can extract private benefits. 
However, the multivariate test does not support this view. Table 8 reports the results of 
estimating the impact of capital expenditure on both measures of dual class discount. The 
results indicate that after controlling for management voting leverage and other factors, 
capital expenditure does not affect dual class discounts. This implies that investors do not 
view capital expenditure as an avenue through which controlling shareholders and managers 
extract private benefits. One possible explanation is that it is difficult to disentangle the 
effects of real long-term investments and potential extraction of private benefits through the 
use of capital expenditure on firm value. Alternatively, capital expenditure may not be an 
avenue to extract private benefits due to its importance as capital investment for corporate 
growth. 
5.2.5 Dual Class Discount and Excess Compensation 
To test the rational investor hypothesis explaining dual class discount firms using 
excess compensation, I estimate equation (9) and obtain the excess compensation. I then 
estimate equation (10) and the results are presented in Table 9. The results indicate that after 
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controlling for excess corporate cash holdings, the higher the excess total compensation, the 
larger the valuation discount of dual class companies (Panel A, Table 9, Column V). Also, 
various components of the compensation package such as excess salary, bonuses and other 
compensation result in a greater discount of dual class companies. We can argue that 
investors believe that executive compensation is a channel through which controlling 
shareholders' and managers' can extract private benefits. The interaction term between 
excess cash and management voting leverage is negative and significant. This confirms the 
rational investor hypothesis that investors expect executives in dual class firms to use their 
control to extract resources for the firms they control. Therefore, investors, in turn, discount 
the value of dual class firms. The control variables corroborate prior findings. Size is 
positive and significant which is consistent with prior studies, such as that of Zingales 
(1995). 
In column VI (Panel A, Table 9), I examine the relationship between family 
executives' excess compensation and dual class discount. Excess compensation paid to 
family CEOs (CEO only and CEO and Chairman) in dual class companies leads to an 
increase in the valuation discount of dual class firms. This is consistent with the evidence 
provided by King and Santor (2008). 
In Panel B, Table 9, the dual discount is computed using the industry average Q 
ratio. The results for total compensation, salary and other compensation are similar to the 
results reported in Panel A, Table 9. As for dual class family excess total compensation, 
excess compensation to family CEOs results in a larger dual class discount. 
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5.3 Endogeneity 
5.3.1 Simultaneity and Two-Stage Least Square Estimation 
The identification assumption crucial to the causal interpretation of the findings 
above is that the variation in management voting leverage is unrelated to unobserved factors 
which influence executive compensation. This assumption is motivated by the observation 
that ownership structure is established at the IPO stage or earlier in the firm's life cycle. 
However, there are occasions where dual class ownership and control structure is 
established long after IPO. Therefore, it is possible that some unobserved factors correlate 
with changes in control structures that affect executive compensation. Therefore, the 
regression estimates in Tables 4-6 are likely to be biased and inconsistent due to 
simultaneity. In order to address the potential simultaneous process determining executive 
compensation and ownership structure or omitted variable bias, a two stage least square 
estimation technique is utilized. Executive ownership can influence the level of executive 
compensation, while executive compensation, especially stock options, can influence their 
ownership level. As a result, the following specification will be jointly estimated with 
equation (13): 
Mgmt.Votej
 t =a + \\i Ln( Compensation ) . t Jt +v|/ Beta + \\i Lev.t +M? Qt 
+ \\f Name + \\i Media+\\i Sizet+Zjt (12), 
where management voting leverage, compensation, financial leverage (Lev.) and size are 
defined in Table 1A, Appendix A. Beta is estimated using the previous 5 years of monthly 
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returns. Q is the Tobin's Q ratio. Name is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm name is 
the same as an individual's name. Media is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the 
media industry.39 
5 
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where Pred.Mgmt.Vote is the predicted management voting leverage from equation (12) 
above. 
The results of the second stage regression are presented in Table 10. Column I 
shows the estimates for equation (13) for total compensation. Predicted management voting 
leverage is positive and significant indicating that executives are using their voting power to 
extract higher compensation. Column II presents results for a modified version of equation 
(13) which includes family executive indicator variables. The results are similar to those 
presented in Table 5. Finally, column III reports the second stage results for a sub-sample of 
family executives only. Dual class family executives received significantly higher total 
compensation, except for family VPs in dual class firms. 
I used leverage, size, beta and Tobin's Q as determinants of management voting leverage following Lins 
(2003) and Smith et al., (2009). 
39
 A firm is defined as a media firm if it belongs to SIC codes 2710-11, 2720-21, 2730-31, 4830, 4832-33, 
4840-41, 7810, 7812 and 7820. Gompers et al., (2010) show that name and media variables are important 
predictors of dual class ownership structure. Therefore, I include a name and media variable in estimating 
equation (12). 
63 
5.3.2 Heckman Sample Selection 
It is possible that dual class firms self-select this type of ownership structure and 
therefore, we have to account for the sample selection bias. Using the Heckman (1979) two-
stage estimation procedure, I account for the potential bias due to self-selection. In the first 
stage, I estimate a probit model with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the firm is a dual 
class firm and 0 otherwise. Several of the independent variables used in determining dual 
class status are based on prior studies such as Gompers et al. (2010). Using the estimated 
parameters from the probit model, I compute the inverse Mills ratio which is included as an 
additional explanatory variable in the pool regression. The results of the Heckman second-
stage estimation are presented in Table 11. The results are similar to those presented in 
Tables 4-6. The inverse Mills ratio is not significant indicating that sample self-selection 
bias does not affect the results. 
5.3.3 Robustness Check 
It is often argued in the literature that equity ownership by executives tends to have 
an impact on their compensation. Executives having a significant ownership stake in the 
firm they manage are less likely to extract excess compensation. As a result, I include 
percentage of equity ownership as an additional explanatory variable. The percentage of 
equity ownership is negative and significant at the 5% level (Table 12). This corroborates 
evidence from prior studies (Core et al., 1999 and Chalmers et al., 2006). However, 
management voting leverage is still positive and significant at the 1% level after controlling 
for the percentage of equity ownership by each executive, governance variables and firm 
characteristics. In addition, the literature on CEO compensation often argues that a CEO's 
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age is a positive determinant of CEO compensation. Therefore, I include executives' age as 
a control variable and re-estimate equations 4-6 above. The coefficient on the age variable is 
not statistically significant (Table 12). 
I also re-examined the valuation discount of dual class firms using only those with 
both classes of shares trading on the exchange. There are 18 dual class firms (126 firm-year 
observations) that have both classes of shares trading in the sample. The regression results 
(not reported) are qualitatively similar to those presented in Tables 7 and 8. 
6.0 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
A long standing concern regarding concentrated ownership and control is that it 
creates agency problems and also leads to the extraction of private benefits and agency 
costs, especially in dual class firms where there is the separation of voting and cash flow 
rights. In addition, the channels through which controlling shareholders and managers can 
extract private benefits have not been well documented in the literature. Of particular 
interest is the relationship between these channels and the observed valuation discount of 
dual class companies compared to single class concentrated control companies. Using Q 
ratio as a measure of value, I show that there is a significant difference in the valuation 
between dual and single class companies. Using mean (median) Q ratio, there is an 8.33 % 
(9.3%) discount of dual class firms relative to matching single class companies. 
Using a sample of 1584 dual and single class concentrated control companies over 
the period 2001-2007 from the S&P 1500 group of companies and utilizing panel regression 
techniques with industry and year fixed effects, this essay provides empirical evidence 
showing a direct link between dual class discount and excess compensation and excess cash. 
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However, capital expenditure does not explain the dual class discount. Therefore, the 
channels of wealth expropriation are excess compensation in general, excess compensation 
for family members, and excess corporate cash holdings. The degree of excess 
compensation is greatest in dual class companies with executives who are family members. 
This essay tests the effects of two different ownership structures with different forms 
of concentrated control using a sample of U.S firms. In the first ownership structure, 
concentrated control is obtained via majority voting rights (dual class ownership structure). 
In the second sample, control occurs through significant equity ownership (single class 
concentrated control firms). The tests indicate that executives in dual class companies earn 
significantly higher compensation compared to executives in similar single class companies. 
The results also show that family CEOs in dual class companies receive higher 
compensation compared to family CEOs in single class concentrated control companies. 
Family CEOs, in general, are paid more compensation relative to non-family CEOs. I 
conducted a series of robustness checks and corrections of potential endogeneity due to 
simultaneity and self-selection biases. Using two-stage least square and Heckman sample 
selection specification, the results are robust to potential endogeneity biases. Also, I re-run 
the analysis with "wedge" instead of management voting leverage. In addition, I include 
executives' age and equity ownership and the results remain qualitatively the same. 
Using the valuation discount of dual class firms, I provide evidence of private 
benefits of control by relating excess compensation to the dual class discount. In particular, 
excess total compensation paid to dual class family CEOs increases the dual class discount. 
In addition, excess cash holdings lead to a larger valuation discount of dual class companies 
relative to single class concentrated control firms. This is consistent with the belief that 
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managers can misuse corporate cash holdings in the pursuit of private benefits and as a 
result, investors discount the value of dual class companies. Additional tests indicated that 
capital expenditure is not a channel for the expropriation of shareholders' wealth in dual 
class companies. Consistent with Masulis et al. (2009), the two channels of extraction of 
private benefits from dual class companies are executive compensation and cash holdings. 
In summary, the evidence supports the agency cost argument that dual class 
controlling shareholders and managers use their control to extract private benefits from the 
firm at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, investors are aware of this perquisite 
consumption and discount the value of these companies, accordingly. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of executive compensation (2001-2007) 
Significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% is indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. Test for difference in mean is the t-test and test for 
difference in median is the Wilcoxon signed-rank. 
Panel A: All Executives 
($000) Dual Class 
Mean Median _ " Obs Dev. 
Salary 503.41 400.48 449.61 3960 
Bonuses 468.76 150.00 1280.26 3960 
Other Compensation 126.64 19.64 646.37 3960 
Stock Options 1216.94 286.50 3349.62 3960 
Total Compensation 2597.74 1454.35 4588.05 3960 
Single Class 
Mean Median „ ' Obs Dev. 
429.08 360.00 255.77 3960 
330.60 135.65 808.52 3960 
122.77 22.98 576.06 3960 
1214.37 388.85 2631.82 3960 
2319.55 1280.87 3639.96 3960 
Test for 
difference 
in mean 
c 72*** 
0.28 
0.04 
2.17** 
Test for 
difference 
in median 
T 27*** 
-1.87* 
-6.90*** 
2.08** 
Panel B: President and Chief Executive Officer 
($000) 
Salary 
Bonuses 
Other Compensation 
Stock Options 
Total Compensation 
Mean 
779.79 
1008.15 
221.68 
2500.67 
5197.12 
Dual Class 
Median 
690.30 
351.40 
47.23 
750.41 
2828.54 
Std. 
Dev. 
617.36 
2276.79 
994.37 
5973.59 
6060.02 
Obs 
819 
819 
819 
819 
819 
Single Class 
Mean 
685.33 
624.52 
199.27 
2577.54 
4743.65 
Median 
650.00 
283.85 
46.97 
1055.58 
2551.79 
Std. 
Dev. 
318.20 
1326.66 
651.05 
4387.90 
5180.89 
Obs 
808 
808 
808 
808 
808 
Test for 
difference 
in mean 
-5 0 7 * * * 
414*** 
I 95** 
-0.29 
2.18** 
Test for 
difference 
in median 
2 72*** 
2.48** 
0.16 
-3.84*** 
2.54** 
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Table 1 Cont'd 
Panel C: Chief Financial Officer 
Dual Class 
Salary 
Bonuses 
Other Compensation 
Stock Options 
Total Compensation 
Mean 
394.60 
289.82 
76.12 
866.08 
1775.06 
Median 
344.14 
113.18 
17.26 
276.21 
1082.56 
Std. 
Dev. 
228.17 
578.07 
326.41 
1809.93 
2389.54 
Obs 
670 
670 
670 
670 
670 
Single Class 
Mean 
349.17 
247.56 
84.40 
819.75 
1719.54 
Median 
319.00 
137.23 
19.79 
343.40 
1071.70 
Std. 
Dev. 
169.94 
432.65 
431.17 
1484.91 
2050.77 
Obs 
702 
702 
702 
702 
702 
Test for 
difference 
in mean 
413*** 
1.89* 
-0.39 
0.26 
0.18 
Test for 
difference 
in median 
3 62*** 
-0.26 
-1.10 
-2.53** 
0.63 
Panel D: Chief Operating Officer 
Dual Class 
Salary 
Bonuses 
Other Compensation 
Stock Options 
Total Compensation 
Mean 
555.61 
573.62 
141.19 
1164.24 
2835.11 
Median 
477.50 
209.59 
23.25 
372.64 
1696.83 
Std. 
Dev. 
518.82 
1406.42 
427.81 
2244.56 
3802.98 
Obs 
374 
374 
374 
374 
374 
Single Class 
Mean 
442.24 
359.47 
174.65 
1235.38 
2547.76 
Median 
403.70 
163.90 
23.44 
519.26 
1425.98 
Std. 
Dev. 
208.96 
906.01 
1125.85 
2309.04 
3474.51 
Obs 
352 
352 
352 
352 
352 
Test of 
Mean 
difference 
3 g2*** 
2.42** 
-0.53 
-0.42 
1.98** 
Test of 
Median 
difference 
3.63*** 
2.67*** 
-0.56 
-1.87* 
2.07** 
Panel E: Vice President 
Dual Class 
Salary 
Bonuses 
Other Compensation 
Stock Options 
Total Compensation 
Mean 
357.32 
229.15 
60.70 
766.27 
1521.43 
Median 
315.00 
208.08 
13.62 
196.05 
957.52 
Std. 
Dev. 
182.70 
596.33 
215.48 
2142.24 
2501.34 
Obs 
1583 
1583 
1583 
1583 
1583 
Mean 
329.04 
181.92 
44.72 
743.71 
1398.45 
Single 
Median 
300.00 
109.16 
21.33 
274.27 
887.61 
Class 
Std. 
Dev. 
151.07 
409.66 
410.04 
1481.36 
1862.25 
Obs 
1625 
1625 
1625 
1625 
1625 
Test for 
difference 
in mean 
4 35*** 
3 02*** 
2.42** 
0.34 
2.04** 
Test for 
difference 
in median 
3 80*** 
2.33** 
-5.08*** 
-5 94*** 
3 29*** 
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Table 1 Cont'd 
Panel F: Family CEO & Chairman 
Dual Class 
Salary 
Bonuses 
Other Compensation 
Stock Options 
Total Compensation 
Mean 
885.67 
1264.78 
354.13 
3982.87 
7313.90 
Median 
800.00 
369.60 
103.21 
616.63 
2987.81 
Std. 
Dev. 
558.35 
2788.90 
490.99 
6889.87 
9684.55 
Obs 
201 
201 
201 
201 
201 
Single Class 
Mean 
666.37 
823.63 
89.91 
2501.99 
4460.25 
Median 
582.50 
278.15 
16.91 
875.50 
1527.34 
Std. 
Dev. 
313.71 
2847.06 
147.66 
4736.53 
6346.50 
Obs 
94 
94 
94 
94 
94 
Test for 
difference 
in mean 
2.69*** 
2.25*** 
2 57*** 
1.37 
2.22** 
Test for 
difference 
in median 
3 22*** 
1.98** 
4 59*** 
-0.94 
3 37*** 
Panel G: Family CEO 
Family CEO 
Salary 
Bonuses 
Other Compensation 
Stock Options 
Total Compensation 
Only 
Mean 
708.79 
1231.96 
225.53 
2534.48 
5195.37 
Dual Class 
Median 
650.00 
420.00 
32.66 
937.17 
2823.63 
Std. 
Dev. 
480.71 
774.55 
718.69 
4931.29 
5128.17 
Obs 
175 
175 
175 
175 
175 
Mean 
573.51 
359.15 
169.12 
2623.87 
4078.05 
Single 
Median 
581.75 
14.00 
48.87 
1373.15 
2140.08 
Class 
Std. 
Dev. 
257.75 
708.64 
288.07 
3781.29 
4542.40 
Obs 
47 
47 
47 
47 
47 
Test for 
difference 
in mean 
1.86* 
2.13** 
0.22 
-0.11 
2.25** 
Test for 
difference 
in median 
2.09** 
3 go*** 
-0.86 
-1.10 
2.06** 
Panel H: Family CEO Vs. Non-Family CEO 
Family CEO 
Salary 
Bonuses 
Other Compensation 
Stock Options 
Total Compensation 
Mean 
768.60 
1108.28 
241.78 
3093.68 
5806.49 
Median 
675.00 
341.44 
45.86 
792.00 
2837.13 
Std. 
Dev. 
577.54 
2700.16 
1189.98 
5233.53 
6042.82 
Obs 
517 
517 
517 
517 
517 
Non-Family CEO 
Mean 
716.62 
685.31 
196.34 
2288.06 
4658.71 
Median 
657.42 
311.00 
47.94 
821.75 
2582.60 
Std. 
Dev. 
450.53 
1322.69 
621.17 
4008.14 
5636.95 
Obs 
1110 
1110 
1110 
1110 
1110 
Test for 
difference 
in mean 
I 97** 
4 23*** 
1.01 
2 07*** 
3 i i * * * 
Test for 
difference 
in median 
2.44** 
2.47** 
-0.66 
-1.43 
2.86*** 
Note: CEO and President are referred to as CEO in the above panels. 
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Table 2: Number of dual class firms by two-digit SIC industry code 
This table illustrates the two-digit SIC code industry distribution of 792 firm-year observations over 
the period 2001-2007. 
SIC Code 
10-17 
20 
22 
23 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
42 
47 
48 
50-51 
52-59 
60-61 
62 
63 
67 
72 
73 
78 
79 
80 
82 
87 
Industry description 
Construction 
Food and Kinder Products 
Textile Mill Products 
Appeal and other Finish Products 
Printing and Publishing 
Chemicals and Allied Products 
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 
Rubber and Misc. Plastic Products 
Leather and Leather Products 
Primary Metals 
Fabricated Metal Product 
Industrial Machinery and Equipment 
Electronic and other Electrical Equipment 
Transportation Equipment 
Instrument and Related Products 
Misc. Manufacturing Industries 
Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing 
Transportation Services 
Communications 
Wholesale Trade 
Retail trade 
Deposit Institution, and Non-depository Credit Institutions 
Security And Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, & Services 
Insurance 
Holding And Other Investment Offices 
Personal Services 
Business Services 
Motion Pictures 
Amusement and Rec. Services 
Health Services 
Educational Services 
Engineering and Management Services 
% of total 
2.78 
7.70 
2.40 
1.89 
8.21 
4.92 
0.51 
1.39 
1.89 
0.25 
0.76 
4.04 
7.58 
3.41 
3.54 
1.52 
1.14 
0.76 
7.95 
2.90 
8.59 
1.52 
2.27 
3.66 
1.77 
1.52 
9.09 
1.77 
2.02 
1.01 
0.51 
0.76 
Note: The industry breakdown for the single class concentrated control companies is exactly the 
same as above due to matching by industry group. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of governance characteristics, firm characteristics and executive characteristics 
Significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% is indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. Test for difference in mean is the t-test and test for 
difference in median is the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Panel A: Governance Characteristics 
Dual Class 
Mean Median „ 
Dev. 
Cash Flow Rights (Largest Shareholder) % 22.50 18.20 16.50 
Voting Rights (Largest Shareholder) % 57.80 54.80 25.70 
Cash Flow Rights (Management & Directors) % 24.90 19.30 15.60 
Voting Rights (Management & Directors) % 58.30 57.30 25.20 
Mgmt. Voting Lev. 3.01 2.42 2.15 
Institutional Ownership % 16.92 13.60 15.66 
Board Size 10.89 10.00 3.89 
Independent directors % 59.29 58.33 15.39 
Busy Directors % 16.58 12.50 14.72 
Grey Directors % 10.23 9.09 11.75 
Family Directors % 15.80 12.50 12.73 
Single Class 
Mean Median _. 
Dev. 
23.60 19.20 13.20 
23.60 19.20 13.20 
17.10 16.50 14.10 
17.10 16.50 14.10 
1.00 1.00 0.00 
21.49 18.71 14.96 
10.32 10.00 3.48 
68.81 71.43 16.33 
13.00 11.11 15.34 
9.89 7.69 12.14 
5.62 0.00 10.60 
Test for 
difference 
in mean 
-0.71 
34 33*** 
14.21*** 
44 25*** 
-13 24*** 
0.87 
-26.71*** 
5 j9*** 
3 o«*** 
34.83*** 
Test for 
difference 
in median 
-0.62 
15.75*** 
447*** 
15.82*** 
82.55*** 
-15.65*** 
0.08 
-27.01*** 
6.88*** 
4.58*** 
37.86*** 
Note: Observation for dual class sample is 792 firm-year and single class sample is 792 firm-year. A grey director is defined as an outside 
director who is related to the company through a transactional relationship and a busy director is a director with more than 4 board 
memberships. 
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Table 3 cont'd 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Dual Class 
Tobin's Q ratio 
Industry Adjusted Q 
Sales ($m) 
Risk- Std Deviation % 
Performance - RET % 
Performance - ROA % 
Financial Leverage -D/A 
Growth (%) 
Cash ($m) 
ACash, ($m) 
ACash, / Total Asset,.] 
Capex ($m) 
ACapex ($m) 
ACapex/Market Value Equity 
Mean 
1.87 
-0.59 
4917.45 
40.27 
12.61 
9.75 
21.61 
9.98 
642.28 
48.99 
0.028 
256.54 
21.73 
0.024 
Median 
1.47 
-0.41 
1523.90 
30.79 
8.35 
8.87 
20.34 
6.67 
166.00 
5.14 
0.003 
65.50 
1.78 
0.007 
Std. Dev. 
1.24 
1.73 
14597.23 
31.46 
34.87 
8.81 
18.10 
15.61 
775.81 
508.54 
0.173 
518.22 
143.35 
0.065 
Single Class 
Mean 
2.04 
-0.39 
4653.87 
40.88 
10.80 
9.57 
21.81 
9.37 
431.08 
24.98 
0.012 
138.34 
7.44 
0.007 
Median 
1.62 
-0.35 
1629.00 
31.10 
7.45 
9.06 
20.82 
6.46 
132.80 
5.27 
0.002 
46.51 
1.36 
0.001 
Std. Dev. 
1.25 
2.26 
15302.38 
28.12 
38.52 
9.30 
18.96 
16.64 
841.11 
119.54 
0.095 
308.65 
132.88 
0.068 
Test for 
difference 
in mean 
-3 02*** 
-2.00** 
0.78 
-0.29 
2.18** 
0.86 
-0.58 
1.07 
2.88*** 
1.79* 
1.99** 
3 33*** 
2.24** 
9 21*** 
Test for 
difference 
in median 
-4 53*** 
-1.98** 
-0.89 
-0.69 
1.58 
-0.04 
-0.28 
1.08 
3 ig*** 
-1.03 
1.73* 
3.84*** 
0.78 
9 Q Q * * * 
Note: The number of observations for each of the dual and single class samples is 792 firm-year. 
Industry Adjusted Q-Mean is defined as the difference between the firm's Q ratio and the average SIC Industry Q ratio. 
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Table 3: Cont'd 
Panel C: Executive Characteristics 
Dual Class Single Class 
Chairman only 
Chief Executive Officer & Chairman 
Chief Executive Officer Only 
Chief Financial Officer 
Chief Operating Officer 
Vice President 
Other Executives 
Total 
Family 
Executives 
115(63.5%) 
201 (51.8%) 
175 (40.6%) 
21(3.1%) 
47(12.6%) 
81(5.1%) 
18(6.1%) 
658 (16.8%) 
Non-Family 
Executives 
66 (36.5%) 
187(48.2%) 
256 (59.4%) 
649 (96.9%) 
327 (87.4%) 
1502(94.9%) 
275 (93.9%) 
3262 (83.2%) 
Trttal 
181 
388 
431 
670 
374 
1583 
293 
3920 
Family 
Executives 
33 (34.0%) 
94(20.4%) 
47 (13.5%) 
13(1.8%) 
12 (3.4%) 
26(1.6*) 
6(1.8%) 
231(5.9%) 
Non-Family 
Executives 
64 (66%) 
366 (79.6%) 
301 (86.5%) 
689 (98.2%) 
340 (96.6%) 
1599(98.4%) 
330 (98.2%) 
3689(94.1%) 
Total 
97 
460 
348 
702 
352 
1625 
336 
3920 
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Table 4: Regression of executive compensation on management voting leverage, firm 
and governance characteristics 
For a complete definition of the variables see Appendix A, Table 1A 
5 
Ln( Compensati on)l t = a ( + (j)( Mgmt Vote t_x + X1"!, kFirm Chara cteristics k ,_, 
k=\ ' 
'k,j + Z i , j , t + X S ( k Governance k , + Z Y, A Position t 
k=\ ' 'J' k=\ 
where Ln( Compensati on)l , is the natural log of the /"'components as well as total compensation 
for all senior executives' compensation package for firm j at year /. T-statistics are adjusted for 
robust standard errors and reported below the estimated coefficient. Significance level at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% is indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Mgmt. vote 
Firm Characteristics 
Performance (ROA) 
Financial Leverage 
(D/A) 
Size (Log of sales) 
Risk (Std. Dev.) 
Growth 
Salary 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
0.021 
10.53*** 
-0.238 
-3 80*** 
-0.036 
-0.95 
0.428 
35 49*** 
-0.032 
-1.76* 
-0.232 
-6.09*** 
Governance Characteristics 
Board Size 
Independent Directors 
Busy Directors 
Grey Directors 
Fam. Directors 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.014 
6.22*** 
0.071 
1.59 
0.069 
1.90* 
0.198 
440*** 
0.242 
3 yg*** 
-0.025 
-0.88 
Bonuses 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
0.033 
6 13*** 
0.601 
2 22*** 
0.212 
2.67*** 
0.848 
25.82*** 
0.153 
3 02*** 
0.205 
1.89* 
0.026 
4 23*** 
0.037 
0.35 
0.118 
1.17 
0.012 
0.10 
0.231 
1.85* 
0.234 
2 on*** 
Other 
Compensation 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
0.021 
2.15** 
0.829 
3 4i*** 
0.159 
1.44 
0.751 
18.89*** 
-0.180 
-2.57** 
-0.905 
-7 08*** 
0.017 
2.52** 
0.207 
1.69* 
0.047 
0.36 
-0.182 
-1.20 
0.025 
0.15 
0.409 
3.68*** 
Stock 
Options 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
0.016 
2.67*** 
0.760 
3 59*** 
-0.613 
-5.84*** 
1.003 
29 39*** 
0.581 
Q4Q*** 
1.381 
12.98*** 
0.027 
4 04*** 
0.136 
1.12 
0.331 
3 no*** 
0.124 
0.86 
-0.338 
-2.36** 
0.054 
0.57 
Total 
Compensation 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
0.029 
8.80*** 
0.320 
2.06** 
-0.283 
-5 51*** 
0.862 
44.00*** 
0.103 
2 go*** 
0.563 
6 94*** 
0.014 
4 39*** 
0.383 
6.15*** 
0.254 
4.02*** 
0.193 
2.58*** 
-0.251 
-3 24*** 
0.085 
1.60 
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Table 4 Cont'd 
Executive Positions 
CEO & Chairman 
CEO Only 
Chair Only 
CFO 
COO 
VP 
Intercept 
Industry & 
Year Effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
Salary 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
0.613 
2959*** 
0.421 
17 79*** 
0.302 
4.05*** 
-0.11 
-5 92*** 
0.117 
5 40*** 
-0.156 
-9 00*** 
4.304 
90 51*** 
Yes 
0.465 
7920 
Bonuses 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
1.055 
17 89*** 
0.839 
14.58*** 
0.731 
7 39*** 
-0.091 
-1.80* 
0.272 
4 39*** 
-0.245 
-5.36*** 
1.807 
13.00*** 
Yes 
0.359 
5585 
Other 
Compensation 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
1.009 
12 99*** 
0.575 
7 j6*** 
0.778 
6.48*** 
-0.033 
-0.48 
0.201 
2.47** 
-0.033 
-0.54 
-0.008 
-0.04 
Yes 
0.223 
7333 
Stock 
Options 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
1.353 
22.40*** 
1.15 
17 58*** 
0.725 
6.23*** 
0.146 
2 59*** 
0.473 
7 32*** 
-0.044 
-0.83 
2.055 
13 33*** 
Yes 
0.427 
5894 
Total 
Compensation 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
1.008 
28.05*** 
0.821 
21 43*** 
0.471 
7.65*** 
-0.036 
-1.13 
0.281 
7 49*** 
-0.148 
-5 13*** 
3.694 
44.63*** 
Yes 
0.483 
7920 
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Table 5: Panel regression of executive compensation on family executives, 
management voting leverage, firm and governance characteristics 
For a complete definition of the variables see Appendix A, Table 1A 
6 
Ln(Compensation) - a, + £<P,
 kFamilyPosition +§,MgmtVote 
i,j,i £_i ' k,j j,t-\ 
5 6 
+ Z'H,
 kFirm Characteristicsk tA + Y.&,,kGovernancek ]tA 
6 
k=\ 
+ T.y,ikPositionkj+e,Jit 
k=\ 
where Ln(Compensati on)t , is the natural log of the /* components as well as total compensation 
for all senior executives' compensation package for firm j at year /. T-statistics are adjusted for 
robust standard errors and reported below the estimated coefficient. Significance level at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% is indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Salary Bonuses 
Other 
Compensation 
Stock 
Options 
Total 
Compensation 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Fam. CEO & 
Chairman 
Fam. CEO Only 
Fam. Chair Only 
Fam. CFO 
Fam. COO 
Fam. VP 
Mgmt. Voting Lev. 
Firm Characteristics 
Performance 
(ROA) 
Financial Leverage 
(D/A) 
Size (Log of sales) 
Risk (Std. Dev.) 
Growth 
0.004 
0.13 
0.023 
0.53 
0.217 
1.56 
0.126 
1.29 
0.177 
3 7i*** 
-0.048 
-1.38 
0.020 
10.07*** 
-0.233 
-3 70*** 
-0.013 
-0.33 
0.426 
34.89*** 
-0.232 
-6.11*** 
-0.032 
-1.74* 
0.03 
1.65* 
0.061 
3.65*** 
-0.009 
-0.71 
0.02 
0.64 
0.053 
2.40** 
-0.039 
-1.00 
0.035 
4.22*** 
0.614 
-j 29*** 
0.254 
2.88*** 
0.846 
25.75*** 
0.216 
2.00** 
0.155 
3.06*** 
0.068 
0.58 
0.122 
0.97 
0.122 
0.57 
0.014 
0.04 
0.38 
1.52 
0.20 
1.58 
0.018 
1.95* 
0.827 
3.40*** 
0.151 
1.39 
0.749 
18.81*** 
-0.91 
-7 12*** 
-0.178 
-2.55** 
0.027 
1.79* 
0.042 
2.28** 
0.007 
0.38 
0.01 
0.67 
0.027 
2 75*** 
0.053 
1.45 
0.002 
0.25 
0.757 
3.65*** 
-0.549 
-5.46*** 
0.996 
28.77*** 
1.383 
13.02*** 
0.569 
g 27*** 
0.035 
-2 2i*** 
0.035 
3 oi*** 
0.027 
2.61*** 
0.04 
3 os*** 
0.029 
5 34*** 
0.001 
0.03 
0.017 
3 34*** 
0.526 
2.01** 
-0.285 
-5 09*** 
0.860 
43.81*** 
0.564 
7 00*** 
0.100 
2 70*** 
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Table 5 Cont'd 
Salary 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Governance Characteristics 
Board Size 
Independent 
Directors 
Busy Directors 
Grey Directors 
Fam. Directors 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Executive Positions 
CEO & Chairman 
CEO Only 
Chair Only 
CFO 
COO 
VP 
Intercept 
Industry & 
Year Effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
0.014 
6.05*** 
0.071 
1.59 
0.075 
2.05** 
0.198 
4 4Q*H=* 
0.208 
3 53*** 
-0.028 
-0.97 
0.42 
16.17*** 
0.196 
1.42 
0.615 
26.63*** 
-0.109 
_5 77*** 
0.108 
4.81*** 
-0.151 
-8.46*** 
4.308 
90.87*** 
Yes 
0.495 
7920 
Bonuses 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
0.025 
4.06*** 
0.044 
0.41 
0.137 
1.35 
0.033 
0.27 
0.194 
1.54 
0.226 
2.81*** 
0.789 
13 03*** 
0.755 
6.98*** 
1.028 
16.64*** 
-0.091 
-1.80* 
0.263 
4.22*** 
-0.242 
-5 27*** 
1.805 
12.88*** 
Yes 
0.392 
5585 
Other 
Compensation 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
0.016 
2.45** 
0.209 
1.71* 
0.062 
0.47 
-0.179 
-1.18 
-0.072 
-0.40 
0.407 
3.65*** 
0.548 
6.23*** 
0.725 
4.30*** 
0.988 
11.40*** 
-0.030 
-0.45 
0.179 
2.18** 
-0.038 
-0.62 
0.018 
0.10 
Yes 
0.221 
7333 
Stock 
Options 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
0.028 
5.03*** 
0.118 
0.97 
0.354 
3 29*** 
0.113 
0.78 
-0.337 
-2.34** 
0.028 
0.29 
1.118 
16.61*** 
0.733 
5 64*** 
1.327 
21.58*** 
0.145 
2.57** 
0.462 
7.08*** 
-0.048 
-0.91 
2.107 
13.41*** 
Yes 
0.451 
5894 
Total 
Compensation 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
0.014 
4.43*** 
0.373 
5.98*** 
0.267 
4.22*** 
0.192 
2.57** 
-0.266 
-3 42*** 
0.07 
1.32 
0.796 
19.98*** 
0.440 
6 53*** 
0.978 
26.47*** 
-0.037 
-1.18 
0.273 
7.22*** 
-0.147 
-5 10*** 
3.736 
44.46*** 
Yes 
0.512 
7920 
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Table 6: Panel regression for a sub-sample of family executives 
For a complete description of the variables see Appendix A, Table 1 A. 
6 
Ln(Compensati on)' , = a , + £(p,
 k(DFam .Execu .k x Mgmt. Vote t_x) 
k=\ ' 
5 
+ §tMgmt Vote t_x + Yir\l kFirm Char a ct eristics k n 
* = 1 ' 
6 6 
+ Y.^,,kGovernance
 k ,_, + Zy , kPosition k + s 
* = 1 A = l 
where Ln( Compensati on)x , is the natural log of the /* components as well as total compensation 
of each executives' compensation package for firm j at year / and DFam.Execu. is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 the kth family executive in they'"1 dual class firm and zero otherwise. T-statistics 
are adjusted for robust standard errors and reported below the estimated coefficients. Significance 
level at the 1%, 5% and 10% is indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Salary Bonuses 
Other 
Compensation 
Stock 
Options 
Total 
Compensation 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
DFam. CEO &Chair x 
Mgmt. Vote 
DFam. CEO only x 
Mgmt. Vote 
DFam. Chair only x 
Mgmt. Vote 
DFam. CFO x Mgmt. 
Vote 
DFam. COO x Mgmt. 
Vote 
DFam. VP x Mgmt. 
Vote 
Mgmt. Vote 
Firm Characteristics 
Performance (ROA) 
Financial Leverage 
(D/A) 
Size (Log of sales) 
Risk (Std. Dev.) 
Growth 
0.017 
2.12** 
0.021 
2.00** 
0.021 
2 93*** 
0.023 
2.00** 
0.022 
2 74*** 
-0.016 
-0.85 
0.069 
2.43** 
-0.112 
-0.46 
0.172 
1.50 
0.449 
12.09*** 
0.022 
0.31 
-0.350 
-2.31** 
0.041 
1.71* 
0.074 
2.57** 
0.001 
0.05 
-0.003 
-0.07 
0.009 
0.22 
-0.043 
-0.86 
0.238 
1.84* 
0.749 
1.15 
0.163 
0.54 
0.771 
6.60*** 
-0.050 
-0.26 
-0.656 
-1.6 
0.103 
2 7Q*** 
0.036 
0.89 
0.141 
4.66*** 
0.050 
0.89 
0.132 
7ig*** 
0.073 
1.44 
0.035 
0.35 
0.841 
1.13 
1.526 
3.56*** 
0.487 
3.06*** 
-0.036 
-0.13 
0.689 
1.06 
0.008 
0.48 
-0.020 
-0.86 
-0.010 
-0.56 
-0.006 
-0.33 
0.011 
0.76 
-0.051 
-1.09 
0.435 
4 40*** 
1.701 
1.99** 
-0.103 
-0.24 
1.178 
6.78*** 
1.216 
2 72*** 
1.134 
2.80*** 
0.026 
2.12** 
0.036 
2.28** 
0.048 
4_]4*** 
0.008 
0.51 
0.032 
2 07*** 
-0.054 
-1.27 
0.344 
6.24*** 
0.999 
2.03** 
0.108 
0.52 
0.886 
10.98**: 
-0.004 
-0.030 
0.697 
2.56** 
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Table 6 Cont'd 
Salary 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Governance Characteristics 
Board Size 
Independent Directors 
Busy Directors 
Grey Directors 
Family Directors 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Executive Positions 
CEO & Chairman 
CEO Only 
Chair Only 
CFO 
COO 
VP 
Intercept 
Industry & 
Year Effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
0.023 
2 97*** 
-0.186 
-1.65* 
-0.012 
-0.11 
-0.156 
-0.94 
0.176 
1.22 
-0.381 
-3 34*** 
0.277 
3.00*** 
0.083 
0.84 
0.065 
0.67 
-0.402 
-3 15*** 
-0.072 
-0.66 
-0.343 
-3 39*** 
4.486 
25.30*** 
Yes 
0.541 
889 
Bonuses 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
0.033 
1.90* 
0.254 
0.67 
0.453 
1.49 
0.161 
0.37 
-0.152 
-0.34 
0.531 
1.43 
0.429 
2.05** 
0.19 
0.86 
0.195 
0.84 
-0.112 
-0.37 
-0.048 
-0.17 
-0.748 
-2.84*** 
2.371 
c 27*** 
Yes 
0.576 
601 
Other 
Compensation 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
0.054 
2.44** 
-0.004 
-0.01 
0.493 
1.13 
-0.226 
-0.46 
-0.601 
-1.01 
-0.338 
-0.80 
0.623 
1.34 
0.377 
0.80 
0.334 
0.70 
-0.186 
-0.31 
-0.58 
-1.08 
-0.249 
-0.51 
0.215 
0.29 
Yes 
0.389 
804 
Stock 
Options 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
-0.015 
-0.69 
0.404 
0.98 
-0.030 
-0.08 
-0.516 
-1.14 
0.017 
0.03 
-0.164 
-0.36 
1.457 
3 08*** 
1.559 
2 30*** 
0.841 
1.69* 
0.424 
0.76 
0.724 
1.43 
0.890 
1.71* 
0.426 
0.54 
Yes 
0.396 
571 
Total 
Compensation 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
-0.012 
-1.08 
0.531 
2.55** 
0.430 
2.01** 
-0.14 
-0.52 
-0.029 
-0.11 
-0.030 
-0.13 
0.571 
•2 4 j # * * 
0.461 
271 *** 
-0.174 
-0.90 
0.012 
0.05 
-0.258 
-1.32 
-0.068 
-0.35 
3.375 
11.08*** 
Yes 
0.601 
889 
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Table 7: Panel regression of dual class discount on excess corporate cash holdings 
Dual Class Discount
 /+1 = a + (3j {Excess Cash x Mgmt.Vote) t + §2Mgmt. Vote t 
+ p^Excess Cash
 t + (3^Financial Leverage t 
+ fi5Conversion Right , + (36 Size t + fi7Div. diff t + s t 
where dual discount in models (1) & (2) is the difference between Tobin's Q ratio of a dual class 
company and the Q ratio a single class concentrated control company using propensity score 
matching. The dual class discount in models (3) and (4) is the difference between Q ratio of a dual 
class firm and its industry mean Q ratio. 
A cash. 
Total assets 
( 
t-\J 
A casht t 
Dual class V Total assets t-\ J Single class Excess cash is defined as v ' "»«<"«™ ^ ' "wpeciass
 w h e r e t h e 
change in cash is cash and marketable securities at the end of year t minus year t-1. Conversion right 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if superior voting shares can be converted into subordinate voting 
shares and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of market value of equity. Div. diff is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if dividend paid or payable to subordinate voting shares is greater than 
dividend paid or payable to superior voting shares and zero otherwise. T-statistics are adjusted for 
robust standard errors and reported below the estimated coefficients. Significance level at the 1%, 
5% and 10% is indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Excess Cash x Mgmt. Vote 
Mgmt. Vote 
Excess Cash 
ACashf 
ACash, x Casht. i f 
ACash, x Financial Leverage! 
Financial Leverage 
Conversion Rights 
Size 
-0.358 
-3.68*** 
-0.134 
-9 22*** 
1.097 
3.67*** 
-0.044 
-3 08*** 
-0.402 
-5.88*** 
0.118 
5.60*** 
-0.414 
-3.63*** 
-0.136 
-9 35*** 
1.308 
3 42*** 
-0.014 
-2 90*** 
0.02 
0.81 
0.001 
1.95* 
-0.039 
-2 79*** 
-0.400 
-5.81*** 
0.122 
5.77*** 
-0.474 
_4 4j*** 
-0.053 
-3 81*** 
1.478 
3 95*** 
-0.054 
-3 02*** 
-0.266 
-4 72*** 
0.204 
g 44*** 
-0.188 
-2.00** 
-0.052 
-3 70*** 
0.292 
0.86 
-0.013 
-3 11 *** 
0.12 
7Q5*** 
0.001 
0.86 
-0.062 
-3.46*** 
-0.274 
_4 9 ] * * * 
0.193 
8.01*** 
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Table 7 Cont'd 
i!) (?) (3) (4) 
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
t-statistics t-statistics t-statistics t-statistics 
Div. Difference 
Intercept 
-0.152 
-1.16 
-0.486 
-2.65*** 
Yes 
Yes 
0.147 
792 
-0.144 
-1.11 
-0.515 
-2.80*** 
Yes 
Yes 
0.151 
792 
0.688 
j95*** 
-1.178 
-6.65*** 
Yes 
Yes 
0.136 
792 
0.689 
Y 94*** 
-1.083 
-6.15*** 
Yes 
Yes 
0.159 
792 
Industry Effects 
Year Effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
Note: Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for presentation 
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Table 8: Panel regression of dual class discount on capital expenditure 
Dual Class Discount
 t+] = a + Pj (Capex x Mgmt.Vote) t + ^1Mgmt. Vote t 
+ fi3Capex t + p^Financial Leverage t + fi5Conversion Right t 
+ p6 Size j t + p7Z)zv. diffJt + ey_, 
where dual discount in model (1) is the difference between Tobin's Q ratio of a dual class company 
and the Q ratio a single class concentrated control company using propensity score matching. The 
dual class discount in model (2) is the difference between Q ratio of a dual class firm and its industry 
mean Q ratio. 
Capital Expenditure (Capex) is defined as 
AC apex,
 t 
Market Value. , < . , , , 
, _ 1
 / Dual class 
AC apex,
 t 
Market Value, . . , , 
' ~ ' / Single class 
T-statistics are adjusted for robust standard errors and reported below the estimated coefficients. 
Significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% is indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. 
(1) (2) 
Estimates Estimates 
t-statistics t-statistics 
Capex x Mgmt. Vote 
Mgmt. Vote 
Capex! 
Financial Leverage 
Conversion Rights 
Size 
Div. Difference 
Intercept 
Industry Effects 
Year Effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
0.053 
0.93 
-0.086 
-4.65*** 
-0.011 
-3.86*** 
-0.010 
-0.50 
-0.463 
-5 24*** 
0.110 
2 yo*** 
-0.091 
-0.48 
-0.618 
-2.33** 
Yes 
Yes 
0.056 
792 
-0.041 
-1.08 
-0.051 
_3 49*** 
-0.010 
-3 23*** 
-0.033 
-1.62 
-0.299 
-5.11*** 
0.233 
8.35*** 
0.715 
g i y * * * 
-1.365 
-7 01*** 
Yes 
Yes 
0.082 
792 
Note: ' Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for presentation. 
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Table 9: Fixed effects regression of dual class discount on excess compensation and excess corporate cash holdings 
5 6 6 
Ln( Compensation )t t - al + ^r\t kFirm Characteristicsk t_x + X $ , kGovernancek t_x + £ Y Position + s 
* = i * = i
 k = l 
where / is equal to different components as well as total compensation for each executives' compensation package for firmy" at year t. 
Dual Class Discount
 (+1 = a + $xExcess Comp. t + ^1{Mgmt. Vote x Excess Cash) t + $3Mgmt. Vote t + $4Excess Cash t 
6 
+ § ^ Financial Leverage
 t + $6Conversion Right , + P7 Size} t + p8Dz'v. diffJt + Y,JtPositionk + 8 , 
Excess compensation
 y , is the residual from the above equation and it represents excess salary (column I), excess bonuses (column II), excess other 
compensation (column III), excess stock options (column IV) and excess total compensation (column V). Column VI reports estimates for the 
interaction term between the dummy variable for dual class executives and excess total compensation. Excess cash, dividend difference (div. diff), 
financial leverage, size and conversion rights are the same as in Table 7. T-statistics are adjusted for robust standard errors and significance level at the 
1%, 5% and 10% is indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Panel A: Dependent variable -dual discount is the difference between Tobin's Q ratio of a dual class company and the Q ratio of a single class 
concentrated control company using propensity score matching. 
1^  II i n IV V^  VI 
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est t-stat Est t-stat Est. t-stat 
Excess Compensation -0.162 -2.70*** -0.063 -1.61 -0.064 -3.82*** 0.115 3.65*** -0.131 -3.35*** -0.106 -2.36** 
Mgmt. Vote x Excess 
Cash -0.351 .3.43*** _0.279 -2.43** -0.423 -3.42*** -0.581 -3.88*** -0.342 -3.50*** -0.067 -8.88*** 
Mgmt. Vote -0.133 -9.11*** -0.129 -7.65*** -0.128 -8.84*** -0.160 -9.00*** -0.134 -8.86*** -0.364 -3.59*** 
DFam. CEO & Chair x Excess Compensation - -0.351 -2.78*** 
DFam. CEO only x Excess Compensation -0.455 -1.99** 
DFam. Chair only x Excess Compensation 0.057 0.45 
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Table 9 Cont'd 
Est. 
I 
t-stat 
DFam. CFO x Excess Compensation 
DFam. COO x Excess Compensation 
DFam. VP x Excess Compensation 
Excess Cash 
Financial Leverage 
Conversion Rights 
Size 
Div. Diff 
Intercept 
Executive Positions 
Industry and Year Fixed 
Effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
1.077 
-0.046 
-0.402 
0.115 
-0.164 
-0.347 
T ^2*** 
-3 21*** 
-5.83*** 
5 42*** 
-1.26 
-1.74* 
Yes 
Yes 
0.166 
3960 
Est. 
0.890 
-0.044 
-0.605 
0.148 
-0.254 
-0.353 
i 
II 
t-stat 
2.57** 
-3 03*** 
-7 12*** 
5.72** 
-1.59 
-1.49 
Yes 
Yes 
0.113 
2860 
Est. 
1.503 
-0.047 
-0.375 
0.118 
-0.132 
-0.320 
i 
in 
t-stat 
5 12*** 
-3 70*** 
5 29*** 
5.53*** 
-1.03 
-1.67* 
Yes 
Yes 
0.161 
3731 
Est. 
1.562 
-0.070 
-0.573 
0.098 
0.277 
-0.112 
I 
rv 
t-stat 
3.55*** 
-2.81** 
-6.97** 
3.52** 
2.37** 
-0.43 
Yes 
Yes 
0.106 
2809 
Est. 
1.041 
-0.050 
-0.405 
0.137 
-0.178 
-0.441 
V 
t-stat 
3 4i*** 
-3 23*** 
-5.84*** 
5 04*** 
-1.30 
-2.19** 
Yes 
Yes 
0.191 
3960 
Est. 
0.285 
0.141 
0.050 
1.110 
-0.052 
-0.409 
0.127 
-0.135 
-0.622 
VI 
t-stat 
0.74 
0.67 
0.32 
3 53*** 
-3.49*** 
_5 95*** 
5 96*** 
-1.04 
-3 22*** 
Yes 
Yes 
0.221 
3960 
91 
Table 9: Cont'd 
Panel B: Dependent variable - dual discount is the difference between Tobin's Q ratio of a dual class company and its industry mean Q ratio. 
Excess Compensation 
Mgmt. Vote x Excess 
Cash 
Mgmt. Vote 
Est. 
-0.046 
-0.378 
-0.051 
I 
t-stat 
-1.82* 
-3 35*** 
-3.60*** 
DFam. CEO & Chair x Excess Compensation 
DFam. CEO only x Excess Compensation 
DFam. Chair only x Excess Compensation 
DFam. CFO x Excess 
DFam. COO x Excess 
Compensat ion 
Compensation 
DFam. VP x Excess Compensation 
Excess Cash 
Financial Leverage 
Conversion Rights 
Size 
Div. diff 
Intercept 
Executive Positions 
Industry and Year 
Fixed Effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
1.102 
-0.058 
-0.276 
0.199 
0.681 
-1.149 
2 74*** 
-3 20*** 
-4 92*** 
8.21*** 
1 §5*** 
-6.23*** 
Yes 
Yes 
0.093 
3960 
Est. 
-0.013 
-0.546 
-0.056 
1.670 
-0.059 
-0.331 
0.212 
0.698 
-1.259 
II 
t-stat 
-0.41 
_4.64*** 
-3 57*** 
4 I T * * * 
-3.05*** 
_4 7i*** 
7 QQ*** 
6.41*** 
-6.12*** 
Yes 
Yes 
0.105 
2860 
Est. 
-0.051 
-0.433 
-0.025 
1.754 
-0.042 
-0.284 
0.184 
0.677 
-1.303 
( 
in 
t-stat 
_3 19*** 
_4 5i*** 
-1.90* 
5 35*** 
-2.55** 
-5.16*** 
7 15*** 
7 gi*** 
-7 24*** 
Yes 
Yes 
3.085 
3731 
Est. 
0.042 
-0.185 
-0.055 
0.622 
-0.006 
-0.293 
0.213 
0.600 
-1.030 
( 
rv 
t-stat 
1.63 
-1.69* 
_3 34*** 
1.48 
-0.19 
-4.42*** 
7 26*** 
4 g3*** 
-4.34*** 
Yes 
Yes 
3.101 
2809 
Est. 
-0.204 
-0.455 
-0.047 
1.380 
-0.055 
-0.244 
0.220 
0.643 
-1.342 
V 
t-stat 
c 7i*** 
_4 5j*** 
-3 35*** 
3 gg*** 
-3.06*** 
-4.40*** 
9 08*** 
7 4i*** 
-7.26*** 
Yes 
Yes 
0.105 
3960 
Est. 
-0.170 
-0.030 
-0.154 
-0.383 
-0.207 
0.049 
-0.045 
-0.212 
0.213 
1.359 
-0.055 
-0.250 
0.221 
0.650 
-1.427 
VI 
t-stat 
-4.61*** 
-4.34*** 
-4 49*** 
-3 07*** 
-1.93* 
0.27 
-0.17 
-0.56 
1.31 
3 9i*** 
-3 09*** 
-4.38*** 
9 in*** 
7 30*** 
-8.02*** 
Yes 
Yes 
0.109 
3960 
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Table 10: Pair-wise test of separation of voting and cash flow rights on executive compensation: Fixed effects and 2SLS 
Note: This table presents results of the fixed effects pair-wise regressions using the Two Stage-Least Square approach. The results reported in column I 
are the second stage estimates for equation (10) using the predicted management voting leverage estimated using equation (9). Column II reports the 
results of estimating equation (5) which examines executive compensation of family members using the predicted management voting leverage from 
equation 9. Column III reports the results of re-estimating equation (6) using predicted management voting leverage for a sub-sample of family 
executives only. For a complete description of the variables, see Table 1. Significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% is indicated as *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
i n ra 
Dependent Variable: Ln (Total Compensation) 
t-
Mgmt. Voting Leverage 
Fam. CEO & Chairman 
Fam. CEO Only 
Fam. Chair Only 
Fam. CFO 
Fam. COO 
Fam. VP 
Performance 
Financial Leverage (D/A) 
Size 
Risk (Std. Dev.) 
Growth 
Board Size 
Independent Directors 
Busy 
Grey 
Estimates 
0.387 
0.369 
0.014 
0.769 
0.085 
0.535 
0.014 
0.395 
0.271 
0.222 
t-statistics 
21 94*** 
3 Qg*** 
0.26 
38.62*** 
2.44** 
6.88*** 
4.60*** 
6.61*** 
4 49*** 
3 Qg*** 
Estimates 
0.379 
0.022 
0.035 
0.024 
0.036 
0.023 
0.004 
0.383 
0.019 
0.764 
0.086 
0.534 
0.013 
0.402 
0.278 
0.246 
t-statistics 
21.70*** 
2.13** 
3 28*** 
2.36** 
2 03*** 
4g3*** 
0.19 
3 19*** 
0.33 
38.43*** 
6.89*** 
2.49** 
4 34*** 
6 74*** 
4.62*** 
3 4]*** 
Mgmt. Voting Leverage 
DFam. CEO & Chair x Mgmt. 
Vote 
DFam. CEO only x Mgmt. Vote 
DFam. Chair only x Mgmt. Vote 
DFam. CFO x Mgmt. Vote 
DFam. COO x Mgmt. Vote 
DFam. VP x Mgmt. Vote 
Performance 
Financial Leverage (D/A) 
Size 
Risk (Std. Dev.) 
Growth 
Board Size 
Independent directors 
Busy 
Grey 
Estimates 
0.344 
0.031 
0.030 
0.047 
0.008 
0.030 
-0.060 
1.107 
0.088 
0.888 
0.027 
-0.670 
-0.012 
0.493 
0.436 
-0.173 
statistics 
6.20*** 
2.32** 
1.85* 
3 99*** 
0.48 
3.68*** 
-1.28 
2.22** 
0.42 
10.96** 
2 47*** 
-0.18 
-1.07 
2.37** 
2.05** 
-0.64 
93 
Table 10 Cont'd 
Family Directors 
Inst. Investors 
Intercept 
Estimates 
-0.230 
0.083 
3.207 
I 
t-statistics 
-3 10*** 
1.62 
3819*** 
Estimates 
-0.283 
0.082 
3.242 
II 
t-statistics 
-3 81*** 
1.64 
38.50*** 
Family Directors 
Inst. Investors 
Intercept 
in 
Estimates 
-0.098 
-0.060 
3.423 
t-statistics 
-0.36 
-0.25 
11 29*** 
Executive Positions Yes Yes Executive Positions Yes 
Industry and Year Effects Yes Yes Industry and Year Effects Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.518 0.529 Adjusted R2 0.601 
Obs. 7920 7920 Obs 881 
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Table 11: Total Compensation based on the Heckman two stage treatment effects model 
This table reports the second stage coefficients of estimates from Heckman two stage treatment effect models. In the first stage, we run the probit 
selection model where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm has more than one class of common shares and 0 
otherwise. I include Lambda (inverse Mills ratio) in the second stage with control valuables. The dependent variable in the second stage is the Ln(total 
compensation). Model (1) is similar to the last column in Table 4, Model (2) includes indicator variables for various executive positions held by family 
members and Model (3) examines a sub-sample of only family executives. For a complete description of the variables see Appendix A, Table 1A. T-
statistics are adjusted for robust standard errors and significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% is indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Mgmt. Voting Leverage 
Fam. CEO & Chairman 
Fam. CEO Only 
Fam. Chair Only 
Fam. CFO 
Fam. COO 
Fam. VP 
Performance 
Financial Leverage (D/A) 
Size 
Risk (Std. Dev.) 
Growth 
Board Size 
Independent Directors 
Busy 
Grey 
Family Directors 
Inst. Investors 
Estimates 
0.030 
0.100 
-0.276 
0.862 
0.100 
0.579 
0.014 
0.391 
0.254 
0.203 
-0.202 
0.069 
t-statistics 
8.82*** 
0.80 
_5 3i*** 
43 79*** 
2 74*** 
7 09*** 
4 49*** 
5 gj*** 
3 9g*** 
2.66*** 
-1.85* 
1.26 
Estimates 
0.017 
0.034 
0.035 
0.029 
0.040 
0.028 
0.001 
0.095 
-0.276 
0.859 
0.579 
0.097 
0.014 
0.387 
0.268 
0.202 
-0.233 
0.055 
t-statistics 
3 42*** 
3 ]3*** 
3 oi*** 
2 »2*** 
306*** 
5.28*** 
0.04 
0.76 
.4 89*** 
43.58*** 
7 14*** 
2.66*** 
4 5i*** 
5.75*** 
419*** 
2.64*** 
-2.14** 
1.01 
Mgmt. Voting Leverage 
DFam. CEO & Chair x Mgmt. Vote 
DFam. CEO only x Mgmt. Vote 
DFam. Chair only x Mgmt. Vote 
DFam. CFO x Mgmt. Vote 
DFam. COO x Mgmt. Vote 
DFam. VP x Mgmt. Vote 
Performance 
Financial Leverage 
Size 
Risk (Std. Dev.) 
Growth 
Board Size 
Independent Directors 
Busy 
Grey 
Family Directors 
Inst. Investors 
Estimates 
0.034 
0.025 
0.037 
0.048 
0.008 
0.032 
-0.050 
1.046 
0.106 
0.884 
-0.007 
0.700 
-0.012 
0.558 
0.438 
-0.159 
-0.010 
-0.031 
t-statistics 
6.17*** 
2.04** 
2.29** 
412*** 
0.50 
3.84*** 
-1.26 
2.11** 
0.51 
10.84*** 
-0.04 
2.56** 
-1.05 
2.41** 
2.02** 
-0.59 
-0.03 
-0.13 
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Table 11 Cont'd 
Lambda (Inverse Mills Ratio) 
Intercept 
Model (1) 
Estimates t-statistics 
0.014 0.52 
3.668 43.05*** 
Model (2) 
Estimates t-statistics 
0.008 0.32 
3.713 42.84*** 
Model (3) 
Estimates 
Lambda (Inverse Mills Ratio) 0.002 
Intercept 3.379 
t-statistics 
0.01 
10.96*** 
Executive Positions Yes Yes Executive Positions Yes 
Industry and Year Effects Yes Yes Industry and Year Effects Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.456 0.484 Adjusted R2 0.583 
Obs. 7920 7920 Obs. 881 
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Table 12: Panel regression of total compensation on management voting leverage, age 
and equity ownership 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total compensation. Share ownership is the 
percentage of equity owned by an executive. For a complete definition of the variables see Appendix 
A, Table 1A. T-statistics are adjusted for robust standard errors and significance level at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% is indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Mgmt. Vote 
Executive Age 
Equity Ownership 
Firm Characteristics 
Performance (ROA) 
Financial Leverage 
(D/A) 
Size (Log of sales) 
Risk (Std. Dev.) 
Growth 
Estimates 
0.043 
-0.001 
0.454 
0.278 
0.726 
0.131 
0.851 
Governance Characteristics 
Board Size 
Independent Directors 
Busy Directors 
Grey Directors 
Fam. Directors 
Institutional Ownership 
Executive Positions 
CEO & Chairman 
CEO Only 
Chair Only 
CFO 
COO 
VP 
Intercept 
Industry & Year Effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
0.019 
0.632 
0.626 
0.461 
-0.261 
-0.054 
0.854 
0.711 
0.369 
-0.094 
0.170 
-0.202 
3.990 
t-statistics 
7.05*** 
-0.73 
2 15*** 
4.08*** 
28.28*** 
2.06** 
11 29*** 
4 78*** 
6.92*** 
g Q1 *** 
2 07*** 
-2.34** 
-0.63 
15.44*** 
12 94*** 
5.30*** 
-1.59 
2.80*** 
-3 80*** 
26.46*** 
Yes 
0.469 
3889 
Estimates 
0.034 
-0.636 
0.23 
0.282 
0.780 
0.146 
0.615 
0.015 
0.178 
0.421 
0.278 
-0.254 
-0.120 
1.171 
0.903 
0.645 
0.036 
0.359 
-0.013 
4.083 
t-statistics 
6.98*** 
-1.96** 
2.14** 
1.88* 
31.15*** 
1.96** 
6.12*** 
4.46*** 
1.72* 
4 03*** 
1.88* 
-1.68* 
-1.26 
18 91*** 
15.56*** 
8.86*** 
0.67 
r Q c * * * 
-0.27 
30.52*** 
Yes 
0.475 
3448 
Estimates 
0.048 
0.001 
-0.741 
0.327 
0.438 
0.758 
0.246 
0.676 
0.012 
0.471 
0.472 
0.198 
-0.533 
-0.309 
1.039 
0.828 
0.474 
0.024 
0.270 
0.009 
4.003 
t-statistics 
5.56*** 
0.56 
-2.08** 
2.39** 
4 IT*** 
19 95*** 
1.99** 
4 go*** 
2.45** 
2 io*** 
2 "7Q*** 
2.03** 
-2.41** 
-2.14** 
11.67*** 
o 67*** 
4.80*** 
0.26 
2 03*** 
0.11 
15.80*** 
Yes 
0.483 
3332 
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Figure 1: Median total compensation of the top three highest paid executives over the period 2001-2007 
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Figure 2: Average discount of dual class firms with both classes of shares trading over the period 1998-2007 
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Note: The discount is calculated using monthly data. The mean discount over the period 1998-2007 is -5.10% and statistically significant 
from zero. This is consistent with the findings of Zingales (1995). The definition for share discount = ^ 51, " ' ' ' , where r is the ratio of 
votes per restricted voting shares divided by votes per superior voting shares and PRV is the price of restricted voting shares and PSV is the 
price of superior voting shares. This is a modified version of Zingales (1995) voting premium. 
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8.0 Appendix A: 
Table 1A: Variable description and measurement 
Variable Label Measurement 
Compensation 
Salary 
Annual Bonuses 
Stock Option Grants 
Other compensation 
Total compensation 
Salary 
Bonuses 
Stock 
Options 
Other 
Total 
The dollar value of the base salary earned by the named 
executive officer. 
The dollar value of bonuses earned by the named 
executive officer. 
Executive's stock options compensation valued using 
the Black-Scholes model. 
Other compensation received by the executive including 
perquisites and other personal benefits, termination or 
change-in-control payments, contributions to defined 
contribution plans, life insurance premiums, gross-ups 
and other tax reimbursements, discounted share 
purchases, value of restricted stock grants and long term 
incentive payouts. 
Sum of salary, bonuses, stock options and other 
compensation (Execucomp- TDC1). 
Governance Characteristics 
Management Voting 
Leverage 
Board size 
Independent directors 
Grey outside directors 
Busy directors 
Family Directors 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Mgmt. vote 
Boardsize 
Independent 
directors 
Grey 
Busy 
Fam. Dir 
Inst, investors 
The percentage of total votes controlled by the 
management and directors divided by the percentage of 
total equity stake owned by management and directors 
as a group. 
Number of directors on the board. 
Number of unrelated outside directors divided by total 
number of directors. 
Number of outside directors who are related to the 
company through transactional relationships divided by 
total number of directors. 
Number of directors with more than 4 board 
memberships divided by total number of directors. 
The percentage of family members on the board of 
directors. 
Percentage of shares owned or controlled by 
institutional investors. 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm performance Performance Annual return on assets as measured by EBIT/total 
assets at fiscal year end. 
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Table 1A Cont'd 
Variable 
Financial leverage 
Firm size 
Firm risk 
Growth 
Cash 
Capital expenditure 
Label 
Financial 
Leverage 
Size 
Risk 
Growth 
Cash 
Capex 
Measurement 
Total short-term and long-term debt divided by total 
assets. 
Natural logarithm of firm's sales. 
Standard deviation of firm's annual stock returns over the 
previous 5 years. 
Geometric mean growth in total assets over the previous 
five year period. 
Cash and marketable securities. 
Firms capital expenditure spending. 
Executive Characteristics 
Chief Executive 
Officer & Chairman 
Chairman Only 
Chief Executive 
Officer Only 
Chief Financial Officer 
Chief Operating 
Officer 
Vice President 
Other Executives 
Family CEO & 
Chairman 
Family Chairman Only 
Family Chief 
Executive Officer Only 
Family Chief Financial 
Officer 
Family Chief 
Operating Officer 
Family Vice President 
Other Family 
Executives 
CEOChair 
Chair only 
CEO Only 
CFO 
COO 
VP 
Other 
Fam. 
CEOChair 
Fam. Chair 
only 
Fam. CEO 
Only 
Fam. CFO 
Fam. COO 
Fam. VP 
Fam. Other 
Indicator variable =1 if the executive is the CEO and is 
also the Chairman of the board and 0 otherwise 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is the 
Chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. 
Indicator variable =1 if the executive is the CEO only 
and 0 otherwise 
Indicator variable =1 if the executive is the CFO and 0 
otherwise 
Indicator variable=l if the executive is the COO and 0 
otherwise 
Indicator variable =1 if the executive is the VP and 0 
otherwise 
Binary variable =1 if the executive in not CEO, 
Chairman, CFO COO or VP and zero otherwise. For 
example, President of a subsidiary is classified as an 
other executive. 
Indicator variable =1 if the executive is the CEO is also 
the Chairman of the board and a family member and 0 
otherwise 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is the 
Chairman of the board and a family member and 0 
otherwise 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is the founder or 
a related family member and 0 otherwise 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO is the founder or 
a related family member and 0 otherwise. 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the COO is a family 
member and 0 otherwise. 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the VP is a family member 
and 0 otherwise. 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the executive is a family 
member and classified as an other executive and zero 
otherwise. 
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Chapter 3 
Ownership Structure, Agency Problems and Dividend Policy 
1.0 Introduction 
This research investigates the effects of different ownership structures on corporate 
distribution of wealth when companies are closely controlled. The sample of companies 
studied is drawn from the S&P 1500 and the aim is to examine whether dividends are higher 
in firms with dual class ownership structure relative to firms with a single class concentrated 
ownership structure.40 There are generally two agency issues associated with concentrated 
ownership and control. The separation of ownership and control gives rise to classical 
principal-agent problems between managers and shareholders. This type of agency problem 
can be mitigated through an increase in ownership and monitoring by large shareholders 
with a significant equity stake in the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However this 
in turn, gives rise to a different type of agency problem. Concentrated ownership and control 
in both single class and dual class companies can result in conflicts between large majority 
and minority shareholders.41 The agency costs associated with dual class ownership 
structure are higher than those of single class concentrated control firms due to the 
additional monitoring costs associated with two groups of non-controlling shareholders: 
Following LaPorta et al., (1999) and Claessen et al., (2000), a single class firm with concentrated ownership 
is defined as a firm with ownership of 15% of the shares outstanding by an individual, a family or an institution. 
41
 Minority shareholders are defined as a group of dispersed shareholders who each hold a small proportion of 
votes in the firm. 
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minority shareholders who hold superior voting shares and minority shareholders who hold 
restricted voting shares. 
Agency costs imposed by controlling shareholders with large voting rights and small 
equity interest (dual class firms) can be larger than those imposed by controlling 
shareholders who hold a majority of the cash flow rights (single class with concentrated 
ownership).4 As the size of cash flow rights decrease, the agency costs increase however, 
not linearly, but rather at a sharply increasing rate (Bebchuk et al., 2000). In dual class 
firms, the controlling shareholder receives only a fraction of the corporate distribution, but 
extracts the full private benefits from assets left in the firm (Bebchuk et al., 2000). 
Therefore, there is a desire to institute lower distribution policies in order to retain assets 
which are extracted as private benefits. In comparison, controlling shareholders of single 
class firms will receive a larger fraction of the corporate distribution to shareholders because 
of their significant equity ownership. Hence, they have an incentive to distribute more cash 
flow than their dual class counterparts. 
Dual class ownership structure can also lead to weaker alignment of interests among 
shareholders compared to single class companies with concentrated ownership due to the 
divergence of voting and cash flow rights. This can lead to potential expropriation of 
minority shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1988). Concentrated control in the hands of a 
single shareholder gives him/her the opportunity to extract private benefits both in dual class 
and single class companies at the expense of minority shareholders. However, this may be 
more pronounced in dual class firms where large shareholders control a significant 
2
 A controlling shareholder is defined as an owner with a certain percentage of total votes which normally 
allows them to have de facto control due to the difficulty of organizing dispersed shareholders. Hence, I focus 
on the agency problems of concentrated ownership and control. 
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proportion of the voting rights relative to the small proportion of cash flow rights they own 
(Correia da Silva et al., 2004). 
The main objective of this research is to examine the agency problems associated 
with concentrated ownership and control. In particular, I examine dividend policy of dual 
class companies compared to single class companies with concentrated control. I attempt to 
provide evidence in support of one of the three competing explanations for dividend policy 
in a sample of firms with concentrated ownership and control. This research intends to test 
which of the three hypotheses hold: the rent extraction/private benefits of control 
explanation, the family legacy explanation and the managerial reputation explanation for 
corporate distribution. The rent extraction/private benefit hypothesis predicts that 
executives and controlling shareholders in dual class firms will set a low dividend payout 
policy in order to retain and use firms' resources for their own benefits. The separation of 
voting from cash flow rights allows a controlling shareholder to extract private benefits 
without facing the proportionate cash flow consequences that a similar controlling 
shareholder with significant equity ownership in a single class firm would face. 
Alternatively, in firms with family control, the family reputation, identity and wealth are 
attached to the firm or a group of related companies. Therefore, in order to ensure 
intergenerational transfer of wealth, control and the family legacy to their heirs, 
controlling shareholders may set a low dividend payout policy. The resources retained 
within the firm are then used to grow the wealth in the firm. 
The managerial reputation explanation for dividend policy in dual class firms 
states that investors know that managers of dual class firms may expropriate resources 
from the firm and as a result, investors will discount the value of dual class firms. In 
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order to entice investors to hold restricted voting shares and alleviate concerns about 
expropriation, managers will set a high payout policy. Hence, managers subject the firm 
to raise capital more frequently and therefore, subject the firm to scrutiny from 
investment banks and the capital markets in general (Rozeff, 1982 and Easterbrook, 
1984). Hence, managers establish a reputation of limited expropriation. 
Using a propensity score matched sample of dual and single class concentrated 
control firms from the S&P 1500 group of companies, the findings are consistent with the 
extraction of private benefits hypothesis. Dual class firms, on average, tend to retain more 
wealth within the firm compared to single class companies. I find that cash dividend and 
total distribution scaled by market capitalization (dividend yield), earnings (dividend 
payout) and operating cash flow are negatively related to the divergence of voting and 
cash flow rights. The evidence indicates that the greater the excess voting rights relative 
to cash flow rights, the more wealth is retained within the company which can be used to 
pursue private benefits or grow the firm for the future generation of family members. In 
order to separate the two explanations, I identify firms with controlling shareholders-
managers and examine excess compensation of these executives. I find evidence 
consistent with the extraction of private benefits hypothesis. Excess total compensation 
paid to controlling shareholders-managers is negatively associated with cash dividend 
and total distribution. This implies that controlling shareholders-managers retain 
corporate wealth which is then extracted as excess compensation. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), in a perfect world where there are no 
taxes, information asymmetry or agency costs, dividend policy does not matter. However, in 
most countries there are taxes on dividends as well as capital gains. In most countries, 
capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than dividends. Therefore, investors should prefer 
capital gains over dividends and hence, companies should not be motivated to pay dividends 
on this basis. However, firms continue to initiate and pay dividends. This behavior by firms 
has lead to the "dividend puzzle" (Black, 1976). As a result, several theoretical and 
empirical studies have attempted to explain why some firms pay dividends and why others 
choose not to pay dividends. Numerous studies have investigated this issue in the context of 
taxation and argue in favour of a tax clientele explanation for dividend payments including: 
Miller and Modigliani (1961), Brennan (1970), Elton and Gruber (1970), Lewellen et al. 
(1978), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), Porterba and Summer (1984) and Masulis 
and Trueman (1988). A second group of studies try to explain dividend policy using 
information asymmetry arguments including: Fama et al. (1969), Ross (1977), Bhattacharya 
(1979), Kalay (1980), Aharony and Swary (1980), Miller and Rock (1989), Asquith and 
Mullins (1983) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990). Another group of studies provide a 
behavioural explanation for dividend policy. These include: Shefrin and Statman (1984) and 
Frankfurter and Lane (1984).44 
For example, Black and Scholes (1974) did not find any support for the tax effects on dividend policy 
whereas Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) provided evidence relating dividends to pretax returns. Capital 
gains are more highly valued than cash dividends (Porterba and Summers, 1984) because of differential 
taxation of the two equity returns. 
44
 For a comprehensive review of the literature on dividend policy see Frankfurter and Wood (2000). 
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In addition, recent studies investigate the agency explanation for dividend policy (La 
Porta et al., 2000) while others examine dividend policy in a concentrated ownership setting 
(Faccio et al, 2001; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003; Chen et al., 2005 and Mancinelli and 
Ozkan, 2006). In this paper, I used dividend policy to examine agency problems and the 
extraction of private benefits in two different ownership structures. I propose three 
explanations, managerial reputation explanation, private benefits and family legacy, for 
dividend policy in firms which are controlled by votes (dual class firms) compared to 
companies which are controlled by significant equity ownership (single class firms with 
concentrated ownership). 
2.1 Agency Theory, Private Benefits and Dividend Policy 
2.1.1 Private Benefits and Family Legacy Explanation for Dividend Policy 
Outside the U.S., the Berle-Means (1932) notion of separation of ownership and 
control is an exception and not the norm (La Porta et al., 1999). In fact, concentrated control 
is very common in most countries, particularly in countries with weak investor protection. 
Control can occur in the form of dual class ownership structures, pyramids and cross-
holdings. By having significant voting power, controlling shareholders have the ability to 
influence the firm's decisions such as payout policy. 
Testing the rent extraction property of dividends, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) 
examine the conflict between large and small outside shareholders using high ownership 
concentration in Germany. They provide evidence that the voting rights of the largest 
shareholder significantly reduce payout ratios. Also, the divergence between cash flow and 
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voting rights significantly lowers payout ratio. Similarly, Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006) 
find that as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase, firms make lower dividend 
payments.46 They argue that the results support the argument that a higher level of 
ownership concentration is associated with a higher probability of expropriation of outside 
shareholders. To the extent that there are private benefits to the largest shareholder for 
holding larger amounts of cash, lower payouts will increase the ability of the larger 
shareholders to expropriate the outside minority shareholders. Therefore, when large owners 
gain nearly full control of the firm, they prefer to generate private benefits of control that are 
not shared by minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Using a sample of Canadian firms, Eckbo and Verma (1994) develop and test a 
model where managerial benefits from free cash flow, heterogeneous personal taxes and 
information asymmetries give rise to internal shareholder conflicts over the dividend 
decisions. The consensus dividend hypothesis implies that actual cash dividend distribution 
will vary with relative voting power of shareholder groups having different preferences for 
dividends.47 The model predicts that the magnitude of cash dividend increases with 
corporate or institutional share ownership whereas it decreases with voting power of 
manager-owners and it is almost zero when managers-owners have absolute voting control. 
The empirical evidence supports the above predictions. 
The deviation of voting and cash flow rights occurs through pyramids and cross-holdings. The voting rights 
of the second largest shareholder have a positive influence on payout. This implies that the second largest 
shareholder acts as a monitor of the largest shareholder. However, Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006) did not find 
any relationship between the voting rights of the second largest shareholder and dividend payout. 
46
 They studied the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of 139 Italian-listed closely-
held companies. 
47
 According to the dividend consensus hypothesis, actual dividend polices represent a compromise solution 
where the interests of various heterogeneous shareholder groups are represented by the groups' voting power. 
The interests of the manager-owner are pitched against the interests of the large corporate/institutional 
shareholders. 
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These studies interpret lower dividend payout ratios as evidence of rent extraction or 
expropriation of minority shareholders. However, low dividend payout ratio can also be 
consistent with the idea that controlling shareholders retain wealth in order to grow the firms 
for intergenerational transfer of wealth to heirs or other family members. In addition, if 
ownership structures like dual class are costly, why do investors voluntarily become 
minority shareholders of dual class firms, especially in countries with weak legal protection 
for minority shareholders? Initially, investors may have been induced by higher dividends to 
invest in these firms. Investors may be compensated for holding restricted voting shares 
with higher dividends relative to dividends paid to superior voting shareholders. Also, 
capital gains are another potential reason why investors may hold restricted voting shares in 
dual class companies. In addition, legal protection in the U.S. may be stringent enough to 
limit expropriation or extraction of private benefits and hence, investors are more willing to 
hold restricted voting shares in this market. 
Examining dividend policy in family firms, Chen et al., (2005) provide evidence of a 
negative relationship between family ownership (up to 10%) and dividend policy and a 
positive relationship between ownership (10%-35%) and dividend yield for small 
capitalization firms in Hong Kong.49 They interpret their findings as an indication that 
controlling shareholders are using dividends as a way to extract resources because dividends 
The evidence that dual class share structure is detrimental to minority shareholders is somewhat mixed. For 
example, Partch (1987) compares managerial ownership before and after the creation of a class of limited 
voting common stock for 44 publicly traded firms between 1962 and 1984, and examines whether the event 
affects the wealth of current shareholders. He argues that there is no evidence that current shareholders are 
harmed by the creation of limited voting common stock. Similar evidence is provided by Ang and Megginson 
(1989) and Cornett and Vetsuypens (1989). On the other hand, Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) find significant, 
negative abnormal stock price returns at the announcement of the dual-class recapitalization. In the case of 
Canada, Jog and Riding (1986) provide similar evidence. 
49
 Chen et al. (2005) examine ownership concentration as the fraction of total company shares outstanding held 
by the controlling family. They investigate the relationship between ownership and dividend policy for a group 
of family-controlled firms in Hong Kong. They did not examine how the divergence of voting and cash flow 
rights affect dividend policy. 
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make up a disproportionately large part of the income they derive. They also argue that 
small firms are subject to less scrutiny by investors and these firms may be using dividend 
policy as a means to extract resources. Alternatively, their results are consistent with the 
argument that outside investors anticipate potential expropriation and therefore, demand 
higher payouts from firms with potentially the largest agency conflict. I can distinguish 
between these alternative explanations by examining dual class companies compared to 
single class concentrated control companies. Since controlling shareholders in dual class 
firms attain control using votes and not cash flow rights, evidence of higher dividend 
payouts would be consistent with the argument that outside investors anticipate potential 
expropriation and hence, demand higher payouts. 
2.1.2 Managerial Reputation Explanation for Dividend Policy 
According to La Porta et al. (2000), the agency approach does not rely on the 
assumptions of Miller and Modigliani (1961) when explaining dividend policies. First, the 
investment policy of firms cannot be viewed as independent from the firm's dividend 
policy. Payouts can reduce cash flow available to invest in poor NPV projects. Second, the 
allocation of profits to all shareholders on a pro rata basis cannot be taken for granted. It 
does not allow for the possible diversion of resources by insiders at the expense of minority 
shareholders. Therefore, dividend payments can be seen as a mechanism to reduce agency 
costs. Dividend payments help to alleviate agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders because paying dividends and subsequently raising funds in the capital markets 
50
 In fact, an executive in position of the CEO and Chairman received 14 times the dividend income relative to 
their cash salary. Also, the average CEO who was not the Chairman received 4 times the dividend income 
relative to their cash salary. 
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serve as a disciplinary mechanism (Rozeff, 1982 and Easterbrook, 1984)5I By raising 
capital, firms are subjected to scrutiny by investment banks, regulators and the capital 
market as a whole. Born and Rimbey (1993) and Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey (1995) provide 
evidence to support Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) hypotheses. Also, Jensen (1986) 
argues that higher dividend payments reduce agency costs of "free cash flow" by preventing 
managers from using excess cash to undertake low return projects or "pet" projects which 
benefit managers rather than shareholders. 
Examining firms from 33 countries, La Porta et al., (2000) test two competing 
agency explanations of dividend policy, the outcome model versus the substitution model of 
dividends explanation. They provide evidence to support the outcome agency model of 
dividends. In particular, they show that firms in common law countries have higher 
payouts. They argue that investors in countries with good legal protection use their legal 
power to extract dividends from firms especially when investment opportunities are poor. 
However, it is not clear whether the outcome or substitution model of dividend policy is 
dominant in firms with ownership structures that allow for the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. Shareholders can use their legal power to force firms to pay dividends thereby 
51
 Rozeff (1982) argues that dividend payments are part of the firm's optimal monitoring/bonding package and 
they serve to reduce agency costs This implies that firms will choose a level of dividend to minimize agency 
and transactions costs 
52
 The first explanation views dividend policy as an outcome of legal protection Shareholders use their legal 
power to force firms to pay dividends thereby disgorging any excess cash This can be achieved by voting for 
directors who offer better dividend policies, selling shares to potential hostile raiders or by suing companies that 
spend too lavishly on activities that benefit insiders only The second explanation argues that dividends can act 
as a substitute for legal protection According to the substitute model, insiders interested in issuing equity in the 
future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders Therefore, 
dividends play an important role in establishing a reputation of limited expropriation La Porta et al, (2000) 
provide several examples where shareholders have successfully forced firms to pay dividends such as Chrysler 
and Velcro Industries 
53
 Countries with a common law origin tend to have better legal protection of minority shareholders 
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disgorging any excess cash. This, in theory, can effectively limit the extraction of private 
benefits. 
Furthermore, Faccio et al. (2001), using cross-country data from Europe and Asia, 
show that investors appear to be more conscious of expropriation within tightly controlled 
pyramidal groups.54 To offset investor's concerns, higher dividends are paid by corporations 
affiliated with such groups especially those exhibiting a wider discrepancy between 
ownership and control. This is consistent with the managerial reputation explanation for 
dividend policy in firms with concentrated control. On the other hand, they provide evidence 
that investors seem to be less conscious of expropriation in corporations that are loosely 
affiliated within groups in a pyramid structure (control links exceed 10% but not 20%). 
In a corporation with low cash flow to control rights, dividend payments are 
expected to be low since controlling shareholders seek to retain corporate resources (Faccio 
et al., 2001). However, a rational investor, perceiving risk of expropriation, will attach a 
lower value to the shares of these corporations and will be less willing to supply capital. 
Dividend policy can address this concern. Firms with low ownership rights relative to 
control rights can refrain from expropriation by committing to a high dividend policy and 
hence, reduce cash flow that may be potentially expropriated. 
2.2 Why study dual class share structures of firms in the U.S.? 
Dual class structures are more complex compared to single class firms in the U.S. It 
is also a more convenient way of transferring corporate control to heirs of controlling 
54
 Control occurs mainly through group affiliation in the form of pyramids, cross-holdings and reciprocal 
holdings. In their sample, using the 10% ownership cut off, 56% of the European firms are controlled by 
families compared to 45% in Asia. Also, 15% has no controlling shareholder in Europe whereas 20% are 
widely held in Asia. 
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shareholders with a small proportion of wealth invested compared to single class companies 
with concentrated ownership. In addition, the protection of minority shareholder rights in the 
U.S. is much greater than several European and Asian countries where concentrated control 
is more prevalent (La Porta et al., 1998). Hence, expropriation or rent extraction by the 
controlling shareholder may be more difficult in the U.S. Therefore, the costs of 
expropriation may be much higher in the U.S. and hence, using dividend policy to 
expropriate shareholder wealth may not be as common. In addition, the SEC disclosure 
requirements ensure that information relating to voting rights, accounting information and 
executive compensation is properly disclosed and easily accessible to investors. This makes 
controlling mechanisms, such as multiple voting share structures, more visible compared to 
pyramid structures with several complex layers which are used to the control company. 
3.0 Hypotheses, Methodology and Data 
3.1.0 Hypotheses 
Several studies argue that dual class ownership structure fosters managerial 
entrenchment and that controlling shareholders have incentives and opportunities to extract 
private benefits of control. Dual class share structure allows for separation of voting and 
cash flow rights. This separation enables the controlling shareholder to make decisions that 
provide them with private benefits without facing the proportionate cash flow consequences 
that they would in a single class firm. The divergence of cash flow and voting rights leads to 
lower accountability which is consistent with entrenchment (Harris and Raviv, 1988). 
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Therefore, controlling shareholders may set low dividend payouts and extract resources in 
other ways such as excess compensation. This argument leads to the hypothesis below. 
HI: Dividend payout for dual class firms with a high degree of concentrated 
control will have a lower payout policy compared to single class firms. 
Alternatively, dual class firms serve to retain the "family legacy". Accordingly, dual 
class controlling shareholders may retain resources in order to grow the company since the 
wealth of several generations is tied up in the company. As a result, founding families 
represent a special class of large shareholders that may potentially have unique incentive 
structures and a strong voice (Anderson et al., 2003). Also, since dual class firms tend to be 
family-controlled firms, family integrity and strong feelings of identity may result in family 
managers seeking to achieve the firm's goal over their individual goals (Davis, Schoorman 
and Donaldson, 1997 and Corbetta and Salvato, 2004). The firm may be passed on to the 
family's next generation and therefore, it is important to pursue long-term oriented business 
strategies such as, investing in R&D. Firm survival is important since a founding family 
may view the firm as an asset to bequest to family members and their dependents rather than 
consuming wealth (Casson, 1999; and Anderson et al., 2003). As a result, controlling 
shareholders in dual class firms are more likely to maximize firm value and therefore, are 
less likely to extract wealth from the firm for their own benefits. Therefore, firms that are 
family controlled may retain resources in order to grow the firm by undertaking long-term 
value enhancing projects that are beneficial to several generations of family members. 
A competing explanation is the managerial reputation explanation. Investors, 
knowing that controlling shareholders have the ability to extract private benefits, will tend to 
discount the value of dual class firms relative to the value of single class firms with 
concentrated ownership. Therefore, in order to entice investors to hold restricted voting 
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shares and alleviate investors' concern about expropriation, controlling shareholders can 
commit to a high dividend payout policy. By paying higher dividends, managers commit the 
firm to raise capital more frequently and hence, the firm is subjected to increased scrutiny by 
investment professionals, investors and the capital market (Rozeff, 1982 and Easterbrook, 
1984). Hence, dual class firms are more likely to pay dividends than single class firms and 
payout larger dividends (Francis et al., 2005). 
To distinguish between the private benefits hypothesis and the family legacy 
explanation for low dividend payout, dual class firms will be sorted into different groups. 
Firms with controlling shareholders as executives will be classified into one category and 
those with controlling shareholders who are not executives of the firm but sit on the board of 
directors, will be classified into another group. This distinction between the two groups of 
controlling shareholders allow us to separate controlling shareholders who may potentially 
extract private benefits from those who may find it difficult to extract private benefits in the 
form of excess compensation because they are not executives. Using an indicator variable to 
identify firms with executive-controlling shareholders, I am able to test the family legacy 
and rent extraction hypotheses. Excess executive compensation is one potential channel 
through which controlling shareholders and managers can extract private benefits (Masulis 
et al., 2009). If controlling shareholders-executives set a low payout policy in order to 
extract private benefits, I expect executive compensation in those firms to be greater than 
those in dual class firms with non-executive controlling shareholders. 
H2: Dual class firms with controlling shareholders as executives will have a 
higher level of executive compensation relative to dual class and single class firms 
where the controlling shareholder is not apart of the executive team. 
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3.2.0 Methodology 
I will examine the relationship between concentrated control and dividend policy 
after controlling for relevant cross-sectional factors using several econometric techniques. 
These include: (i) panel regression controlling industry and year fixed effects and (ii) Tobit 
regression which is suitable as an econometric technique since dividend distribution is 
censored from below at zero. The regression equation is specified as follows: 
Payout ratio
 lt =fi0+\i]Mgmt.Vote lt_\+y'X + slt (1) 
The dependent variable in equation (1) is corporate distribution to common 
shareholders over the fiscal year t. Based on prior literature, the vector X comprises of firm 
characteristics which have been proven to influence dividend payout ratio. These variables 
are size (log of sales), financial leverage (total debt-to-total asset), growth (five year 
geometric mean growth in total assets), capital rationing dummy, performance (return on 
assets), and institutional ownership (percent of equity held by institutional investors) and £,, 
is the error term with the usual white noise assumptions. 
I measure corporate distribution to common shareholders as follows: cash 
distribution is defined as cash dividends declared and paid to common shareholders 
including special cash dividends and total distribution is defined as: 
Total Distribution = cash dividends + share repurchases (2) 
Stock repurchase is calculated as common and preferred stock repurchases adjusted 
for any decreases in preferred stocks (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998 and Banyi et al., 
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2008).55 Both measures of corporate distribution are scaled by operating cash flow, after 
taxed earnings (dividend payout) and market capitalization (dividend yield). The primary 
reason for using several ratios is to insulate our overall findings from potential biases that 
may arise due to accounting flexibility or manipulations. 
To test whether divergence of voting and cash flow rights influence corporate 
distribution, I construct a voting leverage ratio as follows: Management voting leverage 
,,„
 rr „ % of total votes controlled by management and directors T_ , 
(Mgmt Vote) = . If the private 
% of total equity held by management and directors 
benefits/rent extraction hypothesis is correct, then I expect management voting leverage to 
be negatively related to dividend payout. However a negative relationship is also consistent 
with the preservation of family wealth for future generations. If the rational expectation 
hypothesis is correct, then management voting leverage will be positively related to payout. 
In terms of the control variables, debt can be used to curb agency costs, and expropriation, 
by limiting the amount of resources that can be paid as dividends (Jensen, 1986 and Francis 
et al., 2005). Therefore, financial leverage (debt-to-asset) is expected to be negatively related 
to dividend payout. In addition, institutional investors can act as a monitor and hence, reduce 
the need for high payout as a disciplinary mechanism. However, institutional investors can 
also force managers to pay out more of the corporate resources as dividends and raise capital 
in the external capital markets. Therefore, the effects of institutional investors on dividend 
payout can be positive or negative. 
55
 Banyi et al (2008) find that Compustat purchase of common and preferred stocks (item #115) minus changes 
in the value of preferred stocks is the best estimate of actual repurchases This measure is usually not offset by 
either concurrent sales of stocks through equity offering or exercise of employee stock options unlike the CRSP 
measure of monthly decline m shares outstanding (alternative approach to estimate share repurchases) 
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Following Farinha (2003), I define growth as the geometric mean growth in total 
assets over the previous five year period.56 It is expected to be negatively related to dividend 
payout. In addition, firms facing difficulties in raising capital in the external market may 
limit their payouts. Therefore, I have to control for the effects of this potential capital 
rationing behavior by firms on dividend payout. As a result, I construct a capital rationing 
dummy variable. Following Faccio et al. (2001), I compute the average increase in capital 
stock (excludes reserves and retained earnings) plus financial debt as a ratio of sales. I then 
take a five year average of this ratio in order to smooth capital rationing which may be due 
to transitory factors such as, the business cycle. The capital rationing dummy variable is 
equal to 1 if the ratio is below the sample median and the company's growth rate is above 
the sample median, otherwise it is set equal to 0. It is expected to be negatively related to 
dividend payout. 
Business risk or fixed operating costs may affect corporate distribution. As a result, 
firms will retain more of their earnings since retained earning is the least costly method of 
financing. An increase in risk profile of the firm can result in an increase in financing costs. 
Therefore, risk (beta) is expected to be negatively associated with dividend payout. In 
addition, larger and more profitable firms are more likely to pay higher dividends and thus 
retain less cash within the firm. Hence, profitability (ROA) and size (log of sales) are 
expected to be positively related to dividend payout. 
In order to distinguish between the extraction of private benefits hypothesis and the 
family legacy hypotheses, I estimate equation (3). Following Zingales (1995) and Masulis et 
al. (2009), I estimate equation (3) using firm characteristics and governance variables that 
561 replace asset growth with growth rate in sales as a measure for the firm's growth rate and the results are 
similar. 
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have been proven to explain CEO executive compensation and extract the residuals as a 
measure of excess CEO total compensation. I then use the excess compensation from 
equation (3) to test the extraction of private benefits hypothesis by estimating equation (4) 
below: 
5 8 
Ln(Compensation) , = a + £ r\kFirm Characteristicsk ,_, + £ 8kGovernancek , t_\ 
k=\ k=\ 
+ e„ (3) 
where Ln(Compensation) is the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation for firm j at 
year t. Firm characteristics include: size, profitability, growth, risk and financial leverage. 
The governance variables are as follows: board size, percentage of independent, busy and 
grey directors, percentage of institutional ownership, CEO tenure, CEO-Chairman duality 
and percentage of family members on the board of directors.57 
To test the second hypothesis that controlling shareholder-executives of dual class 
firms extract excess compensation compared to single class closely-held firms, the 
following Tobit regression specification is estimated: 
Payout Ratio,
 t = P0 + p, (EC, t x ExcessCompl t x Mgmt. Votel r_,) + P2 (EC,, x Mgmt. Vote,,_,) 
+ p3 (ExcessComplt x Mgmt. Vote,t_x) + p4 (EC x ExcessComp), t 
+ P5Mgmt. Vote,,_, +fi6Family Director, t +fi7EClt +p8 Excess Comp.It 
+ y ' x + 8l,/ (4) 
where EC is a binary variable equal to 1 if the controlling shareholder is the CEO or 
President of the firm and 0 otherwise, and EC x ExcessCompx Mgmt Vote is an interaction term 
57
 CEO-Chairman duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman and zero otherwise. 
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which is used to test the second hypothesis. It is expected to be inversely related to dividend 
payouts. Hence, if controlling shareholders-executives are extracting resources (excess 
compensation) from the firm which they controlled with votes, I expect the dividend payout 
ratio to be lower than in firms where the controlling shareholder is not an executive. In 
addition, family director which is the percentage of family members on the board of 
directors is included as a control variable. It is expected to be negative and significant if the 
firm is retaining wealth to grow the firm and preserve wealth for future generations rather 
than extracting resources (family legacy). I include management voting leverage and 
excess total compensation so that our interaction term does not merely pick up the effects of 
excess voting rights as well as the influence of excess total compensation on dividend 
payout. The dividend policy will alternatively be defined as dividend-to-market 
capitalization (dividend yield), dividend-to-earnings (dividend payout) and dividend-to-cash 
flow ratio. The vector, X contains a set of control variables as defined in equation (1). 
3.3.0 Data 
3.3.1 Sample Construction 
The dataset examined in this research is constructed using a variety of sources. 
To construct a sample of U.S. dual class firms, I retrieve a list of firms with dual class share 
structure from Corporate Library for 2005-2007. Corporate Library identifies all firms with 
dual class common shares as a takeover defense mechanism during this period. I extend this 
list of dual class firms to 2001 using a list of dual class IPOs and a list of dual class firms 
581 replace family director with a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is a family firm and zero otherwise. The 
results are qualitatively the same. 
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used in Gompers et al. (2010). The list of 1,910 dual class firms over the period of 2001-
2007 is merged with Execucomp database to determine whether compensation data is 
available for these firms. Execucomp database contains executive compensation data for the 
top executives representing the S&P 1500 group of companies. For each dual class company 
with compensation data, I retrieve proxy statements from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) website and check the proxy statement for each firm in the sample to 
ensure that they are in fact, dual class companies. Next, using proxy statements, I collect 
voting rights per share and the number of superior voting and restricted voting shares owned 
by the largest shareholders and management and directors as a group. 
For each firm, I collect accounting data from Compustat. I retrieve annual firm-level 
information such as cash dividends, purchase of common and preferred shares, total assets, 
sales, long-term debt, common equity and operating income. In addition, I collected several 
governance variables and equity ownership data from Corporate Library and Execucomp. 
These include the number of directors, outside related directors and unrelated directors. I use 
proxy statements, the firm website and internet search engines such as Lexus Nexus and 
Google to identify family executives and family directors. I then calculate the percentage of 
family members who are directors of the board. In order to complete the set of control 
variables I collect stock return data from CRSP. I obtain monthly returns to estimate beta 
and annual returns to compute standard deviation. Finally, I collect CEO total compensation 
(TDC1) from Execucomp. 
59
 A list of dual class IPO is available on Jay Ritter's IPO website. Andrew Metrick generously provided the list 
of dual class companies used in their study. 
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3.3.2 Propensity Score Matching 
The list of dual class companies is matched with a list of single class firms with 
concentrated ownership using propensity score matching. Propensity score matching 
methods were developed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Heckman and Robb (1986) and 
Heckman et al. (1998). Propensity score matching has become a popular matching technique 
applied to studies of the financial markets (see Hillion and Vermaelen, 2004 and Villalonga, 
2004) which allows for matching using a larger number of characteristics and hence, 
reducing or eliminating potential bias. The greater the overlap in all characteristics of the 
treated and control groups, the more comparable the groups are and the smaller the bias 
(Heckman et al., 1997 and Heckman et al, 1998). 
Using a propensity score algorithm, I estimate a probit model of the determinants of 
dual class structure and compute a propensity score for each firm based on several firm and 
governance characteristics. The propensity score is then used to match each dual class firm 
with a similar single class company. The following firm and governance characteristics are 
used in the matching exercise: equity ownership of the largest shareholder, sales, industry, 
return on asset, annual stock return, beta, standard deviation of annual returns, market-to-
book, debt-to-asset, sales growth, board size, proportion of independent directors, busy 
directors, grey directors, institutional ownership, company age, R&D-to-sales, capex-to-total 
asset and family firms. This matching exercise results in a final sample of 792 dual class 
firm-years over the period of 2001-2007. This represents an average of 113 dual class firms. 
The final matched sample is made up of 1,584 firm-year observations. 
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4.0 Results 
4.1.0 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the data used in the regression. The last column in Table 1 
shows the test statistics for the difference in mean and median for the two samples. In the 
dual class sample, the largest shareholder owns an average of 22.5% of the equity stake 
compared to 57.8% of the voting rights. Management and directors as a group, control 58.3 
% of the total votes compared to 24.9% of the equity stake. The disparity between voting 
and cash flow rights is at the heart of the agency problems associated with dual class 
ownership structure. 
Table 1 shows that dual class firms pay significantly lower cash dividends and total 
distribution as a ratio of market capitalization (dividend yield) or earnings (dividend payout) 
compared to single class companies. For example, dual class firms pay 20.2% of their 
earnings as cash dividends compared to single class companies with concentrated control 
which pay 24.9% of their earnings to common shareholders. In terms of total distribution, 
dual class companies seem to repurchase fewer shares compared to single class closely-held 
firms with concentrated control. One possible explanation is that controlling shareholders of 
dual class companies retain resources in order to extract private benefits. 
One possible reason for holding restricted voting shares is the higher dividends paid 
to those shareholders relative to superior voting shareholders. In the sample of dual class 
firms, 13.5%) of these firms pay preferential dividends to shareholders of restricted voting 
shares. This is a form of compensation for the lack of voting rights of restricted voting 
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shares. Typically, restricted voting shareholders receive at least 10% more in dividends paid 
than superior voting shareholders.60 
As for specific characteristics, Table 1 shows that the dual class sample and the 
matching single class concentrated ownership sample are very similar in terms of size, risk 
(beta), performance (ROA), financial leverage (D/A) and growth. The tests for mean 
(median) difference are insignificant for these variables. The mean (median) size of dual 
class firms in the sample is $4.9 billion ($1.5 billion) compared to $4.7 billion ($1.6 billion) 
for single class companies. Similarly, the mean (median) return on assets for the dual class 
sample is 9.68% (8.87%) compared to 9.57% (9.06%) for matching single class companies. 
Based on the summary statistics, it appears that the matching procedure is reasonable since 
the two samples are similar on several other dimensions such as risk, profitability, financial 
leverage and growth. 
Superior voting shares of dual class firms are often held by insiders and in most 
cases superior voting shares are not traded. Hence, ownership of restricted voting shares by 
institutions limits their voting power. Therefore, if voting rights are an important 
determinant of ownership, then institutional investors are less likely to hold a significant 
proportion of equity in dual class companies. In fact, institutional ownership is lower in dual 
class companies with the mean holdings of 16.9% compared to mean ownership of 21.5% in 
single class firms. The difference in mean (median) is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. 
Preferential dividends paid to restricted voting shareholders can range from 4% to 100% more than dividends 
paid to superior voting shareholders. For example, Haverty Furniture in its proxy statement states that common 
stock has a preferential dividend rate of at least 105% of the dividend paid on class A common stock (superior 
voting shares). However, the actual difference in dividend paid is 8% for fiscal year 2007. Claire Stores Inc, in 
fiscal year 2006, paid a total of $0.40 per share on our common stock and $0.20 per share on our Class A 
common stock (superior voting shares). 
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Dual class firms are often family firms (83.2%) with several family members 
serving as officers and directors. In fact, 15.8% of all directors in dual class firms are family 
members compared to 5.6%) in similar single class companies. Since dual firms are 
frequently managed by family members, one possible explanation for the high retention rate 
in dual class firms is the family legacy explanation. 
4.2.0 Regression Analysis 
Table 2 presents the results of fixed effects and Tobit regression estimation for each 
of the three measures of cash dividend on management voting leverage and several firm 
specific factors. Management voting leverage is negatively related to cash dividend ratio in 
all the regression specification. The coefficients are negative and significant at either the 1% 
or 5% level except for cash dividend as a ratio operating cash flow which is significant at the 
10% level in the Tobit specification. This finding is consistent with prior studies such as 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) and Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006).61 The results are consistent 
with the extraction of private benefits hypothesis. The greater the divergence of voting and 
cash flow rights, the lower the dividend payout. Controlling shareholders are retaining 
wealth which can be used to pursue private benefits. However, the results provided in Table 
2 are also consistent with the family legacy explanation. A large proportion of dual class 
firms are family controlled and therefore, it is possible that controlling shareholders are 
retaining wealth in order to preserve and grow the firm for future generations of family 
members. 
61
 These studies use the voting rights of the largest shareholder as a measure of concentrated control. Deviation 
of voting and cash flow rights predominantly occur through the use of pyramid structures or cross-holdings. 
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In terms of the firm specific factors, the sign of the coefficients are consistent with 
prior studies. Several of the firm specific variables are significant across the various 
measures for payout ratios. The capital rationing variable is negative and significant in all 
three measures of cash dividend ratio. The evidence is consistent with previous studies, such 
as Faccio et al. (2001). This implies that firms facing difficulties raising capital will tend to 
retain more resources by limiting their payout. Similarly, I find that firms with higher 
growth rates will pay lower dividends. This finding is consistent with the results provided by 
prior studies, such as Farinha (2003) and Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006). Since internal 
financing is the least costly form of financing, firms with growth opportunities are likely to 
retain earnings in order to exploit future growth potential. In terms of risk, firms with higher 
risk (beta) tend to pay lower dividends. This is consistent with conventional wisdom that 
risk increases borrowing costs and therefore, firms tend to retain more earnings. The 
negative and significant coefficient for the risk variable corroborates previous studies, such 
as Farinha (2003) and Bhatacharyya et al. (2008). Other control variables including size (log 
of sales), performance (ROA) and institutional ownership are significant. 
In Table 3, I present regression results for total distribution on management voting 
leverage and a set of firm specific control variables. In both the Tobit and Fixed effects 
estimation, management voting leverage is negative and significant for all three measures of 
total distribution. The results are also economically significant. Using estimate from the 
Tobit regression, a one standard deviation change in management voting leverage resulted in 
a 5.81% decrease in total distribution as a proportion of earnings. The evidence for total 
distribution presented in Table 3 is consistent with both the extraction of private benefits and 
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the family legacy hypotheses. In addition, firm specific characteristics generally have the 
expected sign. 
In order to distinguish between the extraction of private benefits and family legacy 
hypotheses, I first identify all firms with controlling shareholders as the CEO or President. If 
the extraction of private benefits hypothesis is correct then I expect controlling shareholders-
CEOs to extract private benefits in the form of excess executive compensation. In the 
sample, 59.9% of dual class firms have a controlling shareholder-CEO. In comparison, 
19.4% of single class firms have a controlling shareholder-CEO. 
Panel A of Table 4 presents summary statistics of cash dividend and total 
distribution (scaled by market capitalization, earnings and cash flow) for a combined sample 
of dual and single class firms. It breaks the sample into firms with a controlling shareholder-
CEO versus those without a controlling shareholder-CEO. For both the cash dividend and 
total distribution, firms with a controlling shareholder-CEO tend to pay out less cash than 
firms without a controlling shareholder-CEO. The tests for difference in mean and median 
are negative and significant. This implies that firms with a controlling shareholder-CEO 
retain more wealth within the firm which can be used either to extract private benefits or to 
grow the firm for future generations. To evaluate the latter explanation, we compare the 
capital expenditure-to-sales or capital expenditure-to-asset ratios as proxies for growth 
opportunities. Firms with controlling shareholder-CEOs invest less in capital expenditure as 
a proportion of sales or total asset compared to firms without controlling shareholder-CEOs. 
Thus, the family legacy explanation of low dividend payout is not supported. 
Panels B and C of Table 4 decompose the sample further and show that the lowest 
shareholder payouts are in dual class firms with controlling shareholder-CEOs. Panel B 
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shows that dual class firms with a controlling shareholder-CEO have lower payout ratios 
than dual class firms without a controlling shareholder-CEO. Panel C shows that dual class 
firms with a controlling shareholder-CEO have lower cash distributions than single class 
firms with a controlling shareholder-CEO. Thus, controlling shareholder-CEOs in dual class 
firms tend to distribute the least cash to their outside shareholders. As discussed below, we 
find a link between this low payout and excess executive compensation of the dual class 
controlling shareholder-CEOs. 
Table 5 presents the Tobit regression results for cash dividends. The interaction 
term, EC x ExcessComp x Mgmt. Vote, is negative and significant for all of the various 
measures of cash dividend ratios. This evidence is consistent with the prediction of the 
extraction of private benefits of control hypothesis. The results imply that the higher the 
excess compensation in firms with controlling shareholders-executives and with greater 
divergence of voting and cash flow rights the less cash dividends are distributed. These 
executives institute lower payout policies in order to retain wealth to pursue private benefits 
in the form of excess total compensation. Management voting leverage is negative and 
significant for two of the three of the cash payout ratio measures (dividend yield and 
dividend payout ratio). In addition, all of the firm specific variables generally have the 
expected sign based on previous studies such as Faccio et al. (2001), Farinha (2003) and 
Mancinelli and Ozkan (2006). For example, growth is negative and significant at the 1% 
level for all three measures of cash payout ratio. Table 6 reports the results for total 
distribution. The coefficient of the interaction term between controlling shareholders-
executives and excess CEO total compensation is negative and significant for total 
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distribution-to-market capitalization and total distribution-to-earnings. This provides 
additional support for the extraction of private benefits of control explanation. 
To provide further evidence of the extraction of private benefits, I analyze a sub-
sample of family firms only. If the family legacy hypothesis is correct, then controlling 
shareholders-family executives are not expected to extract excess compensation in family 
firms. However, if the extraction of private benefits hypothesis is correct, then controlling 
shareholders-executives are expected to extract excess compensation and therefore distribute 
less cash dividends or repurchase less shares. The results are presented in Table 7. Excess 
compensation paid to controlling shareholders-executives is negative and significant for 
cash dividends and total distribution. This implies that the higher the excess compensation 
paid to family members who are executives, the lower the corporate distribution. This 
finding is consistent with the prediction of the extraction of private benefits hypothesis for 
dividend policy. Finally, I examine a sub-sample of dual-class family firms only. The 
results presented in Table 8 are consistent with the extraction of private benefits explanation. 
4.3.0 Robustness 
Following Faccio et al. (2001), I computed industry adjusted cash dividends and 
total distribution ratios. I first computed for each SIC industry, the median cash dividend or 
total distribution scaled by market capitalization, earnings or cash flow. Then the 
corporation's cash dividend and total distribution as a ratio of market capitalization, earning 
or cash flow is the difference between the corporation's dividend or total distribution ratio 
and the industry median ratio. In Table 9, I report the results using industry adjusted cash 
dividend and total distribution ratios. The results are similar to those presented in Tables 2 
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and 3. As a further robustness check, I excluded all firms in the financial and utilities 
industries.62 The results are similar to those presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
4.4.0 Simultaneity and Two-Stage Least Square Estimation 
The identification assumption is crucial to the causal interpretation of the findings 
above which is that variation in the ownership structure and management voting leverage is 
unrelated to unobserved factors which influence dividend policy. Eckbo and Verma (1994) 
examine the possibility that the firm's dividend policy and ownership are determined 
simultaneously. They find that dividend yield decreases with the voting power of owners-
managers and it increases with the voting power of institutional shareholders but the 
opposite is not true. They argue that the direction of the causality appears to run from voting 
power to dividend policy. However, it is possible that some unobserved factors correlate 
with changes in control structures that affect dividend policy. Hence, the regression 
estimates are likely to be biased and inconsistent due to simultaneity. In order to address the 
potential simultaneous processes determining dividend policy and ownership structure or 
omitted variable bias, a two stage least square estimation technique is utilized. The first 
stage is estimated using a panel regression. 
Mgmt.Vote J
 t = a + \\S^Beta + \\)2Financial Leveraget + ^ i^Qt "*" V\Namet + \\J5Mediat 
+\\J
 6 Sizet + \\i 7 payout + Sjt (5) 
where beta is estimated using the previous 5 years of monthly returns, financial 
leverage(debt/total asset) and Q is the Tobin's Q ratio. Name is a binary variable equal to 
Financial and utilities firms that belong to SIC 6000-6999 and 4900-4999 were excluded from the sample. 
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1 if the firm name is the same as an individual's name. Media is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the firm is in the media industry.64 Size is defined as the natural logarithm of sales. 
Using the predicted management voting leverage from equation (5), I estimate 
equation (6) using Tobit regression technique because cash dividend and total distribution 
ratios are censored from below at zero. 
Payout ratiolt = P 0 + $xPred.Mgmt. Vote,,_, + y ' X + e, , (6) 
where Pred.Mgmt.Vote is the predicted management voting leverage from equation (5) 
above and the vector X contains several control variables such as size, financial leverage, 
growth, capital rationing dummy, performance and institutional ownership. The results are 
reported in Table 10. The estimated coefficients for predicted management voting leverage 
and control variables are similar to those presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
5.0 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
It is argued that concentrated ownership and control have a significant impact on 
agency costs. Ownership concentration can lead to alignment of interest of managers and 
shareholders. Hence, there is less need for monitoring by shareholders and therefore, lower 
agency costs. However, ownership concentration can also lead to different types of agency 
problems such as, conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. In the case of dual class firms, the resulting monitoring costs may be greater 
63
 I used leverage, size, beta and Tobin's Q as determinants of management voting leverage following Lins 
(2003) and Smith et al., (2009). 
64
 A firm is defined as a media firm if it belongs to SIC codes 2710-11, 2720-21, 2730-31, 4830, 4832-33, 
4840-41, 7810, 7812 and 7820. Gompers et al., (2010) show that name and media variables are important 
predictors of dual class ownership structure. Therefore, I include a name and media variable in estimating 
equation 15. 
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than single class firms with concentrated control since there are two groups of minority 
shareholders (minority shareholders who hold superior voting shares and minority 
shareholders who hold restricted voting shares). In addition, a greater extraction of private 
benefits is possible compared to single class companies with concentrated ownership due to 
the divergence of voting and cash flow rights associated with dual class ownership structure. 
I analyze a sample of dual class and single class S&P 1500 firms during the period 
2001-2007 and provide evidence in support of one of the three explanations of dividend 
policy in a concentrated control setting. First, the managerial reputation explanation states 
that in order to alleviate concerns related to expropriation, dual class firms set a high payout 
policy. By paying out higher dividends, managers commit the firm to raise capital more 
frequently and hence, the firm is subjected to increased scrutiny by investment banks and 
the capital markets in general (Rozeff, 1982 and Easterbrook, 1984). Second, the extraction 
of private benefits hypothesis predicts that dual class ownership may foster managerial 
entrenchment. The separation of voting and cash flow rights enables controlling 
shareholders to undertake decisions which provide them with private benefits without facing 
the proportionate cash flow consequences that they would have in a single class company 
with concentrated control. Therefore, they set lower payout policies because they can extract 
resources in other ways such as excess compensation. Third, the family legacy explanation 
states that, since a large fraction of dual class firms are family controlled, controlling 
shareholders may set a lower dividend policy in order to retain resources which are used to 
grow the company for future generations of family members. 
The empirical results show that dual class ownership structure is negatively 
associated with dividend policy. The test of mean (median) difference indicates that dual 
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class firms pay less cash dividend and total distribution using various measures of cash 
dividend and total distribution ratios (cash dividend and total distribution scaled market 
capitalization, earnings and cash flows). This implies that the type of concentrated control 
matters. The regression tests (Tobit estimation and panel regressions with industry and year 
fixed effects) confirm my univariate findings. The greater the divergence between voting 
and cash flow rights, the lower the cash dividend and total distribution. This is consistent 
with the extraction of private benefits and the agency problems associated with dual class 
share structure. It is also consistent with the family legacy hypothesis. Therefore, I examine 
excess total compensation of controlling shareholders-executives in order to distinguish 
between the two explanations for lower dividend policy and the results are consistent with 
the extraction of private benefits hypothesis. Further, excess compensation paid to a 
controlling shareholder-CEO in a firm with a larger divergence of voting rights relative to 
cash flow rights is negatively associated with dividend policy. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Cash flow rights is defined as the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder or management and directors. Voting rights is the percentage of 
votes held by the largest shareholder or management and directors. Management voting leverage (Mgmt. Vote) is the percentage of total votes 
controlled by management and directors divided by the percentage of total equity held by management and directors, size (natural logarithm of sales), 
financial leverage (total debt divided by total assets), performance (ROA=EBIT divided by total assets), risk (beta is estimated using the CRSP equally 
weighted index and the previous five year monthly stock returns ), growth is the geometric mean growth in total assets over the previous five year 
period, institutional ownership (percentage of shares held by institutional investors) and family director is the percentage of family members on the 
board of directors. Cash dividend is cash dividends plus special cash dividends paid to all common shareholders. Total distribution is defined as cash 
dividends plus share repurchases. Significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% is indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. Test for difference in mean is 
the t-test and test for difference in median is the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Dual Class 
Ownership Characteristics 
Cash Flow Rights -Largest Shareholder % 
Voting Rights - Largest Shareholder % 
Cash Flow Rights - Management & Directors % 
Voting Rights - Management & Directors % 
Management Voting Leverage (Mgmt. Vote) 
Distribution Characteristics 
Cash Dividend/Market Value % 
Total Distribution/Market Value % 
Cash Dividend/Earnings % 
Total Distribution/Earnings % 
Cash Dividend/Cash Flow % 
Total Distribution/Cash Flow % 
Mean 
22.50 
57.80 
24.90 
58.30 
3.01 
0.95 
3.15 
20.15 
57.74 
19.12 
42.31 
Median 
18.20 
54.80 
19.30 
57.30 
2.42 
0.56 
1.60 
8.28 
27.67 
3.24 
12.09 
Preferential Dividend Treatment of Restricted Voting Shares 
Firms with Preferential Treatment % 
Dividend Paying Firms % 
13.50 
65.03 
Std Dev. 
16.50 
25.70 
15.60 
25.20 
2.15 
1.77 
8.32 
38.00 
79.17 
45.24 
69.62 
Single Class 
Mean 
23.60 
23.60 
17.10 
17.10 
1.00 
1.31 
4.31 
24.92 
71.62 
17.60 
55.00 
Median 
19.20 
19.20 
16.50 
16.50 
1.00 
0.74 
1.95 
7.23 
34.07 
4.49 
19.10 
N/A 
56.8 
Std Dev. 
13.20 
13.20 
14.10 
14.10 
0.00 
3.31 
12.39 
58.65 
99.45 
40.87 
94.15 
Test for 
difference 
in Means 
-0.71 
34 33*** 
14.21*** 
44.25*** 
58.60**** 
-2.64*** 
-2.17** 
-1.91* 
-3.05*** 
0.70 
-3 03*** 
N/A 
N/A 
Test for 
difference 
in Medians 
-0.62 
15 75*** 
447*** 
15.82*** 
82.55*** 
-2.88*** 
-1.89* 
0.66 
_j 99** 
-1.24 
-3 34*** 
N/A 
N/A 
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Dual Class 
Firm Characteristics 
Size (Sales) 
Financial Leverage (D/A) 
Performance- (Ret)% 
Performance - (ROA)% 
Risk-(Beta) 
Growth % - (Total Asset) 
Institutional Ownership % 
Family Directors % 
Mean 
4917.45 
21.61 
12.61 
9.75 
0.99 
9.98 
16.92 
15.80 
Median 
1523.90 
20.34 
8.35 
8.87 
0.77 
6.67 
13.60 
12.50 
Std Dev. 
14597.23 
18.10 
34.87 
8.81 
0.81 
15.61 
15.66 
12.73 
Single Class 
Mean 
4653.87 
21.81 
10.80 
9.57 
1.06 
9.37 
21.49 
5.62 
Median 
1629.00 
20.82 
7.45 
9.06 
0.85 
6.46 
18.71 
0.00 
Std Dev. 
15302.38 
18.96 
38.52 
9.30 
0.81 
16.64 
14.96 
10.60 
Test for 
difference 
in Means 
0.78 
-0.58 
2.18** 
0.86 
-1.46 
1.07 
-13 24*** 
34.83*** 
Test for 
difference 
in Medians 
-0.89 
-0.28 
1.58 
-0.04 
-1.63 
1.08 
-15.65*** 
37.86*** 
Note: The number of observations for the dual class sample is 792 firm-year and 792 firm-year for the single class closely-held sample. Earnings are 
defined as earnings after taxes and interest expenses. Cash flow is equal to net operating cash flow. 
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Table 2: Regression of dividend payout on management voting leverage 
Payout ratio,, = P0 + fi^Mgmt .Fbte,,_, + y ' X + s,, 
The dependent variable is cash dividends plus special cash dividends (Div.) paid to common 
shareholders scaled by market value of equity (dividend yield), earnings (dividend payout) and 
operating cash flow. Management voting leverage (Mgmt. Vote) is the percentage of total votes 
controlled divided by the percentage of total equity held by management and directors. X is a vector 
of control variables including: capital rationing (the capital rationing dummy variable is equal to 1 if 
the average increase in capital stock plus financial debt as a ratio of sales is below the sample median 
and the company's growth rate is above the sample median, otherwise it is set equal to 0), 
performance (ROA=EBIT divided by total assets), growth is the geometric mean growth in total 
assets over the previous five year period, risk (beta is estimated using the CRSP equally weighted 
index and the previous five year monthly stock returns ), financial leverage (total debt divided by 
total assets), size (natural logarithm of sales) and institutional ownership (percentage of shares held 
by institutional investors). T-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficients. Significance 
levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Tobit Fixed Effects Tobit 
Fixed 
Effects Tobit 
Fixed 
Effects 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Div. / Mkt. 
Cap. 
Div. / Mkt. 
Cap. 
Div./ 
Earnings 
Div./ 
Earnings 
Div. / Cash 
Flow 
Div. / Cash 
Flow 
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates 
t-statistics t-statistics t-statistics t-statistics t-statistics t-statistics 
Mgmt. Vote 
Capital Rationing 
Performance 
Growth 
Risk 
Financial Leverage 
Size 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Intercept 
-0.001 
-3 83*** 
-0.004 
-3 29*** 
0.018 
3 3j*** 
-0.028 
_7 42*** 
-0.009 
-11.74*** 
-0.002 
-0.66 
0.003 
g 23*** 
-0.013 
-4.20*** 
-0.001 
-0.17 
-0.001 
-5 12*** 
-0.004 
-5.88*** 
0.006 
1.89* 
-0.008 
-5 27*** 
-0.003 
-8.75*** 
-0.001 
-0.77 
0.001 
-0.008 
-4.01*** 
0.008 
4.40*** 
-0.021 
-2.56** 
-0.123 
-2.46** 
0.232 
1.05 
-0.866 
-5 77*** 
-0.273 
-8 95*** 
-0.198 
-1.82* 
0.064 
4 93*** 
-0.435 
-3 31*** 
0.030 
2.26** 
-0.015 
-3.04*** 
-0.109 
-3.60*** 
-0.137 
-1.05 
-0.194 
-3 03*** 
-0.067 
-4.14*** 
0.063 
1.17 
0.011 
1.23 
-0.203 
-2.48** 
0.324 
4 j ^ * * * 
-0.006 
-1.68* 
-0.066 
-3 09*** 
0.310 
3.26*** 
-0.304 
-4 93*** 
-0.132 
-10.02*** 
-0.131 
-2 78*** 
0.019 
340*** 
-0.279 
-4.91*** 
0.131 
2.62*** 
-0.004 
-1.98** 
-0.099 
_3 7]*** 
0.029 
0.26 
-0.080 
-1.45 
-0.060 
-4.26*** 
-0.054 
-0.90 
0.007 
1.02 
-0.260 
-3.62*** 
0.401 
c 30*** 
Industry and Year 
Effects 
LR Chi-Square 
F-statistics 
R-squared 
Observations 
No 
415.5 *** 
n/a 
0.143 
1584 
Yes 
n/a 
35.68*** 
0.155 
1584 
No 
70.64*** 
n/a 
0.085 
1398 
Yes 
n/a 
g32*** 
0.056 
1398 
No 
273.68*** 
n/a 
0.188 
1496 
Yes 
n/a 
7 j5*** 
0.036 
1496 
Note: The R-squared for the Tobit regression is the square of the correlation between the model's 
predicted values and the actual values. 
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Table 3: Regression of total distribution 
Payout ratio,, = p0 + p,Mgm/ .Vote, r_, + y ' X + s,, 
The dependent variable is the total distribution (cash dividends + repurchases) to common 
shareholders scaled by market value of equity (dividend yield), earnings (dividend payout) and 
operating cash flow. Management voting leverage (Mgmt. Vote) is the percentage of total votes 
controlled divided by the percentage of total equity held by management and directors. X is a vector 
of control variables including: capital rationing (the capital rationing dummy variable is equal to 1 if 
the average increase in capital stock plus financial debt as a ratio of sales is below the sample median 
and the company's growth rate is above the sample median, otherwise it is set equal to 0), 
performance (ROA=EBIT divided by total assets), growth is the geometric mean growth in total 
assets over the previous five year period, risk (beta is estimated using the CRSP equally weighted 
index and the previous five year monthly stock returns ), financial leverage (total debt divided by 
total assets), size (natural logarithm of sales) and institutional ownership (percentage of shares held 
by institutional investors). T-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficients. Significance 
levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Mgmt. Vote 
Capital Rationing 
Performance 
Growth 
Risk 
Financial Leverage 
Size 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Intercept 
Industry & Year 
Effects 
LR Chi-Square 
F-Statistics 
R-squared 
Observations 
Tobit 
Total Dist./ 
Mkt. Cap. 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.002 
-2 98*** 
-0.008 
-2.33** 
0.110 
7.08*** 
-0.051 
-6 17*** 
-0.004 
-2.02** 
-0.023 
-2.88*** 
0.005 
5 41*** 
-0.012 
-1.30 
0.001 
0.77 
No 
146.31*** 
n/a 
0.076 
1584 
Fixed 
Effects 
Total 
Dist./ 
Mkt. Cap. 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.001 
-2 78*** 
-0.007 
-2.45** 
0.072 
4.82*** 
-0.035 
-5.66*** 
-0.001 
-0.42 
-0.018 
-2.68*** 
0.004 
4.50*** 
-0.008 
-0.98 
0.015 
2.05** 
Yes 
n/a 
9.26*** 
0.056 
1584 
Tobit 
Total 
Dist./ 
Earnings 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.027 
-2.53** 
-0.233 
-3.48*** 
1.743 
6.01*** 
-0.685 
-4.61*** 
-0.038 
-1.05 
-0.903 
-6.08*** 
0.078 
4 3g*** 
-0.168 
-0.94 
0.221 
1.41 
No 
87.72*** 
n/a 
0.056 
1398 
Fixed 
Effects 
Total 
Dist./ 
Earnings 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.021 
-2.31** 
-0.194 
-3 47*** 
1.136 
4 77*** 
-0.488 
_4 21 * * * 
0.042 
1.43 
-0.525 
-419*** 
0.048 
3 1^*** 
-0.118 
-0.79 
0.416 
3 lg*** 
Yes 
n/a 
9.12** 
0.044 
1398 
Tobit 
Total Dist./ 
Cash Flow 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.025 
-2.52** 
-0.188 
-3.04*** 
1.564 
5.84*** 
-0.503 
-3.68*** 
-0.034 
-1.02 
-0.629 
-4.59*** 
0.031 
1.87* 
-0.322 
-1.95* 
0.363 
2.51** 
No 
86.40*** 
n/a 
0.064 
1496 
Fixed 
Effects 
Total Dist. 
/Cash 
Flow 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.018 
-2.11** 
-0.138 
-2.67*** 
0.697 
2 74*** 
-0.321 
-2 99*** 
0.021 
0.78 
-0.416 
-3.58*** 
0.005 
0.34 
-0.265 
-1.91* 
0.606 
4.86*** 
Yes 
n/a 
5.36*** 
0.036 
1496 
Note: The R-squared for the Tobit regression is the square of the correlation between the model's 
predicted values and the actual values. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of controlling and non-controlling shareholders-CEOs 
Panel A: Controlling shareholder-CEOs vs. non-controlling shareholder-CEOs 
Cash Dividend / Market Value % 
Total Distribution / Market Value % 
Cash Dividend / Earnings % 
Total Distribution / Earnings % 
Cash Dividend / Cash Flow % 
Total Distribution / Cash Flow % 
Capex / Sales % 
Capex / Assets % 
Mean 
0.88 
2.86 
16.88 
37.14 
10.78 
25.49 
4.98 
4.38 
Controlling 
Median 
0.51 
1.59 
7.01 
24.57 
2.92 
11.34 
3.53 
3.30 
Std. Dev 
1.22 
4.21 
23.47 
36.77 
18.92 
32.00 
5.55 
5.51 
Non-Controlling 
Mean 
1.04 
4.16 
19.27 
46.60 
17.27 
38.80 
5.52 
4.98 
Median Std. Dev 
0.63 
2.25 
10.27 
36.77 
5.71 
21.36 
3.45 
3.68 
1.29 
6.67 
25.23 
40.00 
26.73 
39.43 
6.54 
4.85 
Test for 
difference 
in Mean 
-2.55** 
-4 40*** 
i 07** 
-4.86*** 
-5.38*** 
-7 21*** 
-1.79* 
-2.30** 
Test for 
difference 
in Median 
-2.06** 
-4.42*** 
-1 96*** 
-4 35*** 
-3 45*** 
-5.85*** 
1.26 
-0.93 
Note: There are 645 controlling shareholder-CEOs and 939 non-controlling shareholder-CEOs 
Panel B: Controlling shareholder-CEOs vs. non-controlling shareholder-CEOs in dual and single class firms 
Dual Class 
Controlling minus Non-controlling 
Test for difference in mean and median Mean 
Cash Dividend / Market Value % -1.40 
Total Distribution / Market Value % -3.69*** 
Cash Dividend / Earnings % -0.90 
Total Distribution / Earnings % -3.38*** 
Cash Dividend / Cash Flow % .7.09*** 
Total Distribution / Cash Flow % -6.94*** 
Median 
-0.88 
-3 97*** 
-2.07** 
-3.50*** 
-3.64*** 
-5 53*** 
Single Class 
Controlling minus Non-controlling 
Mean 
-1.06 
-1.34 
-2.16** 
-2.51** 
-1.13 
-2.02** 
Median 
-1.52 
-2.02** 
-2.11** 
-2.28** 
-1.51 
-1.58 
144 
Table 4 Cont'd 
Panel C: Dual class and single class firms with controlling shareholder-CEOs 
Cash Dividend / Market Value % 
Total Distribution / Market Value % 
Cash Dividend / Earnings % 
Total Distribution / Earnings % 
Cash Dividend / Cash Flow % 
Total Distribution / Cash Flow % 
Mean 
0.84 
2.76 
14.49 
34.00 
10.28 
24.18 
In the total sample, there are 486 dual class controlling 
Dual Class 
Median 
0.54 
1.58 
7.96 
24.85 
3.01 
8.79 
Std. Dev 
1.13 
3.86 
23.80 
36.49 
18.37 
31.72 
0.98 
3.19 
16.91 
37.59 
12.28 
29.51 
shareholder-CEOs and 159 controllin 
Single Class 
Median 
0.41 
1.64 
6.15 
21.87 
3.64 
17.06 
Std. Dev 
1.47 
5.14 
22.38 
37.73 
20.50 
32.63 
g shareholder-CEOs in sin 
Test for 
difference 
in Mean 
-1.30 
-1.15 
-1.98** 
-2.18** 
-1.96** 
-2.18** 
Test for 
difference 
in Median 
0.55 
-0.29 
1.79* 
1.87* 
-0.17 
-2.08** 
gle class closely-held. 
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Table 5: Tobit regression of dividend payout ratios 
5 6 
Ln( Compensation )
 t = a + £ r\kFirm Characteristicsk t_l + £ 8, Governancek ,_• 
+ E
^ 
Payout Ratio,
 t =(30 + Pi(£C,, x ExcessCompl t x Mgmt. Votelt_x) + p 2 ( £ C , t x Mgmf. Fote,,_,) 
+ P3 (ExcessComplt x Mgmt. Votelt_x) + (34 ( £ C x ExcessComp)l t 
+ fi5Mgmt. Vote,t_x + ^ Family Director, t + &7EC,t + P8 Excess Comp., t 
+ y ' X + s/>( 
The dependent variable is cash dividends paid to common shareholders scaled by market value of equity, 
earnings and operating cash flow. Management voting leverage (Mgmt. Vote) is the percentage of total votes 
controlled divided by the percentage of total equity held by management and directors. Executive-controlling 
shareholder (EC) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the controlling shareholder is the CEO or President and 
zero otherwise (controlling shareholder is defined as an individual with ownership or control of 15% of the total 
equity or total voting rights). Excess CEO total compensation (Excess comp.) is the residual from the first 
equation above where firm characteristics include: size, profitability, growth, risk and financial leverage and 
governance variables are as follows: board size, percentage of independent, busy and grey directors, percentage 
of institutional ownership, CEO tenure, CEO-Chairman duality and percentage of family members on the board 
of directors. X is a vector of control variables including: capital rationing (the capital rationing dummy variable 
is equal to 1 if the average increase in capital stock plus financial debt as a ratio of sales is below the sample 
median and the company's growth rate is above the sample median, otherwise it is set equal to 0), performance 
(ROA=EBIT divided by total assets), growth is the geometric mean growth in total assets over the previous five 
year period, risk (beta is estimated using the CRSP equally weighted index and the previous five year monthly 
stock returns ), financial leverage (total debt divided by total assets), size (natural logarithm of sales) and 
institutional ownership (percentage of shares held by institutional investors). Significance levels at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% are indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: 
EC x Excess Comp. 
x Mgmt. Vote 
EC x Mgmt. Vote 
Excess Comp. x Mgmt. Vote 
EC x Excess Comp. 
Mgmt. Vote 
Family Director 
EC 
Excess Comp. 
Capital Rationing 
Performance 
Growth 
Risk 
Financial Leverage 
Size 
Institutional Ownership 
Intercept 
Observations 
LRChi 
R-squared 
Div. / Market. Cap 
Est. 
-0.0010 
0.0002 
-0.0007 
0.0012 
-0.0009 
-0.0038 
-0.0013 
-0.0028 
-0.0044 
0.0160 
-0.0289 
-0.0093 
-0.0017 
0.0008 
-0.0131 
0.0185 
1584 
452.45*** 
0.179 
t-stat 
-2.05** 
0.04 
-2.52** 
0.92 
-3.01*** 
-0.85 
-0.77 
-4.54*** 
-3.84*** 
2.54** 
_7 47*** 
22 9*** 
-0.73 
3 02*** 
-4.41*** 
10.04*** 
Div. / Earnings 
Est. 
-0.0297 
0.0067 
-0.0225 
0.0811 
-0.0231 
-0.0645 
-0.0456 
-0.1067 
-0.0989 
0.0142 
-0.9803 
-0.2718 
-0.1827 
0.0396 
-0.3917 
0.4155 
1398 
303.94*** 
0.103 
t-stat 
_i 99** 
0.37 
-2.37** 
1.44 
-2.25** 
-0.38 
-0.72 
-3 82*** 
-2.26** 
0.06 
-6.65*** 
-10 1*** 
-2.03** 
4 21*** 
-3 49*** 
6.03*** 
Div. / Cash Flow 
Est. 
-0.0327 
-0.0072 
-0.0230 
-0.0612 
-0.0063 
-0.0765 
-0.0003 
-0.0695 
-0.1103 
0.3090 
-0.5510 
-0.2517 
-0.2486 
0.0823 
-0.3931 
0.0696 
1496 
370.80*** 
0.138 
t-stat 
-2.48** 
-0.47 
-1.69* 
-1.76* 
-0.77 
-0.51 
0.01 
-2.65*** 
-2.86*** 
1.45 
_4 37*** 
-10 5*** 
-3 09*** 
9 79*** 
-3 93*** 
1.15 
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Table 6: Tobit regression of total distribution 
5 6 
Ln( Compensation )
 t = a + X r\kFirm Characteristicsk lt_\+ X 5,Governancek t_x 
k=\ ,J' k=\ K 
+
 *j.t 
Payout Ratio,
 t = P0 + Pi(£Cr ( x ExcessComp,, x Mgmt. Vote,,_,) + $2(EC, t x Mgmt. Vote,,_,) 
+ P3 (ExcessComp, t x Mgmt. Vote,,_,) + P4 (£C x ExcessComp), t 
+ fi5Mgmt. Vote,t_x + fi6Family Director, t + fi7EC, t + P8 Excess Comp., t 
The dependent variable is total distribution to common shareholders scaled by market value of 
equity, earnings and operating cash flow. Management voting leverage (Mgmt. Vote) is the 
percentage of total votes controlled divided by the percentage of total equity held by management 
and directors. Executive-controlling shareholder (EC) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
controlling shareholder is the CEO or President and zero otherwise (controlling shareholder is 
defined as an individual with ownership or control of 15% of the total equity or total voting rights). 
Family director is percentage of family members on the board of directors. Excess CEO total 
compensation (Excess comp.) is the residual from the first equation above where firm characteristics 
include: size, profitability, growth, risk and financial leverage and governance variables are as 
follows: board size, percentage of independent, busy and grey directors, percentage of institutional 
ownership, CEO tenure, CEO-Chairman duality and percentage of family members on the board of 
directors. X is a vector of control variables including: capital rationing (the capital rationing dummy 
variable is equal to 1 if the average increase in capital stock plus financial debt as a ratio of sales is 
below the sample median and the company's growth rate is above the sample median, otherwise it is 
set equal to 0), performance (ROA=EBIT divided by total assets), growth is the geometric mean 
growth in total assets over the previous five year period, risk (beta ), financial leverage (total debt 
divided by total assets), size (natural logarithm of sales) and institutional ownership (percentage of 
shares held by institutional investors). Significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated as *, 
**, and ***, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: 
EC x Excess Comp. 
x Mgmt. Vote 
EC x Mgmt. Vote 
Excess Comp. x Mgmt. Vote 
EC x Excess Comp. 
Mgmt. Vote 
Family Director 
EC 
Excess Comp. 
Capital Rationing 
Performance 
Growth 
Risk 
Financial Leverage 
Total Dist. / 
Market Cap. 
Est. 
-0.0026 
-0.0005 
-0.0014 
-0.0028 
-0.0011 
-0.0128 
0.0011 
-0.0045 
-0.0088 
0.1085 
-0.0472 
-0.0050 
-0.0104 
t-stat 
-2.28** 
-0.49 
-2.42** 
-0.95 
-1.69* 
-1.11 
0.28 
-2.31** 
-3 07*** 
8.15*** 
-6.38*** 
_3 14*** 
-1.58 
Total Dist. / 
Earnings 
Est. 
-0.0646 
0.0208 
0.0109 
-0.0855 
-0.0230 
-0.2384 
-0.0892 
-0.0624 
-0.2347 
1.9587 
-0.6581 
-0.0611 
-0.6726 
t-stat 
-2.22** 
0.87 
0.89 
-1.99* 
-1.78* 
-0.96 
-0.98 
-1.68* 
-3 82*** 
5 70*** 
-4 27*** 
-1.82* 
_c 2 1 * * * 
Total Dist. / 
Cash Flow 
Est. 
-0.0413 
-0.0093 
-0.0181 
-0.1324 
-0.0184 
-0.0342 
-0.0933 
-0.0793 
-0.2767 
2.0099 
-0.3408 
-0.1133 
-0.5007 
t-stat 
-0.75 
-0.42 
-1.64 
1.91* 
-1.31 
-0.14 
-1.07 
-2.10** 
.4 45*** 
5.82*** 
-2.19** 
-3 28*** 
-3 47*** 
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Table 6 Cont'd 
Total Dist. / Total Dist. / Total Dist. / 
Dependent Variable: Market Cap. Earnings Cash Flow 
Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat 
Size 0.0028 5.49*** 0.1073 7.87*** 0.1450 13.03*** 
Institutional Ownership -0.0054 -0.73 -0.2012 -1.25 -0.2593 -1.59 
Intercept 0.0218 4.58*** 0.3799 3,89*** -0.0440 -0.41 
Observations 1584 1398 1496 
LRChi 223.08*** 199.91*** 326.73*** 
R-squared 0.162 0.081 O082 
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Table 7: Tobit regression for a sub-sample of family firms only 
The dependent variable is equal to cash dividend or total distribution (cash dividends + share 
repurchases) to common shareholders scaled by market value of equity, earnings and operating cash 
flow. Management voting leverage (Mgmt. Vote) is the percentage of total votes controlled divided 
by the percentage of total equity held by management and directors. Executive-controlling 
shareholder (EC) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the controlling shareholder is the CEO or 
President and zero otherwise (controlling shareholder is defined as an individual with ownership or 
control of 15% of the total equity or total voting rights). Excess CEO total compensation (Excess 
comp.) is the residual from equation 3. Capital rationing (the capital rationing dummy variable is 
equal to 1 if the average increase in capital stock plus financial debt as a ratio of sales is below the 
sample median and the company's growth rate is above the sample median, otherwise it is set equal 
to 0). Performance (ROA=EBIT divided by total assets), growth is the geometric mean growth in 
total assets over the previous five year period, risk (beta is estimated using the CRSP equally 
weighted index and the previous five year monthly stock returns), financial leverage (total debt 
divided by total assets), size (natural logarithm of sales) and institutional ownership (percentage of 
shares held by institutional investors). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
Cash Distribution 
Dependent 
Variable 
EC x Excess Comp. 
Mgmt. Vote 
EC 
Excess Comp. 
Capital Rationing 
Performance 
Growth 
Risk 
Financial Leverage 
Size 
Div./ 
Market. 
Cap 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
-0.002 
-2.56** 
-0.003 
-2 79*** 
-0.001 
-2 99*** 
-0.001 
-1.25 
-0.004 
-3 24*** 
0.018 
2.41** 
-0.031 
-6 33*** 
-0.009 
_9 j4*** 
-0.007 
-2.23** 
0.002 
4.36*** 
Div./ 
Earnings 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
-0.097 
-3 28*** 
-0.078 
-1.80* 
-0.017 
-2.49** 
0.024 
0.94 
-0.112 
-2.55** 
0.454 
1.84* 
-0.980 
-5.89*** 
-0.226 
.7 34*** 
-0.075 
-0.78 
0.026 
2.51** 
Div./ 
Cash 
Flow 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
-0.062 
-2.06** 
-0.081 
-1.85* 
-0.014 
-2.05** 
0.021 
0.78 
-0.104 
-2.33** 
0.41 
1.62 
-0.551 
-3.40*** 
-0.249 
-7 70*** 
-0.173 
-1.59 
0.059 
6.69*** 
Total Distribution 
Total 
Dist. / 
Market 
Cap. 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
-0.006 
-2.54** 
-0.002 
-0.07 
-0.001 
-1.46 
0.001 
0.38 
-0.011 
-3 28*** 
0.081 
4.05*** 
-0.037 
-3 98*** 
-0.006 
-2.81*** 
-0.005 
-0.67 
0.003 
4 j2*** 
Total 
Dist. / 
Earnings 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
-0.158 
-3 49*** 
-0.029 
-0.41 
-0.014 
-1.25 
0.087 
2.24** 
-0.304 
-4.36*** 
1.467 
3 53*** 
-0.587 
-3 07*** 
-0.058 
-1.43 
-0.415 
-2 72*** 
0.102 
6.07*** 
Total 
Dist. / 
Cash 
Flow 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
-0.138 
-2.13** 
-0.144 
_1 99** 
-0.027 
-2.52** 
0.151 
2.81*** 
-0.315 
-4.28*** 
1.284 
2 94*** 
-0.446 
-2.25** 
-0.128 
-2 99*** 
-0.433 
-2 70*** 
0.187 
10.72*** 
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Table 7 Cont'd 
Cash Distribution 
Div. / Div. / Div. / 
Dependent Market. Earnings Cash 
Variable Cap Flow 
Estimates Estimates Estimates 
t-statistics t-statistics t-statistics 
Institutional -0.013 -0.470 -0.357 
Ownership -3.30*** -3.51*** -2.61*** 
Intercept 0.010 0.419 0.168 
292*** 542*** 2 01** 
Observations 889 874 884 
LRChi 270.82*** 198.15*** 196.44*** 
R-squared 0.178 0.137 0.136 
Total Distribution 
Total Total Total 
Dist. / Dist. / Dist. / 
Market Earnings Cash 
Cap. Flow 
Estimates Estimates Estimates 
t-statistics t-statistics t-statistics 
-0.011 -0.148 -0.042 
-1.04 -0.70 -0.19 
0.018 0.283 -0.085 
3.07*** 2.28** -0.66 
889 874 884 
107.48*** 126.04*** 222.61*** 
0.162 0.106 0.177 
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Table 8: Tobit regression for a sub-sample of dual class family firms only 
The dependent variable is equal to cash dividend or total distribution (cash dividends + share 
repurchases) to common shareholders scaled by market value of equity, earnings and operating cash 
flow. Management voting leverage (Mgmt. Vote) is the percentage of total votes controlled divided 
by the percentage of total equity held by management and directors. Executive-controlling 
shareholder (EC) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the controlling shareholder is the CEO or 
President and zero otherwise (controlling shareholder is defined as an individual with ownership or 
control of 15% of the total equity or total voting rights). Excess CEO total compensation (Excess 
comp.) is the residual from equation 3. Capital rationing (the capital rationing dummy variable is 
equal to 1 if the average increase in capital stock plus financial debt as a ratio of sales is below the 
sample median and the company's growth rate is above the sample median, otherwise it is set equal 
to 0). Performance (ROA=EBIT divided by total assets), growth is the geometric mean growth in 
total assets over the previous five year period, risk (beta is estimated using the CRSP equally 
weighted index and the previous five year monthly stock returns), financial leverage (total debt 
divided by total assets), size (natural logarithm of sales) and institutional ownership (percentage of 
shares held by institutional investors). ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
levels, respectively. 
Cash Distribution 
Dependent Variable 
EC x Excess Comp. 
Mgmt. Vote 
EC 
Excess Comp. 
Capital Rationing 
Performance 
Growth 
Risk 
Financial Leverage 
Size 
Div./ 
Market. 
Cap 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.002 
-1.96** 
-0.001 
-2.52** 
-0.002 
-1.45 
0.010 
0.28 
-0.001 
-0.79 
0.010 
1.32 
-0.031 
-5.76*** 
-0.008 
-7.50*** 
-0.005 
-1.58 
0.001 
1.82* 
Div./ 
Earnings 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.118 
i 7 1 * * * 
-0.020 
-2 74*** 
-0.046 
-0.92 
0.023 
0.81 
-0.028 
-0.57 
0.177 
0.67 
-0.867 
-4.58*** 
-0.201 
-5.87*** 
-0.073 
-0.70 
0.017 
1.44 
Div./ 
Cash 
Flow 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.067 
-2.21** 
-0.017 
-2.41** 
-0.014 
-0.28 
0.016 
0.59 
-0.022 
-0.44 
0.426 
1.62 
-0.533 
-2.86*** 
-0.206 
-5.87*** 
-0.182 
-1.56 
0.066 
6.83*** 
Total Distribution 
Total 
Dist. / 
Market 
Cap. 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.005 
-2.14** 
-0.001 
-1.72* 
-0.001 
-0.31 
0.001 
0.50 
-0.003 
-0.75 
0.063 
2 90*** 
-0.044 
-3.62*** 
-0.003 
-1.24 
-0.009 
-1.08 
0.004 
A T J * # * 
Total 
Dist. / 
Earnings 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.223 
-4 23*** 
-0.015 
-1.16 
-0.036 
-0.42 
0.106 
2.26** 
-0.192 
-2.24** 
1.139 
2.36** 
-0.334 
-1.26 
-0.056 
-1.13 
-0.364 
-2.05** 
0.092 
4.58*** 
Total 
Dist. / 
Cash 
Flow 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.173 
-2.48** 
-0.028 
-2.60*** 
-0.186 
-2.26** 
0.170 
2.86*** 
-0.214 
-2.62*** 
1.346 
2 90*** 
-0.311 
-1.25 
-0.113 
-2.32** 
-0.581 
-3 42*** 
0.208 
11.12*** 
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Table 8 Cont'd 
Cash Distribution 
Div. / Div. / Div. / 
„ , . , , . . , Market. Earnings Cash Dependent Variable _, pi 
Est. Est. Est. 
t-stat t-stat t-stat 
Institutional -0.006 -0.379 -0.197 
Ownership -1.58 -2.65*** -1.40 
Intercept 0.014 0.450 0.036 
3.89*** 4.95*** 0.37 
Observations 667 648 656 
LRChi 151.61*** 125.51*** 139.6*** 
R-squared 0.112 0.124 0.140 
Total Distribution 
Total Dist. Total Total 
/ Market Dist. / Dist. / 
Cap. Earnings Cash 
Flow 
Est. Est. Est. 
t-stat t-stat t-stat 
-0.009 -0.119 0.040 
-0.82 -0.48 0.17 
0.013 0.275 -0.173 
1.78* 1.74* -1.16 
667 648 656 
77.52 78.29*** 205.23*** 
0.082 0.086 0.117 
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Table 9: Tobit regression of industry adjusted cash dividends and total distribution. 
The dependent variable is equal to cash dividend or total distribution (cash dividends + share 
repurchases) to common shareholders scaled by market value of equity, earnings and operating cash 
flow adjusting of industry median. For example, cash dividend-to-market capitalization (Div./ 
Market Cap.) is defined as Div./ Market Cap. for each firm minus its SIC industry median Div./ 
Market Cap. Management voting leverage (Mgmt. Vote) is the percentage of total votes controlled 
divided by the percentage of total equity held by management and directors, capital rationing (the 
capital rationing dummy variable is equal to 1 if the average increase in capital stock plus financial 
debt as a ratio of sales is below the sample median and the company's growth rate is above the 
sample median, otherwise it is set equal to O)performance (ROA=EBIT divided by total assets), 
growth is the geometric mean growth in total assets over the previous five year period, risk (beta is 
estimated using the CRSP equally weighted index and the previous five year monthly stock returns), 
financial leverage (total debt divided by total assets), size (natural logarithm of sales) and 
institutional ownership (percentage of shares held by institutional investors). T-statistics are reported 
below the estimated coefficient. Significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated as *, **, 
and ***, respectively. 
Cash Distribution 
Div. / Div. / Div. / 
Market Earnings Cash 
Cap. Flow 
Dependent Variable 
Est. Est. Est. 
t-stat t-stat t-stat 
Mgmt.Vote -0.001 -0.021 -0.005 
-2.64*** -2.40** -1.35 
Capital Rationing -0.001 -0.113 -0.054 
-0.92 -2.14** -2.41** 
Performance 0.028 0.199 0.322 
4.71*** 0.86 3.28*** 
Growth -0.035 -0.928 -0.323 
-7 80*** -5 86*** -5 01*** 
Risk -0.006 -0.216 -0.103 
-7 35*** -6 96*** _7 7i*** 
Financial Leverage -0.001 -0.144 -0.145 
-0.36 -2.27** -2.96*** 
Size 0.001 0.040 0.008 
4.06*** 2.97*** 1.40 
Institutional -0.010 -0.449 -0.277 
Ownership -2.76*** -3.20*** -4.60*** 
Intercept -0.003 0.036 0.128 
-0.86 0.30 2.47** 
Observations 1584 1398 1496 
LRChi 417.17*** 230.82*** 270.23*** 
R-squared 0.188 0.065 0.133 
Total Distribution 
Total Total Total 
Dist. / Dist. / Dist. 
Market Earnings /Cash 
Cap. Flow 
Est. Est. Est. 
t-stat t-stat t-stat 
-0.001 -0.023 -0.026 
-2 58** -1 99** -2 33** 
-0.001 -0.163 -0.166 
-0.24 -2.24** -2.46** 
0.102 1.568 1.499 
5 76*** 4 99*** 5 15*** 
-0.043 -0.641 -0.406 
-4 72*** -4 00*** -2 76*** 
0.003 0.035 0.018 
1.28 0.89 0.49 
-0.020 -0.865 -0.597 
-2 29** -5 34*** -3 98*** 
0.003 0.045 -0.010 
2.41** 2.34** -0.56 
-0.001 -0.199 -0.392 
-0.07 -1.01 -2.13** 
-0.011 0.161 0.444 
-1.17 0.93 2.77*** 
1584 1398 1496 
150 67*** 123 71*** 9342*** 
0.089 0.087 0.075 
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Table 10: Tobit regression with predicted management voting leverage 
The dependent variable is equal to cash dividend or total distribution (cash dividends + share 
repurchases) to common shareholders scaled by market value of equity, earnings and operating cash 
flow. Predicted management voting leverage (Pred. Mgmt Vote) is the predicted management voting 
leverage using equation (5), capital rationing (the capital rationing dummy variable is equal to 1 if 
the average increase in capital stock plus financial debt as a ratio of sales is below the sample median 
and the company's growth rate is above the sample median, otherwise it is set equal to 0), 
performance (ROA=EBIT divided by total assets), growth is the geometric mean growth in total 
assets over the previous five year period, risk (beta is estimated using the CRSP equally weighted 
index and the previous five year monthly stock returns ), financial leverage (total debt divided by 
total assets), size (natural logarithm of sales) and institutional ownership (percentage of shares held 
by institutional investors). T-statistics are reported below the estimated coefficient. Significance 
levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Cash Distribution 
Dependent 
Variable 
Pred. Mgmt Vote 
Capital Rationing 
Performance 
Growth 
Risk 
Financial Leverage 
Size 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Intercept 
Observations 
LRChi 
R-squared 
Div./ 
Market. 
Cap 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.002 
-3 38*** 
-0.006 
-2.19** 
0.027 
2.35** 
-0.049 
-6.10*** 
-0.014 
-8.60*** 
-0.003 
-0.59 
0.005 
6.67*** 
-0.024 
-3.50*** 
-0.009 
-1.53 
1584 
255.30*** 
0.198 
Div./ 
Earnings 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.045 
_4 11*** 
-0.125 
-2.52** 
0.196 
0.89 
-0.857 
_5 7i*** 
-0.272 
-8 92*** 
-0.210 
-1.93* 
0.071 
5 42*** 
-0.444 
_3 4i*** 
0.053 
0.46 
1398 
242.37*** 
0.182 
Div./ 
Cash 
Flow 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.024 
-2 59*** 
-0.122 
-2.82*** 
0.370 
1.92* 
-0.516 
-4.16*** 
-0.242 
-9 01 * * * 
-0.215 
-2.24** 
0.035 
3 04*** 
-0.526 
-4.58*** 
0.191 
1.89* 
1496 
212.02*** 
0.185 
Total Distribution 
Total 
Dist. / 
Market 
Cap. 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.002 
-2 61*** 
-0.008 
-2.34** 
0.109 
7 02*** 
-0.050 
-6.15*** 
-0.004 
_1 99** 
-0.023 
-2 90*** 
0.005 
5 57*** 
-0.011 
-1.14 
0.011 
0.04 
1584 
148.62*** 
0.161 
Total 
Dist./ 
Earnings 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.032 
-2.39** 
-0.234 
-3.50*** 
1.728 
5 95*** 
-0.683 
_4 59*** 
-0.037 
-1.03 
-0.908 
-6.10*** 
0.082 
4 55*** 
-0.145 
-0.82 
0.208 
1.33 
1398 
123.03*** 
0.152 
Total 
Dist. 
/Cash 
Flow 
Est. 
t-stat 
-0.028 
-2.30** 
-0.189 
-3.06*** 
1.551 
5 79*** 
-0.501 
-3.66*** 
-0.033 
-0.99 
-0.633 
-4.62*** 
0.034 
2.07** 
-0.301 
-1.83* 
0.350 
2.42** 
1496 
92.42*** 
0.145 
154 
Chapter 4 
The Valuation Effects of Dual Class Structure and Managerial 
Entrenchment 
1.0 Introduction 
The separation of voting and cash flow rights in dual class firms allows the 
controlling shareholder-manager to become entrenched by rendering the market for 
corporate control ineffective. In the absence of the threat of hostile takeover, controlling 
shareholders-managers in poorly performing dual class firms face no threat of job dismissal. 
Ruback (1988) argues that dual class ownership structure may be the most effective 
universal anti-takeover device ever invented. 5 Concentrated equity ownership in single 
class firms can also serve to entrench managers. Managers who control a substantial fraction 
of single class firm's equity may have enough voting power or influence to guarantee their 
employment with the firm (Morck et al., 1988). However, unlike controlling managers of 
dual class firms, managers in single class firms with concentrated control still face a risk that 
they will lose their control if they were to issue substantial amounts of new shares. Thus, the 
ability to remain entrenched is not as severe for single class managers. This leads to several 
empirical questions. Do managers in dual class firms display characteristics of 
entrenchment? Does entrenchment in turn, lead investors to discount the value of dual class 
firms? 
5
 Similarly, Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) argue that dual class structure provides an effective defense against 
hostile takeovers. 
155 
Managerial entrenchment, broadly defined, occurs when managers gain so much 
power that they are able to use the firm to further their own interests rather than the interests 
of shareholders (Weisbach, 1988). It is the extent to which managers fail to experience 
discipline from the full range of corporate governance and control mechanisms, including 
monitoring by the board and the threat of dismissal or takeover (Berger, et al., 1997). In this 
research, I define managerial entrenchment more precisely as occurring when the CEO 
remains on the job longer than an industry peer or a matching company CEO, especially 
when the CEO's company is performing relatively poorly. 
In this essay, I investigate the relationship between dual class share structure, 
managerial entrenchment and dual class discount. Managerial entrenchment is expected to 
reduce the value of the firm as there is a lack of discipline on managers to address the poor 
performance. Several studies provide evidence indicating that dual class firms are 
discounted compared to single class firms (King and Santor, 2008, Gompers et al., 2010, 
Smith et al., 2009). Family ownership of dual class firms lead to a 17% discount relative to 
single class firms (King and Santor, 2008). In addition, Smith et al., (2009) find that the 
value of dual class companies is discounted relative to single class concentrated control 
companies. One possible explanation for the dual class discount is managerial entrenchment. 
Entrenched managers are more likely to extract private benefits of control and therefore, 
investors are likely to discount dual class firms relative to single class concentrated control 
companies. In the first essay, I show that dual class executives received excess 
compensation. Entrenchment allows them to enjoy this excess compensation for a longer 
time. 
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In addition to dual class share structure, studies have identified several corporate 
governance provisions such as staggered boards which allow managers to entrench 
themselves. Gompers et al., (2003); Bebchuk and Cohen, (2005); Faleye, (2007) and 
Bebchuk et al., (2009) provide evidence that firms with these provisions are valued less. In 
this paper I extend their research by showing the link between these corporate governance 
provisions, dual class discount and managerial entrenchment. 
Using a sample of dual class firms and a propensity matched sample of single class 
companies with concentrated control, I show that CEOs and directors in dual class firms are 
more entrenched. CEOs and directors of dual class firms tend to have longer tenure 
compared to their counterparts in single class companies. After adjusting for industry 
median, dual class CEOs and directors remain on the job longer than those in similar single 
class companies even when the company is performing relatively poorly. The regression 
results indicate that investors apply a larger discount on the value of dual class firms which 
have a greater degree of managerial entrenchment. The results are robust to several proxies 
of managerial entrenchment. Furthermore, entrenchment is defined in the context of under 
performance by management and hence, it is important to account for past performance. 
Therefore, conditional on past poor performance, I show that dual class firms with excess 
CEO tenure, excess E-index or excess director tenure are discounted more by investors. This 
implies that investors are aware of the impact of managerial entrenchment in firms with dual 
class ownership structure. 
Studies often assume that managers are also controlling shareholders in firms with 
concentrated ownership. However, this is not always the case. My data allows me to 
separate dual class firms into groups where the controlling shareholder or a member of his 
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or her family is the CEO and those where the controlling shareholder is a member of the 
board or the Chairman. The evidence from the sub-sample analysis indicates that the greater 
the degree of managerial entrenchment the larger the dual class discount, especially in firms 
with poor past performance. However, the results do not differ from the sub-sample of firms 
where the controlling shareholder is not the CEO. In dual class firms where the controlling 
share holder is a director or the Chairman, the CEO can become entrenched as long as their 
interest does not diverge from that of the controlling shareholder. Therefore, the results of 
the impact of entrenchment on dual class discount are independent of whether the CEO is 
the controlling shareholder. 
2.0 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1.0 Literature Review 
Entrenchment can have adverse effects on management behaviour and incentives 
(Bebchuk et al., 2009). Managerial entrenchment may result in agency costs to shareholders 
by allowing poor performing managers to remain on the job and allow for empire-building. 
Entrenching mechanisms allow managers to pursue their own interests and extract wealth at 
the expense of outside shareholders. Florackis and Ozkan (2009) provide evidence that firms 
with high levels of managerial entrenchment exhibit higher agency costs. Other studies 
provide evidence that firms with entrenched managers significantly underperform, hold 
large amounts of cash, pay lower dividends, and are less leveraged (Morck et al., 1988 
66
 They used the inverse of asset turnover as a measure of agency costs and interpret this ratio as an asset 
utilization ratio which shows how effectively managers deploy firm assets. 
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Berger et al., 1997; Gompers et al., 2003; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Hardford et al, 2008 and 
Khan, 2006). 
Studies have argued that entrenchment can also produce benefits to shareholders by 
reducing the extent to which the threat of a takeover distorts investments in long-term 
projects (Stein, 1988 and Bebchuck and Stole, 1993). Also, Stulz (1988) argues that 
entrenching mechanisms allow managers to extract higher acquisition premiums in 
negotiated transactions. Prior studies such as Wilcox (2002) and Faleye (2007) argue that 
staggered elections of directors as an entrenching mechanism encourage board 
independence by reducing the threat that a director who refuses to succumb to management 
will not be renominated each year. 
Managerial entrenchment can occur in several ways, including manager-specific 
investment, concentrated ownership and control as well as various anti-takeover provisions 
such as staggered boards. By making corporate investments that fit the expertise of a 
particular CEO, that CEO can reduce the probability of being replaced, can extract higher 
wages and larger perquisites from shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). For example, 
Shliefer and Vishny (1989) argue that excessive growth in sales in the direction of the CEOs 
talents and experience is a means of entrenchment. Long tenured managers, because of 
manager-specific assets, are more valuable to shareholders compared to an alternative 
manager. As a result, these managers can negotiate for higher compensation and increase 
their latitude in running the firm. 
Concentrated ownership and control resulting from dual and single class share 
structure may insulate managers from dismissal even in poorly performing firms. In dual 
class firms, both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms may be ineffective 
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in removing poorly performing managers because managers control the firm with a 
significant proportion of the votes while owning a small fraction of the equity. Furthermore, 
in both dual and single class firms, there is a greater degree of managerial control and 
entrenchment of managers as managerial ownership increases (Morck et al., 1988). 
Therefore, the probability of replacing executives in firms with concentrated ownership and 
control is significantly reduced. Executives in firms with concentrated ownership and 
control may display several characteristics of entrenchment such as long tenure in office and 
compensation that has low sensitivity to performance (Berger et al., 1997). In fact, Morck et 
al. (1988) argue that entrenchment is not just a consequence of voting power. Some 
managers, by virtue of their tenure with the firm, status as founder or even personality, can 
be entrenched. 
Managerial equity ownership or voting control makes it more difficult to remove a 
poorly performing top executive. Denis et al. (1997) find that the probability of turnover is 
significantly less sensitive to performance when officers and directors own between 5% and 
25% of a firm's equity than when officers and directors own less than 5%. Similarly, Huson 
et al. (2001) provide evidence that the likelihood of forced turnover is negatively related to 
the CEO fractional ownership. This may be more pronounced in dual class firms since the 
market for corporate control is virtually ineffective as a disciplinary mechanism as 
executives often control the firm with a significant proportion of the voting rights and a 
small fraction of the equity ownership. 
In addition to dual class share structure, anti-takeover provisions such as staggered 
boards and poison pills may serve to entrench managers and therefore, have a negative 
impact on firm value. Several studies argue that staggered boards can insulate management 
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from the market for corporate control because of the boards' ability to adopt and maintain 
poison pills (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007 Bebchuk et al., 2009). Bebchuk and 
Cohen (2005) provide evidence that staggered boards are associated with an economically 
meaningful reduction in the firm value. This result is stronger for firms which establish 
staggered boards through corporate charter which shareholders cannot amend compared to 
staggered boards established in the company's by-laws. Similarly, Faleye (2007) shows that 
staggered boards destroy value by entrenching management and reducing the likelihood of 
forced CEO turnover. He argues that staggered boards insulate management from market 
discipline and diminish board accountability. Bates et al. (2008), on the other hand, argue 
that staggered boards do not change the likelihood that a firm, once targeted, is ultimately 
acquired. In fact, shareholders of target companies with staggered boards realize bid returns 
that are equivalent to those of targets with a single class of directors. They provide evidence 
that staggered boards reduce the likelihood of receiving a takeover bid. However, the 
economic effect of the bid deterrence on the value of the firm is quite small. 
A staggered board is only one of several provisions which may serve to entrench 
managers. For example, limits to shareholder by-law amendments, golden parachutes and 
supermajority requirements for mergers can also be considered as entrenching provisions. In 
fact, Gompers et al., (2003) consider 24 such provisions followed by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) in the construction of their governance index (G-
index). However, examining these provisions, Bebchuk, et al. (2009) construct an 
entrenchment index (E-index) and provide evidence that the E-index level is monotonically 
associated with reduction in firm valuation during the period 1990-2003. 
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 They use six of the 24 provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Centre which is used to 
construct the G-index. Four of the six provisions (staggered boards, limits on shareholder amendments of the 
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2.2.0 Hypothesis 
Dual class ownership structure can lead to managerial entrenchment by allowing 
managers who control a majority of the voting rights in dual class firms to become 
entrenched. In turn, the more entrenched dual class managers are, the more likely it is that 
such managers will extract pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits at the expense of outside 
shareholders. As a result, investors are expected to apply a greater discount on the value of 
dual class firms. Several characteristics of managerial entrenchment such as CEO tenure, 
and directors' tenure are expected to be related to the observed valuation discount of dual 
class firms. Given this argument, the hypothesis follows: 
H1: The greater the managerial entrenchment, the larger the dual class discount. 
3.0 Methodology and Data 
3.1 Methodology 
To examine the effects of managerial entrenchment on valuation discount of dual 
class firms (HI). I estimate equation (1) below. I expect entrenchment proxies to be 
negatively related to dual class discount, that is, the higher the level of managerial 
entrenchment, the greater the discount. 
by-law, supermajority requirement for mergers and supermajority requirements for charter amendments) set 
constitutional limits on shareholders voting power. The remaining two provisions reduce the impact of market 
for corporate control (poison pill and golden parachute). They argue that the remaining provisions were 
uncorrected with firm valuation. 
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Dual Class Discount
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The dependent variable, dual class discount, is computed as the difference in 
Tobin's Q ratio of dual class firms and their propensity score matched single class 
concentrated control firms. Alternatively, dual class discount is the difference between 
Tobin's Q ratio of dual class firms and the industry average Q ratio. There are several 
managerial entrenchment proxies utilized in the specification (1) above. First, excess CEO 
tenure is the difference in tenure for dual class CEOs and their matching counterpart in 
single class firms with concentrated ownership. The second entrenchment proxy is industry 
adjusted CEO tenure (IACEO Tenure). It is computed as the difference between tenure of 
dual class CEOs and the median industry CEO tenure. The third measure, Excess E-index, 
utilizes the E-index which consists of several anti-takeover provisions that may result in 
managerial entrenchment. Excess E-index is the difference between the E-index value of 
dual class firms and matching single class firms. Excess G-index value is also included as an 
additional control variable. In constructing the excess G-index, I subtract the E-index value 
for each firm from the G-index value and then take the difference between dual class firms' 
G-index and matching single class firms' G-index.6 Finally, industry adjusted directors 
tenure (IADirectors tenure) is used as a proxy for entrenchment. IADirectors tenure is 
computed as the median tenure per director less the median industry tenure per director. 
Entrenchment of directors is likely to be more pronounced in dual class firms because the 
Using average industry CEO tenure produces similar results. 
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 The G-index is corporate governance index which is constructed using 24 governance provisions followed by 
Investor Responsibility Research Centre (Gompers et al., 2003). 
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 Using mean tenure per director produces similar results. 
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controlling shareholders can use their voting power to elect directors who are less likely to 
act against the interest of the controlling shareholders. Also, Morck et al. (1988) suggest that 
outside board members are capable of becoming entrenched. 
Since excess compensation is not given, I need to find a methodology to measure 
excess CEO compensation. Thus, following Zingales (1995) and Masulis et al. (2009), I 
estimate equation (2) using firm characteristics and governance variables that have been 
proven to explain executive compensation and extract the residuals as a measure of CEO 
total excess compensation using equation (2). 
5 
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where Ln(Compensation) is the CEO total compensation for firm j at year t. Total 
compensation (TDC1) is defined as salary + bonus + other compensation + stock options. 
Firm characteristics and governance variables are based on prior studies such as Smith and 
Watts (1992), Core et al. (1999) and Chalmers et al. (2006). Firm characteristics include: 
size, profitability, growth, risk and financial leverage. The governance variables are as 
follows: board size, percentage of independent, busy and grey directors, percentage of 
institutional ownership, CEO tenure, percentage of family members on the board of 
directors and CEO-Chairman duality dummy variable. It is possible that entrenchment and 
excess compensation are correlated because entrenched managers have the ability to extract 
71
 Other compensation includes the value of restricted stock grants, long term incentive payouts, contributions 
to pension plans, life insurance premiums, consulting fees and awards under charitable award programs. 
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 A busy director is defined as a director with more than four board memberships and grey directors are 
defined as outside directors who are related to the company through a transactional relationship. 
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higher compensation from their firm. However, I examined the correlation between excess 
compensation and the various proxies for entrenchment. The correlation is relatively low 
with the highest being 0.07 between excess compensation and industry adjusted CEO tenure 
(IADCEO tenure). 
Following Zingales (1995), conversion right is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
superior voting shares can be converted into restricted voting shares and 0 otherwise, market 
value of equity (size) is used as a proxy for the probability of acquisition and dividend 
difference (Div. diff) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the dividend paid or payable to 
restricted voting shares is greater than that of the superior voting shares and zero 
otherwise.73 
3.2 Data 
3.2.1 Sample Construction 
The dataset used in this research is constructed from a variety of sources. 
To construct a sample of U.S. dual class firms, I retrieve a list of firms with dual of share 
structure from Corporate Library for 2005-2007. During this period, Corporate Library 
identifies all firms with dual class common shares as a takeover defense mechanism for 
2005-2007.1 extend this list of dual class firms over this period to 2001 using a list of dual 
class IPOs and a list of dual class firms used in Gompers et al. (2010).74 The list of 1,910 
dual class firms over the period of 2001-2007 is merged with Execucomp database to 
73
 In 13.5% of the dual class firms, holders of restricted voting (RV) shares are paid more or will receive more 
dividends in the future relative to holders of superior voting (SV) shares. 
74
 A list of dual class IPO is available on Jay Ritter's IPO website. Andrew Metrick generously provided the list 
of dual class companies used in their study. 
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determine whether compensation data is available for these firms. Execucomp database 
contains executive compensation data for the top executives representing the S&P 1500 
group of companies. For each dual class company with compensation data, I retrieve proxy 
statements from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website and check the 
proxy statement for each firm in the sample to ensure that they are in fact, dual class 
companies. Next, using proxy statements, I collect voting rights per share and the number 
of superior voting and restricted voting shares owned by the largest shareholders and 
management and directors as a group. 
For each firm, I collect accounting data from Compustat. I retrieve annual firm-level 
information such as total assets, sales, long-term debt, common equity and operating 
income. In addition, I collect several governance variables and equity ownership data from 
Corporate Library and Execucomp. These include the number of directors, outside related 
directors and unrelated directors. I use proxy statements, firm websites and internet search 
engines such as Lexus Nexus and Google to identify family executives and family directors. 
I then calculate the percentage of family members who are directors of the board. In order 
to complete the set of control variables, I collect stock return data from CRSP. I obtain 
monthly returns to estimate beta and annual returns to compute standard deviation. Finally, 
I collect CEO total compensation (TDC1) from Execucomp. 
3.2.2 Propensity Score Matching 
The list of dual class companies is matched with a list of single class concentrated 
control firms using propensity score matching. Propensity score matching methods were 
developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Heckman and Robb (1986) and Heckman et al. 
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(1998). One of the major benefits of propensity score matching is that it can accommodate a 
larger number of matching variables which can correct for the bias due to systematic 
differences between the treated and control groups. The greater the overlap in all 
characteristics of the treated and control groups, the more comparable the groups are and the 
smaller the bias (Heckman et al., 1997 and Heckman et al., 1998). As a result, propensity 
score matching has become a popular matching technique applied to studies of financial 
markets (see Hillion and Vermaelen, 2004 and Villalonga, 2004). 
Using a propensity score algorithm, I estimate a probit model of the determinants of 
dual class structure and compute a propensity score for each firm based on several firm and 
governance characteristics. The propensity score is then used to match each dual class firm 
with a similar single class company. The following firm and governance characteristics are 
used in the matching exercise: equity ownership of the largest shareholder, sales, industry, 
return on asset, annual stock return, beta, standard deviation of annual returns, market-to-
book, debt-to-asset, sales growth, board size, proportion of independent directors, busy 
directors, grey directors, institutional ownership, company age, R&D-to-sales, capex-to-total 
asset and family firms. This matching exercise results in a final sample of 792 dual class 
firm-years over the period of 2001-2007. This represents an average of 113 dual class firms 
per year. The final matched sample is made up of 1,584 firm-year observations. 
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4.0 Results 
4.1.0 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 Panel A, reports the descriptive statistics of several different characteristics 
of managerial entrenchment. There is no difference in mean and median CEO age in dual 
class firms compared to single class concentrated control companies. Similarly, there is no 
difference in the mean (median) age of directors in dual and single class companies. The 
median age of directors in both dual and single class companies is 59 years. The first proxy 
for managerial entrenchment, CEO tenure, indicates that dual class CEOs tend to remain on 
the job longer than their matching counterparts in single class firms. The difference is 
positive and significant as indicated by the tests for difference in the mean and median. Dual 
class CEOs, on average, retain their position for 5.3 years longer than CEOs in single class 
firms. This is an indication of managerial entrenchment. Alternatively, since dual class firms 
have a higher concentration of family involvement, the longer tenure may reflect such 
involvement. Family CEOs remain longer in their position to give the next generation time 
to mature enough to succeed them. 
Using the second measure of entrenchment, directors' tenure, dual class directors 
have longer tenure compared to directors in single class firms. The average tenure per 
director in dual class firms is 1.9 years longer than those in single class concentrated control 
companies. This suggests that controlling shareholders use their voting power to elect and 
maintain a board of directors who will stay on longer and act in their interest. In Table 1 
Panel A, I also report two industry adjusted measures of entrenchment (industry adjusted 
CEO and directors' tenure). The results indicate that dual class CEOs and directors have a 
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longer tenure relative to single class CEOs and directors after adjusting for average industry 
tenure. CEOs in dual class firms serve in this capacity for 5.66 years longer than their 
industry peers. In comparison, CEOs in single class concentrated control firms serve in this 
role only 0.51 years longer than their industry peers. This implies that controlling 
shareholders of dual class firms are using their voting power to remain on the job longer or 
keep in place a CEO who acts according to the interests of the controlling shareholder. 
Therefore, CEOs of dual class firms are more likely to be entrenched. Investors, knowing 
this, are more likely to discount the value of dual class firms relative to single class firms. 
The third managerial entrenchment measure, E-index, is lower for dual class firms 
than for single class concentrated control companies. One possible explanation is that dual 
class structure is the most effective anti-takeover defense and therefore, dual class firms do 
not need additional anti-takeover defenses such as classified boards. Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
argue that holders of superior voting rights might be sufficient to provide incumbents with a 
powerful entrenching mechanism that renders other entrenching provisions relatively 
unimportant. Nevertheless, dual class firms typically have 2 anti-takeover provisions which 
are identified by Bebchuk et al. (2009) as a part of their E-index and may serve to entrench 
managers. 
Conditional on poor past performance, dual class CEOs and directors typically 
remain on the job longer than their single class counterparts (Table 1, Panel A). The 
univariate test for difference in mean is statistically significant. CEOs of dual class firms 
with poor past performance, relative to the industry, remain on the job 8.63 years longer 
than similar CEOs in single class firms with concentrated ownership. Longer tenure is an 
indication of managerial entrenchment especially when firms have prior poor performance. 
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The last two columns in Table 1 Panel B show the test statistics for the difference in 
means and medians for the two samples. In the dual class sample, the largest shareholder 
owns, on average, 22.5% of the equity stake compared to 57.8% of the voting rights. 
Management and directors as a group, control 58.3 % of the total votes compared to 24.9% 
of the equity stake. In comparison, the largest shareholder in single class firms owns, on 
average, 23.6% of the equity outstanding. The disparity between voting and cash flow rights 
in dual class firms is at the heart of the agency problems associated with this type of 
ownership structure. It can allow managers to become entrenched with a small proportion of 
the equity capital. 
Table 1 Panel C reports descriptive statistics for firm characteristics. Based on the 
mean and median tests, it is evident that the propensity score matching exercise produces 
samples of dual and single class firms that are very similar. There is no difference in size 
(sales), financial leverage (D/A), performance (ROA), risk (beta) and growth (total assets). 
The tests for mean (median) difference are insignificant for these variables. 
4.2.0 Regression Analysis 
Table 2 reports the effects of various entrenchment proxies on dual class discount. In 
this table, dual class discount is computed as the difference in the Q ratio of dual class firms 
and the Q ratio of propensity score matched single class concentrated control firms. In 
model (1), entrenchment (excess CEO tenure) is measured as the difference between CEO 
tenure in a dual class firm and its matching single class firm. The coefficient for excess CEO 
tenure is negative and statistically significant. As expected, the greater the degree of 
entrenchment, the larger the discount of dual class firms relative to single class companies. 
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Furthermore, Goyal and Park (2002) show that the probability of CEO turnover is 
significantly lower when the CEO also serves as the Chairman of the board. Therefore, I 
include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman. The coefficient is 
not statistically significant. This implies that the dual role of CEO and Chairman does not 
seem to affect dual class discount. I include several other variables affecting the discount 
such as excess compensation, management voting leverage and interaction between excess 
cash and management voting leverage. These variables serve as proxies for the extraction of 
private benefits. All of these variables are significant with the expected sign. Other control 
variables are based on prior studies such as Zingales (1995). 
In model (2), excess CEO tenure (IACEO Tenure) is measured as the difference 
between CEO tenure in dual class firms and the median industry CEO tenure. This 
entrenchment proxy is negative and statistically significant as hypothesized above. The 
entrenchment proxy in Model (3) is excess E-index. The excess E-index is the difference in 
the E-index value between a dual class firm and its matching single class counterpart. The 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. In Model (4), 
entrenchment is measured using industry adjusted directors, tenure (IADirectors' tenure). 
The coefficient is negative and significant indicating the greater the entrenchment, the larger 
the dual class discount. Finally, since the correlation among the various entrenchment 
•ye 
proxies are relatively low, I include all the proxies in Model (5). All of the entrenchment 
variables are negative and significant which confirms my expectation that investors discount 
the value of dual class firms which appear to have entrenched managers and directors. 
The highest correlation is 0.40 between IACEO tenure and IADirectors tenure. 
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Table 3 reports the results using an alternative measure of dual class discount. It is 
the difference in Q ratio of dual class firms and the industry average Q ratio. In Models (1) 
to (5), the entrenchment coefficients are similar in significance levels and magnitude to 
those reported in Table 2. The control variables proxying for private benefits are all negative 
and significant. As for the other control variables, they are similar to those reported in Table 
2 except for dividend difference which is positive and significant. In these firms, restricted 
voting shareholders are entitled to receive higher dividends relative to superior voting 
shareholders. As expected, higher dividends reduce the dual class discount. 
4.3.0 Entrenchment Conditional on Past Performance 
The prior literature on managerial entrenchment often utilized anti-takeover 
provisions, executive tenure, and age to proxy for managerial entrenchment (Berger et al., 
1997; Yermack, 2006 and Bebchuk et al., 2009). However, age and tenure can also proxy 
for valuable experience (Norburn and Birley, 1988). Salas (2010) argues that executive 
tenure conditional on firm performance is a more suitable measure of managerial 
entrenchment as managers are truly only entrenched when they are not removed in the face 
of poor relative performance. In light of this argument, it is important to control for firms' 
prior performance when examining entrenchment. Although, the entrenchment measures 
utilized in this study are "excess" measures, entrenchment proxies conditional on prior 
performance will provide a more robust measure of the impact of managerial entrenchment 
on dual class discount. 
Accordingly, I construct two dummy variables based on prior operating 
performance. The first performance dummy variable (Perduml) is equal to 1 if dual class 
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firms' previous 3-year average ROA is less than the ROA of matching single class firms. 
The second performance dummy variable (Perdum2) is equal to 1 if the firm's 3-year ROA 
is less than the 3-year industry average ROA. The 3-year average ROA is utilized as a 
performance in order to eliminate the impact of any transitory effects of operating 
performance. In addition, Denis and Denis (1995) show that firms with 3-years of prior poor 
operating performance are more likely to replace their CEO. Similarly, Huson et al. (2001) 
provide evidence that executive turnover tends to occur when industry adjusted accounting 
performance has declined and stock returns have recently been negative. Hence, CEOs with 
long tenure conditional on poor past performance is a clear indication of managerial 
entrenchment. 
Table 4 presents the results of the effects on managerial entrenchment conditional on 
prior operating performance. I include an interaction term between performance dummy and 
various proxies for entrenchment. In models (1) and (4), the performance benchmark is 
based on the matching group of control firms (Perduml). In models (2), (3) and (5), the 
performance benchmark is based on the industry average performance (Perdum2). 
In models (1) and (3), the performance dummy variables are interacted with excess 
CEO tenure. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant. 
This indicates that dual class firms with previous poor performance and greater managerial 
entrenchment are valued less. In model (2), I use industry as the benchmark for both 
performance (Perdum2) and CEO tenure (IACEO tenure). The results show that investors 
apply a larger discount to dual class firms with worse performance relative to the industry 
and when the CEO remains on the job longer than their industry counterpart. This implies 
that investors are concerned with managerial entrenchment especially in firms that are 
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performing poorly. In model (5), I used industry adjusted directors tenure (IADirectors 
tenure) as the proxy for entrenchment. The results show that firms with poor performance 
and longer directors' tenure are valued less. 
In Table 5, the dependent variable, dual class discount, is computed as the difference 
between Q ratio of dual class firms and the industry average Q ratio. The results presented in 
Table 5 are similar to those presented in Table 4. In addition, the interaction term between 
performance and excess E-index is now significant. Investors apply a greater discount to 
dual class firms with poor performance and excess E-index. This implies that investors view 
anti-takeover provisions, which are a part of E-index, as entrenching provisions especially in 
firms with poor performance. 
Studies which examine concentrated ownership often simply assume that managers 
are also the controlling shareholders. However, this is not always the case. In this study, I 
am able to identify firms where the controlling shareholder is an executive and those where 
the controlling shareholder is a director or Chairman of the board. This is important because 
it is easier to identify cases of entrenchment when the CEO is the controlling shareholder or 
a family member of the controlling shareholder. However, identifying cases of 
entrenchment of outside CEOs in firms with concentrated ownership is a bit more 
challenging. Nevertheless, controlling shareholders are less likely to hire an outside CEO 
who will openly oppose them or act against the interest of the controlling shareholder. An 
outside CEO can become entrenched as long as their interest does not diverge from the 
interest of the controlling shareholder. 
In Table 6, I provide evidence for managerial entrenchment in dual class firms 
where the controlling shareholder is also an executive. The results are similar to those 
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presented in Table 4. Longer tenure of controlling shareholders-executives provides robust 
evidence that investors are aware of the impact of managerial entrenchment on the 
extraction of private benefits and agency costs. Controlling shareholders-executives are 
more likely to be entrenched because they control dual class firms with majority voting 
rights. 
Table 7 presents the results for dual class firms where the controlling shareholder is 
not a member of the executive team. In these firms, the controlling shareholders are 
typically members of the board of directors. The results are similar to those presented in 
Table 6 only for models (2) and (5). By separating the sample into firms with controlling 
shareholders as CEOs and those with non-controlling shareholders as CEOs, I present 
further evidence of the impact of managerial entrenchment on dual class discount. In 
addition, the results presented in Tables 2 to 5 are independent of whether the executives are 
also the controlling shareholders. Executives who are not controlling shareholders can also 
be entrenched because controlling shareholders are more likely to hire executives who are 
less likely to act against the interest of the controlling shareholders. 
4.4.0 Robustness 
Potential endogeneity concerns are common in corporate governance literature. 
Simultaneity and reverse causality can bias our results. Managerial entrenchment can lead to 
dual class discount but it is unlikely that dual class discount influences managerial 
entrenchment. Nevertheless, I utilized a two stage least square technique as a robustness 
check. In the first stage, I estimate a model for the determinants of entrenchment. The 
76
 In firms with non-controlling shareholder as CEOs, the controlling shareholders are usually Chairmen or 
directors of the board. 
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following regressors are included: dual class dummy, E-index, G-index (excluding the E-
index value) and management voting leverage. Dual class ownership structure is arguably 
the most effective anti-takeover defense mechanism which can allow managers to become 
entrenched. Similarly, corporate governance provisions which make up the E-index such as 
poison pills may also render the market of corporate control ineffective and hence, lead to 
entrenchment. In addition, the voting power of superior voting shares in dual class firms can 
allow managers to become entrenched. Therefore, I utilized these variables in order to 
predict management entrenchment. The predicted variable is then used to explain the 
documented dual class discount. 
In the second stage, I include the predicted entrenchment using the estimated 
coefficients from the first stage. I utilized three measures of entrenchment including: CEO 
tenure, industry adjusted CEO tenure and industry adjusted directors' tenure. The results of 
the second stage estimation are presented in Table 8.1 created interaction terms between the 
performance dummy and the predicted entrenchment variables. The performance dummy is 
equal to 1 if a dual class firm's previous 3-year ROA is less than the ROA of a matching 
single class firm with concentrated ownership and zero otherwise. In models (1) to (3), the 
dependent variable, dual class discount, is the difference in Q ratio of dual class firms and 
their matching single class counterpart. The interaction term in each model is negative and 
significant. This is consistent with the above hypothesis and with the results presented in 
Table 4. In models (4) to (6), the dependent variable is the difference between the Q ratio of 
dual class firms and the industry average Q ratio. The results are similar to those presented 
in Table 5. 
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5.0 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
Dual class ownership structure is one of the most effective anti-takeover defense 
mechanisms. It can lead to entrenchment since controlling shareholders can maintain a 
voting block of shares and still raise additional equity capital. Entrenchment can be viewed 
as a benefit to controlling shareholders that imposes agency costs to outside shareholders. 
Therefore, investors are likely to attach lower value to dual class firms with a greater degree 
of entrenchment. In this essay, I investigate whether dual class firms have a greater degree 
of managerial entrenchment compared to single class firms and whether investors discount 
the value of dual class companies that have signs of entrenched managers. The evidence 
provided in the research shows that dual class CEOs and directors are entrenched compared 
to single class CEOs. After adjusting for industry median, dual class CEOs and directors 
have longer tenure than CEOs in single class firms even when the firm is making losses. 
Univariate tests indicate that dual class CEOs and directors have a longer tenure than 
their counterparts in single class firms with concentrated control. Dual class CEOs on 
average, remain on the job 5.32 years longer than CEOs in similar single class firms. This 
evidence can be interpreted as managerial entrenchment. However, longer tenure may also 
indicate experience and superior performance in running the firm. Therefore, I construct 
tests conditional on poor past firm performance using the industry and a matching sample as 
benchmarks. Longer tenure of CEOs and directors in dual class firms when these firms 
perform poorly in the past is consistent with managerial entrenchment. The univariate test 
shows that in dual class firms with poor past performance, CEOs have a longer tenure (2.71 
years) compared to CEOs in similar single class firms. 
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In a panel regression specification, I use several measures of entrenchment and two 
different measures of dual class discount and provide evidence that the greater the 
entrenchment, the larger the dual class discount. Excess CEO tenure (compared to matching 
firms and industry median) leads to a greater discount of dual class firms. Also, investors 
apply a greater discount to dual class firms with excess E-index and longer directors' tenure. 
Although CEO tenure is an indication of managerial entrenchment, it can also signify 
experience and superior ability in running firms. Therefore, I provide evidence conditional 
on poor past performance. When firms perform poorly, managers who are not entrenched 
are more likely to lose their job. Therefore entrenchment measures should be conditional on 
poor past performance. I provide evidence that investors apply a greater discount to dual 
class firms with excess CEO tenure and excess directors' tenure for dual class firms with 
poor past performance. 
I provide further evidence by examining sub-samples of dual class firms with 
controlling shareholders as CEOs and those where the controlling shareholder is a director 
or Chairman of the board. Longer tenure of controlling shareholders-CEOs provides robust 
evidence of the relationship between managerial entrenchment and dual class discount. 
Longer tenure in dual class firms with controlling shareholders-CEOs results in a greater 
discount of these firms especially when prior performance is less than a matching firm or the 
industry average. The evidence suggests that investors are concerned with managerial 
entrenchment, potential agency costs and extraction of private benefits and therefore, attach 
lower value to dual class companies which have a higher degree of entrenchment. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Directors' age is the average age of a company's director. Directors' tenure is the median number a company's directors serve in this role. IACEO 
Tenure and lADirectors' tenure are defined as the industry adjusted tenure for CEOs and Directors, respectively based on industry median. E-
index is the sum of the 6 entrenching provisions identified by Bebchuk et al. (2009) and G-index is the sum of the 24 governance provisions used 
in Gompers et al (2003). Perdum2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's 3-year ROA is less than the 3-year industry average ROA. Cash 
flow rights is defined as the percentage of equity owned by the largest shareholder or management and directors. Voting rights is the percentage of 
votes held by the largest shareholder or management and directors. Management voting leverage (Mgmt. Vote) is the percentage of total votes 
controlled by management and directors divided by the percentage of total equity held by management and directors, size (natural logarithm of 
sales), financial leverage (total debt divided by total assets), performance (ROA=EBIT divided by total assets and RET is measured as the annual 
stock returns), risk (beta is estimated using the CRSP equally weighted index and the previous five year monthly stock returns ), growth is the 
geometric mean growth in total assets over the previous five year period, institutional ownership (percentage of shares held by institutional 
investors) and family director is the percentage of family members on the board of directors. Significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are 
indicated as *, **, and ***, respectively. The test for difference in mean is the t-test and the test for difference in median is the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test. 
Panel A: Entrenchment Characteristics 
Dual Class 
CEO Age (years) 
Directors' Age (years) 
CEO Tenure (years) 
Directors' Tenure 
IACEO Tenure 
lADirectors' Tenure 
E-index 
G-index 
Perdum2* IACEO Tenure 
Perdum2*IADirector Tenure 
Mean 
55.88 
59.33 
14.12 
8.58 
8.28 
1.74 
1.80 
6.09 
10.45 
1.74 
Median 
56.00 
59.65 
10.00 
8.00 
4.25 
1.00 
2.00 
6.00 
8.50 
1.50 
Std Dev. 
7.41 
4.68 
12.13 
5.00 
12.30 
4.25 
1.42 
1.75 
12.76 
4.15 
Single Class 
Mean 
55.38 
59.43 
8.80 
7.62 
3.08 
1.09 
2.66 
6.80 
1.82 
1.07 
Median 
56.00 
59.80 
6.00 
7.00 
0.50 
0.00 
3.00 
7.00 
1.00 
0.50 
Std Dev. 
6.91 
3.79 
8.55 
4.14 
8.56 
3.93 
1.28 
1.88 
8.68 
4.75 
Mean test 
T-stat 
1.37 
-0.43 
Q Qg*** 
4.14*** 
9.68*** 
3 13*** 
-12 57*** 
-7 69*** 
4.64*** 
2 94*** 
Median test 
Z-stat 
1.19 
-0.31 
9 13*** 
3 go*** 
o oy*** 
3.65*** 
_1 1 Q Q * * * 
-7 09*** 
-j c c * * * 
2.32** 
Note: Only non-zero observations are used to calculate the summary statistics for the interaction terms Perdum2*IACEO Tenure and Perdum2*IADirector 
Tenure. For the Perdum2*IACEO Tenure, there are 230 observations for the dual class sample and 157 for the single class sample. For the 
Perdum2*IADirector Tenure, there are 200 observations for the dual class sample and 142 for the single class sample. The median test for the interaction 
terms is the Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
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Table 1 Cont'd 
Panel B: Ownership Characteristics 
Dual Class 
Cash Flow Rights of the Largest 
Shareholder % 
Voting Rights of the Largest 
Shareholder % 
Cash Flow Rights of Management & 
Directors % 
Voting Rights of Management & 
Directors % 
Management Voting Leverage (Mgmt 
Vote) 
Mean 
22 50 
57 80 
24 90 
58 30 
3 01 
Median 
18 20 
54 80 
19 30 
57 30 
2 42 
Std Dev. 
16 50 
25 70 
15 60 
25 20 
2 15 
Single Class 
Mean 
23 60 
23 60 
17 10 
17 10 
100 
Median 
19 20 
19 20 
16 50 
16 50 
100 
Std Dev 
13 20 
13 20 
14 10 
14 10 
0 00 
Mean test 
T-stat 
-0 71 
34 33*** 
1421*** 
44 25*** 
58 60**** 
Median test 
Z-stat 
-0 62 
15 75*** 
4 47*** 
15 82*** 
82 55*** 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
Tobin's Q ratio 
Industry Adjusted Q 
Size (Sales - $ million) 
Financial Leverage (D/A) 
Performance - (Ret) % 
Performance - (ROA)% 
Risk-(Beta) 
Growth % - (Total Asset) 
Institutional Ownership % 
Family Directors % 
1 87 
-0 59 
4917 45 
2161 
12 61 
9 75 
0 99 
9 98 
16 92 
15 80 
147 
-0 41 
1523 90 
20 34 
8 35 
8 87 
0 77 
6 67 
13 60 
12 50 
124 
173 
14597 23 
18 10 
34 87 
8 81 
0 81 
15 61 
15 66 
12 73 
2 04 
-0 39 
4653 87 
2181 
10 80 
9 57 
106 
9 37 
2149 
5 62 
1 62 
-0 35 
1629 00 
20 82 
7 45 
9 06 
0 85 
6 46 
1871 
0 00 
125 
2 26 
15302 38 
18 96 
38 52 
9 30 
0 81 
16 64 
14 96 
10 60 
-3 02*** 
-2 00** 
0 78 
-0 58 
2 18** 
0 86 
-146 
107 
-13 24*** 
34 83*** 
-4 53*** 
-1 98** 
-0 89 
-0 28 
158 
-0 04 
-163 
108 
-15 65*** 
37 86*** 
Note The number of observations for each of the dual and single class samples is 792 firm-year 
Industry Adjusted Q-Mean is defined as the difference between the firm's Q ratio and the average SIC Industry Q ratio 
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Table 2: Effects of entrenchment on discount of dual class Q ratio to that of matching 
single class firms 
The dependent variable is computed as the difference between the Q ratio of dual class firms and the 
Q ratio of matching single class concentrated control firms. Excess CEO tenure is the difference in 
tenure for dual class CEOs and their matching counterparts in single class firms. LACEO tenure is 
the difference between tenure of dual class CEOs and the average industry CEO tenure. Excess E-
index is the difference between the E-index value of dual class firms and matching single class firms. 
In constructing the excess G-index, I subtract the E-index value for each firm from the G-index value 
and then take the difference between dual class firms' G-index and matching single class firms' G-
index. IADirectors' tenure is computed as the median tenure per director less the median industry 
tenure per director. The numbers below the estimated coefficients are t-statistics, with ****** being 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
m (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Excess CEO Tenure 
IACEO Tenure 
Excess E-index 
Excess G-index 
IADirectors' Tenure 
Excess Compensation 
Mgmt. Vote x Excess Cash 
Mgmt. Vote 
Excess Cash 
Financial Leverage 
Conversion Rights 
Size 
Dividend Difference 
CEO Chairman Duality 
Intercept 
Industry and Year effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
-0.011 
-1.82* 
-0.229 
-3 38*** 
-0.293 
-1.19 
-0.109 
-3.50*** 
0.829 
1.03 
-0.571 
-1.53 
-0.265 
-1.72* 
0.143 
2 95*** 
-0.333 
-1.32 
0.143 
1.11 
-0.689 
-1.53 
Yes 
0.242 
792 
-0.013 
-2 93*** 
-0.224 
-3 31*** 
-0.242 
_\ 97** 
-0.102 
_3 34*** 
0.736 
0.90 
-0.872 
-3 13*** 
-0.204 
-1.34 
0.123 
2.60*** 
-0.334 
-1.32 
0.148 
1.17 
-0.643 
-1.53 
Yes 
0.237 
792 
-0.055 
-1.71* 
0.05 
1.60 
-0.23 
_3 4i*** 
-0.261 
-1.05 
-0.113 
-3.68*** 
0.771 
0.96 
-0.938 
-3 77*** 
-0.255 
-1.64 
0.133 
9 79*** 
-0.233 
-0.93 
0.124 
0.99 
-0.757 
-1.75* 
Yes 
0.267 
792 
-0.032 
-2.24** 
-0.236 
-3.50*** 
-0.241 
-1.96** 
-0.110 
-3.62*** 
0.741 
0.90 
-0.875 
-3 15*** 
-0.183 
-1.23 
0.123 
2.54** 
-0.296 
-1.17 
0.105 
0.84 
-0.577 
-1.32 
Yes 
0.256 
792 
-0.012 
-2.34** 
-0.063 
-1.95* 
0.05 
1.53 
-0.019 
-2.04** 
-0.229 
-3 38*** 
-0.252 
-2.02** 
-0.108 
-3 61*** 
0.716 
0.89 
-0.902 
-3 24*** 
-0.215 
-1.43 
0.107 
2.12** 
-0.289 
-1.15 
0.132 
1.05 
-0.447 
-0.96 
Yes 
0.289 
792 
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Table 3: Effects of entrenchment on discount of dual class Q ratio versus the industry 
average 
The dependent variable is computed as the difference between the Q ratio of dual class firms and 
industry average Q ratio. Excess CEO tenure is the difference in tenure for dual class CEOs and their 
matching counterparts in single class firms. IACEO tenure is the difference between tenure of dual 
class CEOs and the average industry CEO tenure. Excess E-index is the difference between the E-
index value of dual class firms and matching single class firms. In constructing the excess G-index, I 
subtract the E-index value for each firm from the G-index value and then take the difference between 
dual class firms' G-index and matching single class firms' G-index. IADirectors' tenure is computed 
as the median tenure per director less the median industry tenure per director. The numbers below the 
estimated coefficients are t-statistics, with ****** being significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Excess CEO Tenure 
IACEO Tenure 
Excess E-index 
Excess G-index 
IADirectors' Tenure 
Excess Compensation 
Mgmt. Vote x Excess Cash 
Mgmt. Vote 
Excess Cash 
Financial Leverage 
Conversion Rights 
Size 
Dividend Difference 
CEO-Chairman Duality 
Intercept 
Industry and Year effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
-0.022 
-1.98** 
-0.425 
-6.53*** 
-0.249 
-1.83* 
-0.028 
_1 99** 
0.787 
1.21 
-0.629 
-2.57** 
-0.146 
-1.27 
0.22 
4.48*** 
0.41 
2.25** 
0.044 
0.41 
-1.545 
-4 29*** 
Yes 
0.144 
792 
-0.009 
-2.03** 
-0.417 
_6.44*** 
-0.246 
-2.05** 
-0.024 
-1.78* 
0.768 
1.20 
-0.609 
-2.49** 
-0.134 
-1.16 
0.207 
4 j ] * * * 
0.363 
2.03** 
0.063 
0.59 
-1.382 
-3 75*** 
Yes 
0.147 
792 
-0.028 
-1.88** 
0.024 
1.13 
-0.424 
-6.50*** 
-0.254 
-2.25** 
-0.029 
-2.94*** 
0.786 
1.20 
-0.648 
-2.66*** 
-0.16 
-1.38 
0.215 
4.46*** 
0.425 
2.33** 
0.046 
0.43 
-1.492 
.4.22*** 
Yes 
0.146 
792 
-0.001 
-2.07** 
-0.425 
-6.52*** 
-0.248 
-1.87* 
-0.027 
-2 89*** 
0.786 
1.21 
-0.628 
-2.57** 
-0.143 
-1.24 
0.218 
A T ^ * * * 
0.403 
2.22** 
0.046 
0.44 
-1.519 
-3 98*** 
Yes 
0.144 
792 
-0.012 
-2.27** 
-0.035 
-1.98** 
0.025 
1.16 
-0.013 
-1.96** 
-0.413 
-6.29*** 
-0.258 
-1.89* 
-0.025 
-2 83*** 
0.777 
1.21 
-0.633 
-2.60*** 
-0.165 
-1.41 
0.207 
414*** 
0.385 
2.12** 
0.075 
0.69 
-1.412 
-1 79*** 
Yes 
0.178 
792 
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Table 4: Effects of entrenchment on discount of dual class Q ratio to that of matching 
single class firms' conditional on past performance 
The dependent variable is computed as the difference between the Q ratio of dual class firms and the 
Q ratio of matching single class concentrated control firms. Excess CEO tenure is computed as the 
difference in tenure for dual class CEOs and their matching counterparts in single class firms. 
IACEO tenure is computed as the difference between tenure of dual class CEOs and the average 
industry CEO tenure. Excess E-index is the difference between the E-index value of dual class firms 
and matching single class firms. In constructing the excess G-index, I subtract the E-index value for 
each firm from the G-index value and then take the difference between dual class firms' G-index and 
matching single class firms' G-index. lADirectors' tenure is computed as the median tenure per 
director less the median industry tenure per director. Perdum 1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if dual 
firms' previous 3-year average ROA is less than the ROA of matching single class firms. (Perdum2 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's 3-year ROA is less than the 3-year industry average 
ROA. The numbers below the estimated coefficients are t-statistics, with ****** being significant 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) £5) 
Perdum 1 x Excess CEO Tenure -0.035 
-3.61*** 
Excess CEO Tenure 0.008 
1.51 
Perdum 1 -0.08 
-0.58 
Perdum2 x IACEO Tenure -0.019 
-2.02** 
IACEO Tenure -0.009 
-1.79* 
Perdum2 0.003 
0.02 
Perdum2 x Excess CEO Tenure -0.016 
-1.79* 
Excess CEO Tenure -0.001 
-0.21 
Perdum2 -0.135 
-1.01 
Perdum 1 x Excess E-index 0.004 
0.08 
Excess E-index -0.063 
-1.53 
Excess G-index 0.051 
1.92* 
Perdum 1 -0.107 
-0.87 
Perduml*lADirectors'Tenure -0.084 
-4.05*** 
lADirectors' Tenure 0.005 
0.32 
Perduml -0.001 
-0.01 
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Table 4: Cont'd 
Excess Compensation 
Mgmt. Vote x Excess Cash 
Mgmt. Vote 
Excess Cash 
Financial Leverage 
Conversion Rights 
Size 
Dividend Difference 
CEO Chairman Duality 
Intercept 
Industry and Year effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
(1) 
-0.211 
-3 10*** 
-0.288 
-1.79* 
-0.11 
-3.46*** 
0.787 
0.99 
-0.043 
-1.16 
-0.278 
-1.81* 
0.152 
2 n*** 
-0.315 
-1.27 
0.162 
1.26 
-0.773 
-1.73* 
Yes 
0.211 
792 
(2) 
-0.236 
-3.44*** 
-0.295 
-1.89* 
-0.109 
-3.44*** 
0.795 
0.98 
-0.053 
-1.44 
-0.268 
-1.75* 
0.13 
2.68*** 
-0.339 
-1.35 
0.14 
1.09 
-0.576 
-1.28 
Yes 
0.236 
792 
(3) 
-0.233 
-3 43*** 
-0.304 
-1.93* 
-0.113 
-3 47*** 
0.842 
1.05 
-0.045 
-1.21 
-0.284 
-1.84* 
0.144 
2 95*** 
-0.313 
-1.24 
0.142 
1.10 
-0.682 
-1.50 
Yes 
0.229 
792 
(4) 
-0.233 
-3 41*** 
-0.264 
_] 99** 
-0.119 
-3 75*** 
0.770 
0.95 
-0.091 
-3 24*** 
-0.269 
-1.73* 
0.134 
9 7Q*** 
-0.227 
-0.91 
0.13 
1.04 
-0.733 
-1.71* 
Yes 
0.276 
792 
(5) 
-0.221 
-3.28** 
-0.268 
-1.87* 
-0.111 
-3.61** 
0.802 
0.98 
-0.079 
-2.87** 
-0.206 
-1.39 
0.123 
2.55** 
-0.273 
-1.10 
0.089 
0.71 
-0.533 
-1.20 
Yes 
0.290 
792 
187 
Table 5: Effects of entrenchment on discount dual class Q ratio versus the industry 
conditional on past performance 
The dependent variable is computed as the difference between the Q ratio of dual class firms and 
industry average Q ratio. Excess CEO tenure is the difference in tenure for dual class CEOs and their 
matching counterparts in single class firms. IACEO tenure is the difference between tenure of dual 
class CEOs and the average industry CEO tenure. Excess E-index is the difference between the E-
index value of dual class firms and matching single class firms. In constructing the excess G-index, I 
subtract the E-index value for each firm from the G-index value and then take the difference between 
dual class firms' G-index and matching single class firms' G-index. IADirectors' tenure is computed 
as the median tenure per director less the median industry tenure per director. Perduml is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if dual firms' previous 3-year average ROA is less than the ROA of matching 
single class firms. Perdum2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's 3-year ROA is less than the 
3-year industry average ROA. The numbers below the estimated coefficients are t-statistics, with 
***, **, * being significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Perduml x Excess CEO Tenure -0.033 
-3 57*** 
Excess CEO Tenure 0.018 
2.47** 
Perduml 0.089 
0.63 
Perdum2 x IACEO Tenure -0.006 
-0.73 
IACEO Tenure 0.001 
-0.01 
Perdum2 0.074 
0.51 
Perdum2 x Excess CEO Tenure -0.024 
-2 90*** 
Excess CEO Tenure 0.012 
1.95* 
Perdum2 0.052 
0.37 
Perdum 1 x Excess E-index -0.147 
-3.06*** 
Excess E-index -0.102 
-2 89*** 
Excess G-index 0.022 
0.99 
Perduml 0.117 
0.85 
Perduml x IADirectors'Tenure -0.093 
.531 *** 
IADirectors' Tenure 0.039 
2.66*** 
Perduml 0.117 
0.88 
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Table 5 Cont'd 
Excess Compensation 
Mgmt Vote x Excess Cash 
Mgmt Vote 
Excess Cash 
Financial Leverage 
Conversion Rights 
Size 
Dividend Difference 
CEO Chairman Duality 
Intercept 
Industry and Year effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs 
(1) 
-0 139 
-2 07** 
-0 321 
-194* 
-0 033 
-1 69* 
0 973 
121 
-0 034 
-0 86 
-0 208 
-170* 
0218 
4 i i *** 
0 578 
3 08*** 
0 048 
0 43 
-1492 
-3 72*** 
Yes 
0 107 
792 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
-0 150 
-2 18** 
-0 325 
-1 96** 
-0 037 
.j 99** 
1 006 
125 
-0 04 
-102 
-0 206 
-1 64 
0 205 
"2 * 7 0 * * * 
0 571 
3 05*** 
0 035 
031 
-1353 
-3 34*** 
Yes 
0 091 
792 
-0 149 
-2 18** 
-0 349 
_1 97** 
-0 037 
-2 03** 
1 052 
131 
-0 037 
-0 95 
-0 221 
-1 78* 
0 206 
3 92*** 
0 59 
3 15*** 
0 03 
0 27 
-1 366 
-3 45*** 
Yes 
0 100 
792 
-0 135 
_1 97** 
-0 319 
-1 30 
-0 038 
.] 97** 
0 958 
1 17 
-0 059 
-2 36** 
-0 183 
-1 50 
0 206 
4 j j * * * 
0 529 
9 77*** 
0 059 
0 55 
-1 452 
-4 04*** 
Yes 
0 109 
792 
-0 140 
-6 38*** 
-0 278 
-1 78* 
-0 022 
-0 71 
0 859 
135 
-0 056 
-2 33** 
-0 155 
-1 34 
0218 
4 4]*** 
0 422 
234** 
0 023 
0 22 
-1 502 
-3 96*** 
Yes 
0 168 
792 
189 
Table 6: Entrenchment effect on dual class discount for a sub-sample of firms with 
controlling shareholders-executives 
The dependent variable is computed as the difference between the Q ratio of dual class firms and the 
Q ratio of matching single class concentrated control firms. Excess CEO tenure is the difference in 
tenure for dual class CEOs and their matching counterparts in single class firms. IACEO tenure is 
the difference between tenure of dual class CEOs and the average industry CEO tenure. Excess E-
index is the difference between the E-index value of dual class firms and matching single class firms. 
In constructing the excess G-index, I subtract the E-index value for each firm from the G-index value 
and then take the difference between dual class firms' G-index and matching single class firms' G-
index. IADirectors' tenure is computed as the median tenure per director less the median industry 
tenure per director. Perduml is a dummy variable equal to 1 if dual firms' previous 3-year average 
ROA is less than the ROA of matching single class firms. (Perdum2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the firm's 3-year ROA is less than the 3-year industry average ROA. The numbers below the 
estimated coefficients are t-statistics, with ****** being significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Perdumlx Excess CEO Tenure -0.033 
-3 03*** 
Excess CEO Tenure 0.011 
1.46 
Perduml 0.123 
0.55 
Perdum2 x IACEO Tenure -0.015 
-2.13** 
IACEO Tenure -0.010 
-0.59 
Perdum2 0.159 
0.55 
Perdum2 x Excess CEO Tenure -0.021 
-2.28** 
Excess CEO Tenure 0.006 
0.68 
Perdum2 0.058 
0.27 
Perdumlx Excess E-index 0.025 
0.35 
Excess E-index -0.10 
-1.73* 
Excess G-index 0.045 
0.92 
Perduml -0.029 
-0.15 
Perduml x IADirectors'Tenure -0.103 
-3.88*** 
IADirectors' Tenure 0.002 
0.09 
Perduml 0.201 
0.91 
190 
Table 6 Cont'd 
Excess Compensation 
Mgmt. Vote x Excess Cash 
Mgmt. Vote 
Excess Cash 
Financial Leverage 
Conversion Rights 
Size 
Dividend Difference 
CEO Chairman Duality 
Intercept 
Industry and Year effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
(1) 
-0.238 
-2.58** 
0.089 
0.27 
-0.049 
. ] gg** 
-0.456 
-0.45 
-0.035 
-0.71 
-0.161 
-0.71 
0.293 
4 79*** 
-0.901 
-1.98** 
-0.070 
-0.402 
-1.94 
-3 35*** 
Yes 
0.102 
486 
(2) 
-0.133 
-1.31 
0.043 
0.13 
-0.049 
-1.88* 
-0.307 
-0.32 
-0.063 
-1.23 
-0.161 
-0.73 
0.250 
3 96*** 
-0.865 
-1.94* 
-0.119 
-0.69 
-1.477 
-2.54** 
Yes 
0.106 
486 
(3) 
-0.264 
-2.86*** 
0.069 
0.21 
-0.062 
-1.40 
-0.401 
-0.4 
-0.03 
-0.61 
-0.172 
-0.75 
0.281 
4.62*** 
-0.851 
-1.86* 
-0.105 
-0.61 
-1.804 
-3 07*** 
Yes 
0.120 
486 
(4) 
-0.245 
-2.54** 
-0.006 
-0.02 
-0.065 
-2.38** 
-0.196 
-0.19 
-0.048 
-0.96 
-0.267 
-1.05 
0.289 
4.58*** 
-0.732 
-1.74* 
-0.086 
-0.51 
-1.889 
-3 18*** 
Yes 
0.103 
486 
(5) 
-0.137 
-1.42 
-0.024 
-0.07 
-0.073 
-2.63*** 
-0.076 
-0.08 
-0.051 
-1.12 
-0.152 
-0.67 
0.281 
4 4g*** 
-0.876 
-2.02** 
-0.168 
-0.99 
-1.566 
-2.61*** 
Yes 
0.113 
486 
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Table 7: Entrenchment effect on dual class discount for a sub-sample of firms with 
non-controlling shareholders-executives 
The dependent variable is computed as the difference between the Q ratio of dual class firms and the 
Q ratio of matching single class concentrated control firms. Excess CEO tenure is the difference in 
tenure for dual class CEOs and their matching counterparts in single class firms IACEO tenure is 
the difference between tenure of dual class CEOs and the average industry CEO tenure Excess E-
index is the difference between the E-index value of dual class firms and matching single class firms 
In constructing the excess G-index, I subtract the E-index value for each firm from the G-index value 
and then take the difference between dual class firms' G-index and matching single class firms' G-
mdex. IADirectors' tenure is computed as the median tenure per director less the median industry 
tenure per director. Perduml is a dummy variable equal to 1 if dual firms' previous 3-year average 
ROA is less than the ROA of matching single class firms. (Perdum2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the firm's 3-year ROA is less than the 3-year industry average ROA. The numbers below the 
estimated coefficients are t-statistics, with ***5**5* being significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Perdum 1 x Excess CEO Tenure -0 024 
-1 51 
Excess CEO Tenure 0 002 
0 02 
Perduml -0 014 
-0 06 
Perdum2 x IACEO Tenure -0 055 
-3 57*** 
IACEO Tenure 0 005 
0 52 
Perdum2 0161 
0 79 
Perdum2 x Excess CEO Tenure 0 021 
1 33 
Excess CEO Tenure -0 022 
-2 10** 
Perdum2 -0 148 
-0 69 
Perdum 1 x Excess E-index -0 046 
-0 55 
Excess E-index 0 021 
0 36 
Excess G-index 0 009 
0 26 
Perduml -0 046 
-0 22 
Perdumlx IADirectors' Tenure -0 059 
-2 08** 
IADirectors' Tenure -0 038 
-1 28 
Perduml -0 006 
-0 03 
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Table 7 Cont'd 
Excess Compensation 
Mgmt. Vote x Excess Cash 
Mgmt. Vote 
Excess Cash 
Financial Leverage 
Conversion Rights 
Size 
Dividend Difference 
CEO Chairman Duality 
Intercept 
Industry and Year effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
(1) 
-0.275 
-2.88*** 
-0.684 
-2.41** 
-0.078 
-3.08*** 
2.467 
2.64*** 
-0.042 
-0.66 
0.167 
0.82 
0.158 
2.31** 
0.215 
0.75 
0.514 
3.16*** 
-0.6252 
-1.04 
Yes 
0.203 
306 
(2) 
-0.368 
-3 45*** 
-0.695 
-2.62*** 
-0.078 
-3.46*** 
2.344 
2.56** 
-0.034 
-0.58 
0.166 
0.83 
0.137 
1.98** 
0.223 
0.71 
0.569 
3 45*** 
-0.458 
-0.75 
Yes 
0.224 
306 
(3) 
-0.295 
-3.02*** 
-0.641 
-2.54** 
-0.156 
-3 58*** 
2.326 
2.63*** 
-0.019 
-0.30 
0.165 
0.81 
0.160 
2.30** 
0.093 
0.34 
0.483 
2 Q ] * * * 
-0.407 
-0.64 
Yes 
0.205 
306 
(4) 
-0.285 
-2.92*** 
-0.695 
-2.48** 
-0.088 
-3 54*** 
2.435 
9 <jQ*** 
-0.013 
-0.20 
0.169 
0.82 
0.152 
2.19** 
0.258 
0.89 
0.515 
2 14*** 
-0.565 
-0.91 
Yes 
0.194 
306 
(5) 
-0.360 
-3 37*** 
-0.641 
-2.47** 
-0.087 
- 3 R ^ * * * 
2.194 
2.50** 
-0.048 
-0.69 
0.234 
1.16 
0.128 
1 07** 
0.422 
1.44 
0.439 
2.64*** 
-0.233 
-0.40 
Yes 
0.224 
306 
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Table 8: Effects of predicted entrenchment on dual class discount conditional on past 
performance 
The dependent variable in models (l)-(3) is computed as the difference between the Q ratio of dual 
class firms and the Q ratio of matching single class concentrated control firms and the dependent 
variable in models (4)-(6) is the difference between the Q ratio of dual class firms and industry 
average Q ratio. Predicted Excess CEO Tenure is the difference in predicted tenure for dual class 
CEOs and their matching counterparts in single class firms. Predicted IACEO tenure is predicted 
industry adjusted tenure of dual class CEOs. Predicted IADirectors' tenure is the predicted median 
industry adjusted tenure per director. Perdum is a dummy variable equal to 1 if dual firms' previous 
3-year average ROA is less than the ROA of matching single class firms. The numbers below the 
estimated coefficients are t-statistics, with ***, **, * being significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Perdum x Predicted 
Excess CEO Tenure 
Predicted Excess CEO 
Tenure 
Perdum 
Perdum x Predicted 
IACEO Tenure 
Predicted IACEO Tenure 
Perdum 
Perdum x Predicted 
IADirectors' Tenure 
Predicted IADirectors' 
Tenure 
Perdum 
Excess Compensation 
Mgmt. Vote x Excess 
Cash 
Mgmt. Vote 
Excess Cash 
Financial Leverage 
Conversion Rights 
(1) 
-0.136 
-5 70*** 
0.094 
9 Q g * * * 
0.015 
0.12 
-0.186 
-2 70*** 
-0.275 
-1.98** 
-0.133 
-3 96*** 
0.641 
0.83 
-0.039 
-1.10 
-0.323 
-2.09** 
(2) 
-0.105 
-6 13*** 
0.044 
1.15 
0.065 
0.49 
-0.183 
-2.64*** 
-0.261 
-1.81* 
-0.117 
-3.46*** 
0.623 
0.80 
-0.029 
-0.82 
-0.323 
-2.14** 
(3) 
-0.497 
_5 97*** 
-0.524 
-1.16 
0.057 
0.41 
-0.198 
-2.82*** 
-0.223 
1 Q Q * * 
-0.170 
-3 79*** 
0.53 
0.66 
-0.025 
-0.72 
-0.296 
-2.02** 
(4) 
-0.100 
-5 32*** 
0.059 
2.23** 
0.123 
0.93 
-0.384 
-5 95*** 
-0.266 
-2.35** 
-0.035 
-1.01 
0.72 
1.14 
-0.026 
-0.72 
-0.194 
-1.66* 
(5) 
-0.073 
-5.80*** 
0.088 
2.61*** 
0.12 
0.92 
-0.382 
-5 89*** 
-0.268 
-2.37** 
-0.054 
-1.55 
0.703 
1.12 
-0.027 
-0.75 
-0.220 
-1.89* 
(6) 
-0.381 
-6.23*** 
0.960 
2.57** 
0.149 
1.13 
-0.376 
-5.82*** 
-0.303 
_| 07** 
0.014 
0.37 
0.826 
1.29 
-0.026 
-0.75 
-0.226 
-1.91* 
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Table 8 Cont'd 
Size 
Dividend Difference 
CEO Chairman Duality 
Intercept 
Industry and Year effects 
Adjusted R2 
Obs. 
(1) 
0.155 
o 2 ^ * * * 
-0.419 
-1.71* 
0.165 
1.30 
-0.95 
-2.12** 
Yes 
0.112 
792 
(2) 
0.148 
3.01*** 
-0.43 
-1.76* 
0.154 
1.21 
-0.744 
-1.60 
Yes 
0.124 
792 
(3) 
0.144 
2 Qg*** 
-0.44 
-1.83* 
0.148 
1.17 
0.733 
0.68 
Yes 
0.128 
792 
(4) 
0.228 
4.58*** 
0.304 
1.69* 
0.062 
0.59 
-1.613 
-4.04*** 
Yes 
0.163 
792 
(5) 
0.217 
4 4]*** 
0.306 
1.72* 
0.06 
0.57 
-1.849 
-4 ] ? * * * 
Yes 
0.169 
792 
(6) 
0.225 
4.58*** 
0.343 
1.87* 
0.057 
0.55 
-3.022 
-3.60*** 
Yes 
0.173 
792 
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Chapter 5 
Contributions and Conclusions 
This dissertation makes several contributions to the finance and corporate 
governance literature. The first essay adds to several streams of literature. First, it 
contributes to the ownership and executive compensation literature by presenting evidence 
in support of the extraction of private benefits of control hypothesis. Second, the research 
contributes to the study of family companies by presenting evidence that all family 
executives, not family CEOs alone, receive higher compensation. Finally, this research helps 
to explain why dual class companies sell at a discount compared to single class companies. 
In the first essay, I investigate the salient agency problems associated with 
concentrated control and the extraction of private benefits. I propose three channels- excess 
compensation, excess cash holdings and excess capital expenditure- through which private 
benefits can be extracted and relate these channels to the documented dual class discount. I 
provide evidence of two channels through which controlling shareholders can extract private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. I show that excess compensation and 
excess cash holdings result in a larger discount of dual class firms relative to a matching 
group of single class companies with concentrated control. This excess compensation is 
greatest when executives are family members of the controlling shareholder. The evidence is 
consistent with family members extracting perquisite consumption at the expense of 
minority shareholders. 
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The second essay examines the relationship between concentrated control and 
dividend policy. I proposed three explanations- extraction of private benefits, managerial 
reputation and family legacy- for dividend policy in firms with concentrated control. I 
provide evidence that, even in the U.S. with its stringent investor protection, controlling 
shareholders of dual class firms are extracting private benefits and hence, instituting a lower 
payout policy. Controlling shareholders of dual class firms, because they control the firm 
with votes rather than equity, receive only a small fraction of the corporate distribution. 
However, they can extract full benefits from assets retained within the firm. The results of 
the second essay complement the findings of the first essay. This essay adds to our 
understanding of dual class share structure and why investors value these firms lower than 
similar single class companies. 
Private benefits and the agency costs of dual class share structure are not always 
tangible. Dual class ownership structure can allow managers to remain on the job even when 
the company is performing poorly relative to its peers. Therefore, managerial entrenchment 
is a form of private benefit flowing from dual class share structure. In essay 3,1 contribute to 
the corporate governance and finance literature by investigating the relationship between the 
documented dual class discount and entrenchment. Dual class share structure is an effective 
anti-takeover defense mechanism that can render the market for corporate control 
ineffective. Hence, managers of dual class firms can become entrenched. Investors are likely 
to apply a greater discount to the value of dual class firms which appear to have a higher 
degree of managerial entrenchment. Using several proxies for entrenchment, I show that 
dual class firms with poor past performance and a greater degree of managerial 
entrenchment have a larger discount. 
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In summary, this research contributes to the corporate governance and finance 
literature by providing evidence that dual class share structure allows controlling 
shareholders and their family members to extract private benefits at the expense of outside 
shareholders, institute lower dividend policy which benefits themselves and allow managers 
to become entrenched. Investors are aware of the perquisite consumption flowing from 
control established by dual class share structure and hence, discount the value of dual class 
firms. 
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